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Abstract
This thesis examines the role of Britain's Special Operations Executive (SOE) in the
evolution of British policy towards wartime resistance in Axis-occupied Albania and
Kosovo. It shows how and why Britain came to support communist elements of the
Albanian resistance to the extent that it did, and challenges a theory that holds British
communists and leftists at SOE headquarters responsible for effecting that support.
The principal sources for this study are former SOE personnel, recently
declassified SOE files and other hitherto untapped records. Together they illuminate
SOE's operating methods and influence on policy-makers to a greater extent than
existing literature on the subject. They suggest that attempts may have been made
inside SOE headquarters to manipulate the flow of information from the field to
higher authority. Yet they confirm, too, that the conduct and politics of SOE staff
officers had little effect on policy. The key decisions that favoured the Albanian
communists were taken above the heads of SOE and to meet short-term strategic
requirements and were based on an accurate assessment of the military situation on
the ground.
This thesis contends that Britain's support for Albania's communists is best
understood when placed in the broader context of Allied wartime strategy and British
foreign policy. From 1940, the course and direction of SOE operations in Albania
were fashioned by military requirements and constrained by the priorities of British
diplomats. These factors helped ensure that, once committed to working with the
Albanian resistance, Britain never pursued anything other than an impartial policy of
arming all Albanians, regardless of their politics, who were genuinely engaged in
action against the Axis. The communist-led 'Partisans' received the bulk of British
support because few other Albanians, despite prolonged efforts by SOE to persuade
them to come out to fight, proved willing or able to put up resistance.
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(J. Amery, Sons ofthe Eagle)
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Introduction
The causes and consequences of several of the activities of Britain's Special
Operations Executive (SOE), the secret organisation set up in the summer of 1940 to
carry out sabotage and support resistance in Axis-occupied Europe, are the subject of
considerable debate among historians and one-time participants. This study re¬
examines one area of controversy in the light of recently declassified SOE files and a
range of other sources. Clarifying SOE's operating methods and influence on higher
authority, it explores the organisation's role in the evolution of British policy in
wartime Albania and Kosovo. It seeks to show how and why Britain came to support
communist elements of the Albanian resistance to the extent that it did, and challenges
a theory that holds British communists and leftists at SOE headquarters responsible
for effecting that policy.1
Between April 1943 and late 1944, SOE despatched to Albania by air and sea
nearly sixty British liaison officers and twice that number of Other Ranks. The latter
worked as paramilitary specialists or operated the wireless telegraphy (w/t) sets that
allowed officers to report to SOE headquarters, receive direction and call in drops and
shipments of arms and ammunition. Spread out across Albania in individual missions,
these men encouraged and armed groups of local guerillas until the Germans
withdrew, in line with their general retreat from the Balkans, at the end of 1944. By
then the resistance was fragmented along political and ideological lines, a brief civil
war was coming to an end and the communist-led 'Partisans' had established control
over most of the country.
For Albania's million inhabitants, the effect of the communist rise to power
was profound and long lasting. The traditional social elite was one of regional, local
and tribal chiefs, mostly in the highlands and mountains of the north, and ofmerchants
and landed individuals in the towns and in the south. It was quickly consigned to the
past. King Zog, a chief who had crowned himself Albania's first monarch in 1924,
had fled the country when Italian forces invaded in 1939. Of the pre-war leaders that
stayed behind, most survived Albania's occupation by the Axis. By 1945, however,
they found themselves liquidated or imprisoned or otherwise stripped of their assets
and influence by the communists. Albania endured a ruthless communist dictatorship
for the next forty-five years. At its head for four decades was Enver Hoxha, the former
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schoolteacher who helped found the Communist Party of Albania in 1941 and
commanded the Albanian Partisans throughout the war.
No Allied power had been involved more deeply than Britain in supporting the
wartime Albanian resistance. A 1942 agreement over global spheres of influence had
given Britain primacy over the United States in operations in the occupied Balkans.
Thus, while a handful of officers and men of the American Office of Strategic
Services (OSS) were infiltrated into Albania in 1943-44 to collect intelligence, the
United States had no active role in arming Albanians or any ability to decide which
ones to support. No such agreement existed with the Soviet Union, but the only
mission - a single officer - that the Soviets sent to Albania before 1945 arrived too
late to help the resistance. No Soviet supplies were sent in and no other Soviet troops
entered the country before the Germans left.
In post-war memoirs, several former SOE officers argue that British policy¬
makers had erred in backing the Albanian Partisans as extensively as they did. By
arming the Partisans to the exclusion of other groups, the memoirists claim, British
policy helped the communists seize power. This argument began to emerge in Julian
Amery's memoir Sons of the Eagle, published in 1948. Son of the then Secretary of
State for India and a future Conservative MP and minister himself, Amery had
parachuted into Albania in the spring of 1944 with a mission led by Lieutenant
Colonel Billy McLean. The mission had been sent to persuade certain 'nationalists'
(the term commonly applied by SOE to non-communist groups) in northern Albania to
come out to fight the Germans. In Sons ofthe Eagle, Amery recounts how the mission
made a particular effort with Abas Kupi, a chief who proclaimed loyalty to the exiled
King Zog, and describes at length how Kupi fought a few actions but was pre¬
occupied primarily by the growing communist threat. Amery also makes clear his
mission's disappointment with the way British policy in Albania developed in 1944.
He argues that the Partisans received excessive supplies of arms and ammunition,
while policy-makers never accorded Kupi and leaders like him the sympathy and
support they deserved. Britain's treatment of the nationalists, Amery writes, was
dishonourable and wrong, for 'we knew that to support only the Partisans was to
surrender Albania to the Russians. They were our allies; but this surrender was none
the less a defeat for the British Empire, and the cause of it lay in some defect either of
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understanding on the part of our statesmen or of vital strength in the imperial body
politic'.2
Other former SOE officers who had worked in wartime Albania echo Amery's
sentiments in their own subsequent memoirs. In No Colours or Crest, for example,
published in 1958, Peter Kemp describes Albania as 'a totally unnecessary sacrifice to
Soviet imperialism. It was British initiative, British arms and money that nurtured
Albanian resistance in 1943; just as it was British policy in 1944 that surrendered to a
•2
hostile power, our influence, our honour and our friends'. In Albanian Assignment,
published in 1984, David Smiley claims that the decision to drop more arms to the
Partisans had been the crucial factor in bringing them to power. Writing a year before
Hoxha's death and six before Albania finally threw off communism, Smiley
concludes: 'Had British aid gone the other way, Albania would be a pro-western
democracy today'.4
To help explain why policy took the course that it did, some authors turn to
one of the most contentious themes in SOE's history: that of mismanagement at its
overseas headquarters in Cairo and the Italian port of Bari. First expressed in memoirs
and widely reprinted since, this is the idea that certain SOE staff officers, with strong
leftwing and communist sympathies, deliberately undermined the efforts of SOE
missions working with Balkan nationalists. These officers are held to have
manipulated policy, by massaging reports from the field before passing them on to
higher authority, for example, to ensure that Yugoslav and Albanian communists
received greater recognition and support than nationalist groups.5 David Smiley
alleges that staff officers in Bari suppressed messages from Albania addressed
personally to Anthony Eden, the Foreign Secretary.6 Alexander Glen, a Royal Navy
intelligence officer who worked in Albania in 1943-44, goes further. 'Loyal'
Albanians like Abas Kupi were unnecessarily 'defeated and some... betrayed' he
writes. 'Kim Philby already had his colleagues well enough placed in some of the
organisations concerned'.
No hard evidence to support or dispute such charges is put forward by these
authors. Yet speculation that some staff officers may have been Soviet agents is
reproduced as fact even by one of SOE's official historians, Professor M.R.D. Foot. In
SOE, a popular history first published in 1984, Foot reasserts several claims found in
earlier memoirs, including speculation over the possible impact on policy-making of
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the death in 1944 of Major Philip Leake, the well-regarded Head of SOE's Albanian
Section. Foot writes of SOE's record in Albania:
What happened can be put brutally briefly. There were several
missions to the northern Albanians, which took up with such local
chieftans as Abas Kupi... There were several more missions to the
southern Albanians, who were dragooned strictly under the
command ofEnver Hoxha, leader of the communist party...
Repeated promises of arms were made to the north; practically
none came through. To the south considerable quantities of arms
were sent, which were used to dispose of all the bands the
southerners could catch in the north... When the Germans pulled
out - unattacked - the southern communists seized... power...
Why this was done will not be known until SOE's papers are
released; and might not be clear even then. It can hardly have been
by the wish of local SOE commanders, let alone by the wish of Lord
Selborne [SOE's Minister] or of [Major-General Colin] Gubbins
[SOE's Chief]; nor by the wish of... Philip Leake, who insisted on
going into Albania on operations and was soon thereafter killed.
Clearly suspecting staff officers in Bari of excessive influence, Foot adds of Leake:
o
'He had been head of the Albanian section; who succeeded him?' In an article in the
Journal ofContemporary Histoiy, Foot even wonders about the possible influence of
James Klugmann, a communist officer on the staff of SOE's Yugoslav Section, 'on
the complexities of SOE's policies in Albania'. He points again to the 'lavish
promises to two divergent resistance groups, the communist one of which was
provided with warlike stores used to destroy the other, which got nothing'.9 Foot is not
alone in his negative assessment of SOE's work in Albania. 'Failure here was
complete' writes historian Henri Michel, for example, in another popular tome, The
Shadow War}0
The claim that Albania fell to communism by default was never seriously
challenged in print until the 1990s. Then, former SOE officer and diplomat Sir
Reginald Hibbert and historian Bernd Fischer presented separate, fresh studies of
Albania's wartime history. Hibbert had spent ten months in Albania with SOE in
1943-44; he ended his post-war career as British Ambassador in Paris. Retirement,
and the declassification of wartime War and Foreign Office archives, allowed him to
publish the first detailed account by a former SOE officer to argue the case for
supporting the Albanian Partisans. Both Hibbert and Fischer, who had also identified a
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need to revise earlier interpretations of British involvement and policy in wartime
Albania, allow that the Partisans turned some of the weapons supplied by the British
against their domestic enemies. They also agree that, though the weapons and warlike
stores captured from the Axis by the Partisans were far more numerous than those
supplied by the British, the arms, funds and training provided by SOE proved valuable
to the early organisation of the Partisans in the summer of 1943. After Italy's
surrender that autumn, that support also bolstered the Partisans' ability to survive joint
German and nationalist attacks during the winter of 1943-44. But both authors analyse
in detail the dynamics ofAlbanian society and politics and the circumstances imposed
on the country by Italy and Germany, and show convincingly that British policy had
not handed Albania to the communists.11
More decisive in assisting the communists to power, argue Hibbert and
Fischer, were the conditions that made any group other than the Partisans ill disposed
and ill suited to waging sustained resistance to the Italians and Germans. It was no
accident that the Communist Party of Albania, which was tiny in size and unsteady in
ideology but guided by skilled emissaries from the Communist Party of Yugoslavia,
was able to take the lead in organising antifascist activity. It was true that a few
prominent non-communists for a time made common cause with the communists, but
most came to believe they had too much to lose by taking up arms against their
occupiers. The power and influence of Albania's traditional leaders rested principally
on the localised support of the individual tribes and communities from which they
came. Opening a campaign of any significance against a modern, mechanised
occupying army, and placing at risk the continued existence of those communities,
was not something to be considered lightly. 'They felt that they could only pursue
military operations as long as they could insure adequate protection for their society
from enemy reprisals' writes Fischer of Abas Kupi and other chiefs. 'Failure to insure
this protection would have led to the rejection of these leaders by their own society'.12
By 1944, writes Hibbert, 'nationalist chieftans knew that the destruction spread by the
Germans was threatening to spell the end of the social system by which the chieftans
existed. That was the fundamental reason for their failure to move against the
Germans: they could not contemplate the destruction which would ensue and which
would sweep them away'.13
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To further secure its interests, much of the old order felt compelled to turn to
the Axis camp for help in countering the communist threat. This was particularly the
case after German forces moved in to Albania on the heels of the Italian collapse.
While Mussolini had sought to absorb Albania into Italy's empire, the German
occupation was primarily a defensive move to safeguard Germany's Adriatic interests
and flank. From the start the Germans pursued a policy of divide-and-rule to minimise
resistance. To exploit the nationalists' fears, Albania's new occupiers went out of their
way to promote the war against the Partisans as one against communism. Few
elements of the traditional elite were aligned ideologically with Nazism; some were
clearly pro-Ally. But once offered a level of self-rule not experienced under the
Italians, and hoping to secure military assistance against the communists, significant
numbers and prominent individuals were quickly won over. A puppet government was
set up; soon nationalist and German forces were in action together against the
Partisans.
By collaborating outright or refusing to resist the Germans, Fischer writes, one
by one the nationalist leaders and groups 'lost political credibility' and were 'removed
from serious contention for power in the postwar setting'.14 The pressures that saw
those nationalists stay neutral or work with the Axis had allowed the communists to
hold out the Partisans as the only organisation in Albania that was genuinely,
unconditionally and patriotically antifascist. Propaganda spread by the communists
found it easy to exploit the nationalist position, especially when set against the
destruction spread in southern Albania by joint nationalist and German forces on anti-
Partisan operations. Eager to join the fight against the Germans and all 'traitors' and
attracted by promises of future change and reform, thousands of young, disaffected
Albanians joined the Partisans in the spring and summer of 1944. Few were convinced
communists, but they swelled the Partisan ranks and provided Enver Hoxha and his
lieutenants with the manpower and popular support with which to seize power. As
Flibbert concludes: '[i]t is very likely that the men and women of Albania became
deeply disillusioned with the brave new society from 1945 onwards, but there can be
no doubt about the popular enthusiasm for it for several months in the middle of 1944
throughout south Albania and in all the areas to which the Partisan units penetrated. A
revolutionary force was released in Albania in 1944 and that was the primary force
which swept Enver Hoxha to power'.15
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Hibbert and Fischer also argue that the alleged incompetence or treachery of
SOE staff officers did not lead British policy-makers astray. Since the 1970s, the
release of wartime Foreign and War Office files has enabled the record of British
policy-making in the Balkans to come under closer scrutiny than previously possible.
As Hibbert, Fischer and the historians Elisabeth Barker and David Stafford show from
work on these files, the key decisions that favoured the Albanian Partisans were taken
above the heads of SOE and to meet short-term strategic requirements.16 Neither the
Foreign Office nor the Chiefs of Staff nor any of the local commands that directed its
activities ever called on SOE to discriminate against resistors in Albania on the
grounds of politics or ideology. Until the end of the war, policy in Albania was always
impartial: provided he was committed to fighting Axis forces, any Albanian could be
supported with arms and ammunition. Hibbert and Fischer also argue that the
decisions taken in the Partisans' favour reflected the reality of the military situation on
the ground. The Partisans were the only Albanians fighting genuinely and
meaningfully against the Germans during the spring and summer of 1944. Moreover,
because the Partisans were the only ones capable of fighting that way, the policy of
supporting the Partisans to the exclusion of the nationalists should, on military
grounds, have been adopted much earlier. Hibbert and Fischer agree that the effort to
work with Abas Kupi in 1944 was doomed to fail and should never have been
attempted.
Indeed, Hibbert especially is scathing about what he terms the 'conspiracy
theory' propagated by Amery, Kemp et al. It is, he says, 'a myth, a fiction': an illusion
'invented' after the war to explain how and why Kupi and other nationalists came to
be defeated at the hands of Hoxha's communists. It not merely distorts the truth, he
feels, but wholly replaces it with unscrupulous and slanderous claims that for over
forty years went unchallenged. According to Hibbert, the writer Nicholas Bethell
relates the theory in 'its crudest form... recording what Billy McLean, Smiley, Amery
and Kemp have been prepared to say privately about fellow officers while themselves
remaining cautious about naming names in print'.17 In the opening chapter of The
Great Betrayal, his account of the joint CIA and MI6 effort of 1949-53 to destabilise
Hoxha's regime, Bethell describes McLean, Smiley, Amery and another SOE officer,
Alan Hare, as the 'four musketeers'. 'They did not share the general British wartime
reverence of Stalin and the great Soviet ally' Bethell writes in a brief survey of SOE's
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activities in wartime Albania. 'It was their duty, they felt, not only to fight Hitler's
Germany, but also to oppose the spread of communist doctrine with which they
expected to find themselves in conflict as soon as the war was won'. Bethell contrasts
the 'musketeers' to certain other SOE officers, who, he says, had supported the
Albanian Partisans on ideological grounds and had influence on policy. Those he
names include John Eyre and Eliot Watrous, both of whom worked on the
headquarters staff of SOE's Albanian Section, and Hibbert himself. 'It was left to the
"musketeers" and a handful of others... to form an anti-Stalinist minority in the
Balkan section of SOE, for which they found themselves labelled by the rest as "the
18*fascist spies'". Hibbert rejects completely this picture of an 'anti-Stalinist' bloc
inside SOE lined up against a pro-Stalinist or otherwise procommunist one. 'The
British officers who found themselves supporting a losing side ought not to feel it
necessary to launch vague charges of treachery in order to puff themselves up as
latter-day Leonidases bravely holding the pass with a tiny band against the hordes of
communism... Those who supported Kupi and the nationalists may wrap themselves
now in the cloak of anti-communism: it was not an item of British Army issue in
1944'.19
Hibbert suggests that the specific charge, leveled by the likes of Smiley and
Glen, that members of the SOE staff in Bari were actively hostile to officers working
with the nationalists is all part of the postwar illusion. 'I never heard any of them
described by fellow officers as "the fascist spies'" he writes. Hibbert himself was a
twenty-two-year-old lieutenant when SOE dropped him into Albania to work with the
guerillas in December 1943. He never worked on the SOE staff and describes himself
as 'politically unformed' at the time. He feels that Bethell vilifies him merely for
having been a junior member of a mission that worked with the Partisans, and for
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becoming 'uniquely articulate' in putting the case for supporting them.
Fischer is less dismissive of claims of 'sabotage' in Bari, which, he concedes,
'may have been true'.21 Yet neither he nor Hibbert addresses in any detail the
allegations made against the SOE staff. They do not clarify the mentalities, politics
and duties of individual staff officers. Nor do they illuminate the extent to which SOE
kept higher authority informed and up-to-date with developments in Albania as
reported by missions in the field. The result is that important questions about SOE's
influence and integrity remain unanswered. Did staff officers seek to undermine the
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efforts of missions attached to the nationalists? Were reports from those missions that
were meant for higher authority suppressed, as has been alleged? Were other reports
massaged to exaggerate Partisan claims to exclusive support? If so, why, and with
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what effect on policy?
This study seeks to examine these strands of the conspiracy theory more
closely and with reference to a variety of sources, including SOE's own Balkan files.
The records of the War and Foreign Offices, the Cabinet Office and Prime Minister's
Office illuminate the concerns and deliberations of policy-making bodies. SOE's
surviving records, which have been gradually released at the Public Record Office
from 1997, clarify SOE's interaction with those bodies and shed light for the first time
on the workings of its Albanian Section in Cairo and Bari. These files contain a wide
selection of previously unseen material. This material includes, for example, the
Section's day-to-day correspondence with superiors and other departments and
commands, copies of captured enemy documents, the texts of w/t messages sent to
and received from missions in the field and the debriefing reports of SOE officers
returned from working with the guerillas.
Work on these records has been supplemented by interviews and
correspondence with surviving SOE and OSS personnel and work on their papers,
diaries and, in several cases, unpublished memoirs. Personnel include officers and
administrators on the staff of SOE's Albanian Section and officers and NCOs attached
to Partisan and nationalist groups in the field. Additionally, the papers of individuals
who were involved in operations and policy-making but are now deceased have been
utilized. Some of the latter papers are held in public collections; family members have
provided others.
Through the results of this research, this study sets out to confirm the grounds
on which British policy was made. It explores whether those grounds reflected the
situation as experienced by officers in Albania and whether those officers' reports
were suppressed and policy manipulated at SOE's Headquarters. It will be shown here
that SOE retained input throughout the war into discussions among decision-makers
over which Albanians to support: it passed advice and reports from the field to
military commanders and other policy-makers, including the Foreign Office in
London. It will also be demonstrated that SOE's Albanian Section in Bari became
increasingly 'pro-Partisan' in its policy proposals to higher authority during the
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summer of 1944. This was the very period when staff officers are accused of
subverting the efforts of SOE missions attached to the nationalists. Indeed, the files
suggest that attempts may well have been made by staff officers in Bari to manipulate
the flow of information to decision-makers in London.
However, SOE's records also help confirm that the conduct of its Albanian
Section in 1944 had little effect on policy. A central contention of this thesis is that
SOE's operations in Albania are best understood when placed in the broader context
of Allied wartime strategy and British foreign policy. From the outset, the course and
direction of SOE's efforts were fashioned by military requirements and constrained by
the priorities of British diplomats. These factors helped ensure that, once committed to
working with the Albanian resistance, Britain never departed from an impartial policy
of promising support to all Albanians, regardless of their politics or ideology, who
were genuinely engaged in action against the Axis. A policy of arming any Albanian
on anything other than convincing military grounds was never likely to be
forthcoming. By the summer of 1944, the Partisans qualified incontrovertibly for arms
on those grounds and were the only Albanian group capable of continuing to inflict
substantial damage on the Germans.
The opening chapter to this thesis presents a fresh assessment of British plans
to foster resistance in Albania in 1940-41. Postwar accounts by officers involved in
the planning argue that their efforts were frustrated and foiled largely by obstacles
imposed unnecessarily by others: had more support been forthcoming from senior
British military commanders or the Germans not attacked Yugoslavia, they suggest,
greater success might have been had.23 These interpretations, however, exhibit
weaknesses common to published recollections of SOE's later Albanian operations in
1943-44. These weaknesses include an exaggerated belief in the ability of Albanian
nationalists to wage meaningful resistance, a lack of appreciation of wider British
strategic and diplomatic interests in the Balkans and a readiness to speculate rather too
freely about why Albanian nationalists received little British support.
Through a study of Margaret Hasluck, an ethnographer whom SOE recruited
in 1942 to work on new plans for Albania, Chapter Two confirms that concerns about
the political consequences of SOE's work in Albania were expressed by British
observers at the time. Hasluck had lived in Albania for twenty years before the war
and identified herself closely with the traditional order. SOE records and the
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recollections of former SOE officers suggest she was not well suited to the role SOE
intended her to fill, but did see clearly that the war created dilemmas that compelled
nationalists to move into the Axis camp. Illuminating how closely SOE's Albanian
operations were harnessed to Allied short-term strategy, this chapter seeks to show
why, despite Hasluck's unease, SOE continued to send arms to a movement it could
see was coming increasingly under communist domination.
Chapter Three throws fresh light on SOE's work in Kosovo and Britain's
handling of conflicting Albanian and Yugoslav claims to the province. Clarifying
some of the priorities that defined British policy in Albania in 1943-44, it re-examines
why the only mission sent to encourage resistance among Albanians in Kosovo was
withdrawn by SOE despite a promising start. Peter Kemp, the mission's commander,
claims in print that he was recalled by British policy-makers keen to appease Tito, the
communist leader of the Yugoslav Partisan movement. Tito, Kemp believes, had
demanded that the British sever contact with Albanian nationalists in Kosovo.24 Yet
SOE files suggest that Tito made no such demand. Kemp's withdrawal, it is argued
here, cannot be seen simply as a mark of Britain's growing political commitment to
Tito's Partisans. British diplomats had long given primacy to appeasing Yugoslav
claims to the province. That primacy, and a desire not to inflame the situation, goes a
long way to explaining why British policy-makers offered all Albanians only
impartial, non-conditional military help against the Germans. The fact that Kemp was
ever sent to Kosovo illustrates how a general lack of knowledge forced the British to
feel their way around wartime Albania and learn the priorities of Albanians -
including their wish for an Allied statement on Kosovo's future - by experience.
Indeed, it now seems his withdrawal was precipitated partly by his own alarming
reports of local tension.
Chapters Four and Five re-examine the postwar claim that a change in
leadership of SOE's Albanian Section in the summer of 1944 marked a turning point
in the Section's conduct. In June, Philip Leake was killed by enemy action on a brief
visit to missions in the field. Julian Amery and David Smiley suggest his death
crucially deprived their mission's efforts and the Albanian nationalists of a
sympathetic ear at SOE Headquarters. 'We had confidence in his judgement, which
we lacked in the other members of his staff Smiley writes; 'later events were to prove
9 S
how significant was his loss'.
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Chapter Four illuminates Leake's views in the months prior to his death. It
demonstrates that, in fact, Leake was much less impressed by the qualities and
fighting potential of nationalists like Kupi than Smiley and others imply. It also shows
that Leake was convinced that Britain should pursue an impartial policy of promising
support only to Albanians genuinely resisting. On the eve of his death, he was
similarly convinced that the Partisans, though evidently communist-led and set on
securing postwar power, deserved British support in their efforts against the Germans.
This chapter also suggests that Leake's assessment reflected an accurate analysis of
the military situation in the field.
Chapter Five addresses the claim that junior officers on the Albanian Section
staff, motivated to misbehave by an unwarranted sympathy for the communist cause,
influenced the pro-Partisan policy that emerged after Leake's death. It is shown here
that while some attempts to manipulate the flow of information to London from the
field may have occurred in the summer of 1944, they had no impact on policy. But
this chapter also seeks to advance a fresh framework for understanding the Section's
views and actions. Contemporary diaries and reports confirm that officers arriving in
Bari from working with Albanian nationalists recorded genuine concerns about the
conduct and mentalities of staff officers they found in the SOE office. The conspiracy
theorists, however, exaggerate the extent to which the Section operated without regard
both to its directives and to the reality of the situation in the field. By the summer of
1944, SOE staff officers in Bari possessed a more accurate picture of events in
Albania - one that fits well with recent scholarly assessments of the contrasting
capabilities of Partisans and nationalists - earlier than decision-makers in London
with whom it corresponded. The most likely explanation for the Section's apparent
attempts, for example, at delaying the onward transmission to London of certain
messages received from the field, is that staff officers were anxious to ensure that
higher authority possessed a similarly accurate picture of how best to maximise the
Albanian war effort.
The final chapter of this thesis explores the allegations leveled against Captain
John Eyre, the officer on the staff of SOE's Albanian Section who is held to have been
a communist and Soviet spy. Doubt is cast here on the likelihood that he worked
covertly for the Soviets or even tried to influence policy through deft subterfuge.
However, this chapter also seeks to underline the care that must be taken not to
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dismiss all the rumour and circumstantial evidence put forward by the conspiracy
theorists. A memoir Eyre wrote after the war and which has escaped the attention of
all other writers on SOE suggests he may well have been aligned ideologically with
the Partisan cause and prepared to manipulate policy in their favour. And with
reference to SOE and MI5 files that shed new light on similar charges long leveled
against certain other staff officers in SOE's Balkan Sections, this chapter highlights
the seriousness of those against Eyre. In the final analysis, Eyre's case underlines
further the isolation of officers in the field from the factors at work on policy; but it
also suggests that not all of those officers' concerns about Bari were a postwar
invention.
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Chapter One
Britain and Albanian resistance
1940-41
In the spring of 1940, Albania became the target of Britain's first attempt of the
Second World War to foster guerilla resistance in occupied southeast Europe. British
diplomats and intelligence officers began to lay plans for a revolt against the Italians
who had ruled the country since invading in April 1939. The climax of a year's covert
preparation came on an April night in 1941. From the safety of still-neutral
Yugoslavia, a party consisting of several dozen Albanians, one British officer and a
baggage-train of mules crossed the border and picked its way into the mountains of
northern Albania. 'It was April 7th, the second anniversary of Mussolini's invasion of
Albania, so at least we were doing our little bit to celebrate the day' the lone Briton,
SOE officer Dayrell Oakley-Hill, wrote later. 'Soon some firing started ahead of us...
and some bullets smacked past'.1 Within days, however, the party dispersed. No revolt
took place. Two years were to pass before British officers returned to Albania and
began working with the locals again.
Britons who took part in this initial period of planning maintain in post-war
memoirs that its ignominious end was unworthy of the venture's grand design. Their
efforts were brought to ruin, they say, only by the negative moral and material impact
of Germany's victorious sweep through the Balkans in the spring of 1941, or by the
failure of British military commanders in the theatre to accord the plans timely and
2 •
adequate support. The implication is that the essential concept of fostering resistance
among traditional leaders in northern Albania was sound.
This chapter re-examines this episode in the light of official records, many of
them released only recently, and privately held papers. It confirms that the plans
received only limited military and diplomatic backing. It also seeks to clarify and
emphasise the weight of the factors at play that ensured that that support was limited.
It is suggested here that those Britons who had laid plans for resistance in Albania in
1940-41 overstate in their memoirs the ability of Albanian tribesmen and chiefs to
have waged and sustained significant resistance. Indeed, since the necessary
preconditions for a successful revolt may never have been in place, it is possible that
the concept may have been fundamentally flawed as well as out of step with wider
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British strategy. To set this fresh examination ofwhy Britain failed to foster resistance
in Albania in 1940-41 in context, however, it is instructive first to clarify how the
plans came to be laid, what was hoped for from their successful execution and why,
according to the planners, they came to little.
The fact that serious planning for Albania began only in April 1940, seven
months into Britain's war with Germany, was deliberate. Desperate to avoid upsetting
or offending Mussolini or otherwise provoking him into a conflict they were not yet
prepared to fight, British strategists and statesmen had worked hard since the early
1930s to avoid driving him into Hitler's arms. When Britain and Italy concluded the
so-called Gentleman's Agreement in 1938, by which both countries agreed to respect
the status quo in the Mediterranean, Britain made little mention of Italy's activities in
Spain. When Mussolini effectively tore up the agreement with his invasion of Albania
the following year, Chamberlain's government made little objection. Certainly, British
intelligence officers, agents and code-breakers closely monitored Italian intentions and
continued to do so despite Italy's declaration of neutrality on the outbreak of the
European war in September 1939. But to maintain that neutrality for as long as
possible the Chiefs of Staff and War Cabinet maintained a strict ban on Britain's
military and intelligence services from preparing any counter-offensive or other anti-
Italian activity. The great fear was that, if they were discovered, such activities might
precipitate an Italian entry into the war on Germany's side with serious implications
for Britain's ability to defend itself and its host of worldwide commitments. 'On
Italy's inactivity depended... the free use of the Mediterranean and, it was believed,
the Red Sea for our shipping', J.R.M. Butler writes in his official history of Britain's
wartime strategy. 'An Italian attack against Egypt and the Canal from Libya would
also be a serious matter. For these reasons the British Government deliberately
avoided giving Italy provocation'.3 In October 1939 a new British Consul to Albania
was appointed, giving a degree of recognition to the Italian occupation. The same
month, the Deputy Chief of the Imperial General Staff told the War Cabinet that the
only plan for stirring up trouble for the Italians in Albania was to leave the task to
Turkey, which might encourage resistance through Albania's muslim population.4
An additional concern was to keep the war out of the Balkans for as long as
possible, which again reflected the weakness of Britain's strategic position. 'All the
countries in the Balkans, except Turkey, are liable to be over-run by the Germans...
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before we could do anything to help them' was the conclusion drawn by the Chiefs of
Staff on 18 September 1939. 'It would be preferable to have the whole of the Balkans
and Italy neutral'.5 In December, General Sir Edmund Ironside, Chief of the Imperial
General Staff, reminded the Chiefs that policy was still 'that we should not irritate
Italy... [and] should, if possible, prevent the war spreading to the Balkans'.6 Later that
month the British high command told their French opposite numbers that Britain was
'in complete agreement as to the importance of keeping ajar the door in South Eastern
Europe' but 'apprehensive of the consequences of opening* that door, and passing
through it, at the present time'. The British, the French were informed, remained
convinced that 'for the moment our activities should be confined to unostentatious
. n
preparations'.
Only in April 1940, with intelligence reports suggesting that conflict with Italy
was imminent, did the British Chiefs of Staff lift the ban on subversive planning.
Intercepted Italian signals revealed worrying 'evidence of unusual... movements' by
the Italian military and navy, while 'agents and visitors to Italy' told of widespread
preparations for war.8 In London orders were issued finally for 'preliminary steps' to
be taken to prepare for a war against Italy. On 27 March, the Commanders-in-Chief of
the Royal Navy were told that a large naval force might have to be assembled, at short
notice, in the Eastern Mediterranean. The Admiralty ordered ten submarines to leave
China and the East Indies for Europe at once.9 And on 6 April the Chiefs of Staff
approved a paper on British policy in the event of war with Italy.10 The paper
recommended that, although its forces and policy would have to be on the defensive
initially, Britain should then seek to 'render untenable the Italian position in Libya,
and eventually in East Africa." Before April was out, the Chiefs also recommended to
12the Cabinet that any Italian aggression in the Balkans must be resisted.
Official British records suggest that it was the growing uncertainty over Italian
intentions that led the British Chiefs of Staff to look to Albania as a potential field for
future operations. On 8 April, a year and a day since the Italian invasion of Albania,
Captain Tommy Davies of the War Office asked the Foreign Office for the
whereabouts of a Dr Malcolm Burr, 'last heard of working under the auspices of the
FO'. Davies explained that Burr was wanted to put together an 'up-to-date




for 'irregular activities in Italy or her colonies'.13 Tommy Davies worked for Military
Intelligence (Research), or MI(R), a small, secret department of the War Office
created in 1938 under Lieutenant Colonel Jo Holland to undertake sabotage and
promote guerilla warfare in enemy-occupied countries. Another of its tasks was to
conduct research into that kind of work and draft papers for planning and advisory
bodies like the Joint Planning Committee and Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC).
These, in turn, advised the Cabinet, the Chiefs of Staff and other decision-makers.
Most of MI(R)'s records are lost or unavailable and it is impossible to establish
precisely from its surviving files when and from where the demand for information on
Albania came, but it is likely that the appreciation Davies wanted from Burr was
destined for the JIC. Although Albania was never discussed explicitly at any JIC
meeting in 1939 or 1940, MI(R)'s working relationship with the JIC was close. Davies
and Holland often attended its meetings, and, as the in-house history of SOE confirms,
MI(R) 'had a large hand' in the spring and summer of 1940 in producing papers for
the JIC on the possibilities of subversive warfare in occupied territories.14
By the end of April 1940, MI(R) had been formally 'charged with the
preparation of plans for the carrying on of guerilla warfare in Albania'.15 As those
plans began to evolve, however, their form became dictated less by the character of
MI(R) than by that of Section D, an internal section of the Secret Intelligence Service
(SIS), which MI(R) enlisted to do its preliminary work. Section D, to quote from
M.R.D. Foot's official SOE history, had been set up in 1938 to 'investigate every
possibility of attacking potential enemies by means other than the operations of
military forces'.16 According to Section D's anonymous in-house historian, this was to
be achieved chiefly through establishing 'lines of communication for covert...
propaganda in Neutral countries' and by directing and harnessing 'the effects of the
17...
various anti-Nazi [sic] organisations working in Europe'. After discussions in
London between George Taylor, the head of Section D's Balkan Section, and
Lieutenant Colonel Jo Holland, head of MI(R), the two organisations agreed to co¬
operate in the preparation of guerilla resistance in Albania 'based upon those elements
in Albania and Yugoslavia and Greece who are still hostile to the Italian
1 R
occupation'. Since Italy was not yet in the war, Section D, as the organisation tasked
with working into still-neutral countries, duly took on the bulk of the preparation work
and the centre of planning on Albania shifted from London to Belgrade.
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Section D's other Balkan activities were being directed already by its field
office in Belgrade, and Taylor, an Australian businessman with long experience of the
Balkans, apparently knew of a community of Albanian exiles and emigres there.19 He
also had faith in the abilities of Julius Hanau, Section D's main representative in
Belgrade, a South African arms dealer who had lived in the Balkans since the end of
the First World War and had worked for Section D since June 1939.20 On 29 April
1940, in a letter that effectively constituted Hanau's directive, Taylor outlined the new
policy change towards Italy and stressed the 'most urgent' need for 'immediate
action... before the balloon goes up'. Section D, Taylor explained, would act 'as a sort
of Advance Guard' for MI(R) by establishing and exploiting anti-Italian contacts
specifically with a view to starting guerilla warfare inside Albania. It would seek out
Albanians willing to co-operate, send in warlike supplies across the Greek and
Yugoslav borders, extract intelligence and generally prepare the ground 'for military
action proper' by MI(R) if and when Italy entered the war. Taylor left to Hanau the
specifics of how to do all this.21 Although well acquainted with the murky worlds of
Balkan business and politics, however, Hanau knew little of Albania or Albanians and
had fewer contacts and assets than Taylor had hoped. He was also busy, indispensable
in his commanding role and too well known in Belgrade to be able to participate very
actively in the venture. Hanau was thus forced to enlist the help of junior members of
Section D and the British Legation staff. One of the latter was Julian Amery, son of
the wartime Secretary of State for India (and later himself a Conservative MP and
minister), who was working at that time as Assistant Press Attache.22 For the next
three months, Amery and other Section D men in Belgrade, none of whom had much
prior knowledge of Albania either, built contacts in Yugoslavia with Albanians who
had fled or been expelled from their country by the Italians or earlier by King Zog,
Albania's pre-war monarch.
In 1948, Amery produced the first published account of British plans to
encourage resistance in Albania in 1940-41. In Sons of the Eagle, he writes that
British planners in Belgrade felt the key to a successful revolt lay in harnessing the
support of Albanians in Kosovo, the southern Yugoslav province adjacent to northern
Albania. He describes how Section D accordingly established contact with the
powerful Kryeziu clan from the town of Gjakova in southern Kosovo, close to
Albania's mountainous northern border. The Kryezius had considerable influence and
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interests in Albania, which Section D thought ideal, Amery writes, for allowing it run
arms and agents from the relative safety of neutral Yugoslavia. Gani Bey Kryeziu, the
family's head and a former officer in the Yugoslav Army, was also highly regarded on
both sides of the border as a military and political leader. Indeed, the family was of a
rare breed ofKosovar Albanians that was respected and feted by the Yugoslavs, which
ensured a degree of further support from the Yugoslav authorities for Section D's
efforts. Impressed by Gani's influence and willingness to help, Section D placed him
and his family at the centre of its plans. The British sent wagons of corn over the
border to win friends, trafficked a few arms across and brought more emigres and
exiles on board. 'Thus, bit by bit', Amery writes, 'the ground was prepared for
revolt'.23
Since a good number of Section D's files survive, the work on Albania of its
Belgrade representatives is reasonably well documented from the start. These records
confirm Amery's suggestion that planners in Belgrade were pleased with the progress
they had made by the summer of 1940. May, to quote from Section D's War Diary,
had been spent mostly 'sifting through names of various exiles with a view to finding
potential leaders and points of resistance'. But by mid-June, according to a report sent
to London by Bill Bailey, a mining engineer who had replaced the recently expelled
Julius Hanau as Section D's Belgrade head, three local organisations were being
supported to work into Albania from Yugoslavia, including Gani Bey Kryeziu's out of
Kosovo. A monthly subsidy of £1,500 was funding each of them and gunrunning
might start once they had proved themselves 'satisfactory'.24 At the end of June,
confident that 'the prospects of both "incidents" and a fairly general rising against the
Italians [in border areas]... were good', Section D asked London for help in securing
five thousand rifles. If the arms could be found, officers in Belgrade 'had no doubt
that an effective diversion would result'.25 On 19 July, Section D in Belgrade then
submitted a detailed plan for a revolt. Gani Bey Kryeziu, by now Section D's principal
Albanian contact, had asked for £3,000 in gold to distribute amongst northern
Albanian chieftans; once the 'revolution' had started he wanted a further £40,000 to
be paid. An offer had also been made by 'the highest military authorities in
Yugoslavia' to supply Section D with 5,000 rifles all 'complete with slings and
bayonets', ten million rounds of ammunition, and twenty-five light machine-guns
'with drums and ammunition'. Conditions of supply were that the supplier would take
29
his wares as far as the Yugoslav frontier and only receive payment once they had
disappeared into Albania. The paper concluded: 'It is clear that an Albanian revolt, at
any rate in certain frontier areas, can be produced, should we want to do so'.26
In July 1940, Section D and MI(R) were wound up and most of their personnel
and Balkan plans absorbed into a new organisation, the Special Operations Executive
(SOE). In this way the groundwork and contacts made with Albanian exiles survived,
although, the same month, Amery left the company of those planning operations in
Albania. The absence was temporary: in 1944 he parachuted into the country and
worked again with some of the Albanians he had known four years before. Sons of the
Eagle recounts mainly those later experiences. Yet Amery also endeavours in his
memoir to fill in details of the latter stages of the earlier enterprise, ofwhich he had no
first-hand knowledge but learnt, presumably, from discussions with SOE officers and
Albanians who had taken part. He sets out, too, why he believes the plans came to
little.
German successes in northern and northwest Europe and Italy's entry into the
war, Amery writes, had given the enterprise a new sense of urgency and pertinence
during the summer of 1940. SOE found and channeled a few more arms into northern
Albania; money was also sent. It also encountered some problems: the arms supply
dried up; the Yugoslav authorities were compelled under Italian pressure to restrict the
movements of the Kryezius and other Albanians recruited to the cause. But when Italy
invaded Greece from its Albanian bases in late October, to the planners, according to
Amery, there seemed a good chance of fashioning a successful revolt. The Greeks
fought well and forced the Italians to retreat into Albania; SOE's Albanians in
Yugoslavia appeared eager for action; it seemed that the British high command might
make available to the guerillas a sizeable number of rifles. Plans to proceed received
approval in London. But when the British ran the plans past the Greeks, Amery writes,
the Greek government, coveting the territory in southern Albania its armies held after
pushing the Italians back, objected strongly. British commanders, unwilling to over¬
ride those objections, shelved SOE's plans. Amery remarks ruefully that when the
Italian line finally held, 'there were British military observers who believed that it
might well have been carried if [Albanian] guerillas could have impeded its supply in
the critical moments of the battle'.27
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By the spring of 1941, according to Amery, the conditions appeared conducive
once again to a successful Albanian rising. In March a coup in Belgrade brought to
power a new government whose military advisers, he writes, 'set great hopes on an
Albanian revolt'. And as Germany manouevered to remove this new, pro-British
regime and assist Mussolini in his efforts against the Greeks, the plans for a revolt
went ahead. Unfortunately, the general atmosphere of the day of confusion, insecurity
and impending conflict with Germany hampered the Kryezius and their allies as they
assembled in Gjakova and prepared to move into Albania. The Yugoslav authorities
arrested some, suspecting them to be fifth column, while many of Gani's own men
'who were to form the spearhead of the revolt' found themselves drafted into the
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Yugoslav Army.
But what really ensured SOE's plans came to naught, Amery claims, was
Germany's conquest of Yugoslavia. In early April, Gani and a force numbered by
Amery at three hundred men crossed from Kosovo into Albania. Major Dayrell
Oakley-Hill, a retired British Army officer who had worked for a decade in pre-war
Albania as an inspector of Zog's gendarmerie and been recruited by SOE in 1940,
went with them. 'They met no initial resistance' according to Amery, 'and were well
received by the local population'. Hundreds of locals, he claims, rallied to join Gani's
force. Subsequently, two 'strong Italian patrols' were met and 'defeated'. Apparently
with close to a thousand men, Gani marched on through the mountains towards
Shkodra, northern Albania's principal port and town. In the hills to the north of the
town he and Oakley-Hill experienced their first reverse when local Catholic tribes
refused to support them. Unable to attack Shkodra alone, the party resolved to return
into Moslem territory close to Kosovo, establish a base and communications with
Yugoslavia and begin to harass the roads. But then news came through of the disasters
overtaking the Yugoslav armies to the north. The German blitzkrieg had opened on the
morning of 6 April with the bombing of Belgrade from the air; German armour on the
ground had made rapid progress since and seemed on the verge of victory.
'Overnight', Amery claims, Gani, Oakley-Hill and the rest of the party 'ceased to be
the vanguard of a powerful army and were transformed into a band of fugitives,
trapped in the mountains of North Albania'. Seeing 'the writing on the wall', Gani
dispersed his men. Oakley-Hill made his way back to Belgrade where eventually he
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gave himself up to the Germans.
31
Dayrell Oakley-Hill wrote his own memoirs after the war. These focus chiefly
on his pre-war years in Albania but also describe in some detail his time as an SOE
officer in 1940-41. Unpublished until 2002, his recollections include the only
available eyewitness account of Gani Bey Kryeziu's 1941 expedition; they also
contradict several aspects of Julian Amery's account of those final stages of the
enterprise. Oakley-Hill suggests Gani set out from Gjakova with much less than three
hundred men: perhaps a few dozen at most. And while he mentions that the occupants
of an Italian border post fired a few shots and then ran away, nothing in Oakley-Hill's
writings suggests that two 'strong Italian patrols' were met and defeated. Nor does
Oakley-Hill echo Amery's grand tone of a valiant 'United Front' of a thousand men
marching on hopefully through the snow towards Shkodra.30
Instead, Oakley-Hill presents a picture of an unhappy rabble of hungry, cold
and ill-equipped men whose leader, Gani Bey Kryeziu, was seemingly troubled by
doubts about their chances of success even before they left Gjakova. Once across the
frontier they attracted less support than they had hoped and found their meager
supplies too inadequate to sustain them for long. Indeed, while a few hundred men did
rally to Gani on the Albanian side of the border, pressure on resources forced him a
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day or two later to 'cut the numbers down to a hundred'." But the most conspicuous
inconsistency between Oakley-Hill and Amery's accounts concerns the Yugoslav
troops that advanced into Albania alongside Gani's men. Of all the published memoirs
and histories that relate the story of the expedition, only Oakley-Hill's account
mentions these troops. Yet he considers their presence crucial in explaining why
Gani's party was forced finally to break up.
According to Oakley-Hill, he and Gani discovered only at the very last
moment that 'Yugoslav troops were also bound for Albania'. This, he writes, was not
good news:
We had planned to enter Albania as a small group and find shelter
with the highland chiefs. We would then sound the local feelings
and try to initiate sabotage and local minor actions. If the situation
was ripe and circumstances were suitable we would work towards a
general rising which, with a neutral Yugoslavia at our backs, was far
from impossible... But now we were to be involved with Yugoslav
troops, who would never be welcome in Albania owing to the many
centuries of hostility between Albanian and Slav. So what would be
our role now?
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The Yugoslav move was presumably part of a military plan to
meet the contingency of a Nazi invasion, a sort of counter-stroke
against the Italians, so our people were unlikely to have been
informed... But the Yugoslavs must have known they would
antagonise the Albanian people, and they certainly did.
Oakley-Hill feels that it was likely to have been word of this development that
explains why, when he joined him in Gjakova, Gani was 'subdued and not very
forthcoming and gave me the impression of being worried'. He also believes that it
was 'precisely' the presence of Yugoslav troops 'which created the hostility' and
explained the deserted villages Gani's party found in the Catholic heart-lands of
northwest Albania. 'These Catholics feared the Slavs and not for the first time they
had been won over by the Italians... [But] I am quite sure that if there had been no
Yugoslavs on the march these villagers would not have gone'.
Oakley-Hill accepts that German successes in the Balkans created a 'general
feeling of panic or paralysis [that]... was evident even in that part of Albania' and
'undermined all chance we had of staying in the mountains and secretly working
against the Fascists'. Nevertheless, he writes, 'I still believe that it was the Yugoslav
entry into Albania that did the greater harm to us. Without that we might still have
crawled quietly into the hills and found shelter with no publicity, the local highlanders
dispersing to their homes. As it was, the whole of the north knew of our presence and
some might think of us as tools of the Yugoslavs. This was the fatal blow'.33
In a third set ofmemoirs, another British planner argues that a revolt may have
succeeded had it been permitted to take place at a more timely moment. Colonel W.F.
Stirling had been recruited by Section D and took overall charge of the Albanian
project during the summer of 1940. A man of action, forceful in his views and with a
wide circle of important contacts and friends, he had brought to the project influence
and determination and personal experience of both Albania and guerilla war. He had
won his first DSO against the Boers at the age of twenty.34 During the First World
War he became 'Stirling the suave': T.E. Lawrence's 'skilled staff officer, tactful and
wise'; the pair drove into Damascus together in 1918.35 After three years as Governor
of southern Palestine, he spent a further eight years from 1923 advising Albania's
government and president, Ahmed Zogu, who crowned himself King Zog I in 1925.36
In late May 1940, so records now reveal. Section D found Stirling working, much to
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his frustration, in telephone censorship and only too happy to help with its Albanian
plans.37
Published in 1953, Safety Last is Stirling's account of his long and eventful
life. In the pages devoted to his Second World War experiences he laments the lack of
British military support for the Albanian venture after Italy's attack on Greece in
October 1940. Stirling claims to have been confident at the time that 'a revolution in
Albania... would paralyse the Italian communications and enable the Greeks to push
forward with the minimum of opposition'. He also claims that General Sir Archibald
Wavell, Commander-in-Chief of the British forces operating in the Middle East and
Greece and an old friend, 'had promised me fifteen thousand rifles for my Albanians
from the Italian arms he had captured in North Africa'. But this opportunity was
promptly lost, Stirling writes, owing to lack of support for the venture from the British
Military Mission in Greece. After pressing the plan on the head of the Mission 'I was
practically forbidden to carry out the plan and every obstacle was put in my way.
When the rifles from Egypt arrived they were deflected to the Greek forces'.38
It seems likely that Stirling was one of the 'observers' who, according to
Amery, believed in the potential of a revolt in late 1940 and regretted that it had not
been allowed to go ahead. But while Amery points to Greek objections as responsible
for the revolt not receiving the green light, Stirling believes the general in charge of
the British Military Mission in Greece was at fault personally in not giving the venture
the necessary support. He describes this officer, whom he does not name, as 'a
charming man, but insufficiently tough; he had spent most of his career as a military
attache in diplomatic circles'. Stirling was 'amazed by his reaction' when in Athens he
laid out to him SOE's plans. '"But", the general objected, "you're gambling with
men's lives!"' Stirling implies that it was this officer and his command that placed
'every obstacle' in the way of a successful Albanian revolt.39
In their memoirs, then, Amery, Oakley-Hill and Stirling all agree that the basic
idea of fostering a revolt in Albania in 1940-41 was sound. For Amery it was brought
to ruin in April 1941 only by the German conquest of Yugoslavia. For Oakley-Hill,
the German advance undermined the enterprise but it was the presence, alongside
Gani Bey Kryeziu's band of irregulars, of Yugoslav troops that proved decisive. For
Stirling, had the plans received greater support from the British forces in Greece, and
the British commander of those forces displayed greater resolve, a successful revolt
34
could have been effected months earlier, in the weeks following the Italian invasion of
Greece. It will now be suggested, however, with reference to contemporary records,
that Amery, Oakley-Hill and Stirling understate in their memoirs how ambitious were
their plans, and fail to acknowledge the full range of preconditions that planners
thought at the time were essential for a successful revolt.
These records do confirm that Stirling, for one, was genuinely displeased in
1940-41 with the head of the British Military Mission in Greece, who can be
identified today as Major General T.G.G. Heywood, a former Military Attache in
Paris.40 In late November 1940, Dayrell Oakley-Hill, with Stirling's assent, tabled a
plan for an Albanian revolt that required support from the Mission in the form of arms
and a means of supplying them to the guerillas.41 At that moment Italian forces were
still struggling to hold the Greek advance. But five weeks later, according to the SOE
War Diary (which was compiled in London from telegrams received from its
representatives overseas), the plan was still 'hanging fire owing to the lack of support
from Military and Air authorities. A telegram [of 5 January 1941] was received from
Colonel Stirling in which he recorded that he and Major Oakley Hill were of the
opinion that General Heywood's opposition was due more to a political bias in favour
of the Greeks than to the actual lack of supplies'.42
Stirling was also unimpressed by the result of a meeting held in Cairo in mid-
January 1941 at Wavell's headquarters, General Headquarters Middle East (GHQ
Middle East), at which Oakley-Hill's plan had been discussed. Heywood, Wavell's
two senior intelligence advisers, Brigadiers John Shearer and Iltyd Clayton, and
SOE's Cairo representative, R.G. Searight, all attended and agreed that the revolt idea
should be 'given up'. Neither Stirling, who was co-ordinating the project from
Istanbul where he was working with Albanian exiles, nor Oakley-Hill, who was
working with other Albanians in Belgrade, had been present.43 Stirling protested that
the decision reached was 'too sweeping and that the way should still be left open for
the preparation of, and effective assistance to, a political and properly coordinated
uprising to embrace all the Albanians of the North and East'.44 Later in January,
Heywood appears to have been responsible for cutting the number of rifles Wavell
had found for Stirling's Albanians from 5,000 to 2,000 (there is no record of Wavell
ever having promised 15,000, as Stirling claims). 'Gen Heywood had said he was
unable to handle more than 2,000' the Diary records.45
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Yet records also suggest that Stirling failed to appreciate adequately at the time
the degree to which Heywood's standpoint reflected wider diplomatic and strategic
concerns and the paucity of resources the British had to hand. The authority for
deciding whether SOE's plans for Albania should be executed lay not in London, as
Amery suggests, but in Cairo, in the hands of Stirling's friend, Archibald Wavell, at
GHQ Middle East. Records confirm that Wavell kept a close eye on Section D and
SOE and never directed Heywood to support plans for a full-scale Albanian revolt. In
July 1940, when British strategy was to keep the war out of the Balkans for as long as
possible, Wavell had instructed Section D to tone down its plans on the grounds that
its preparations threatened to provide Italy with an excuse for invading Greece.46 In
August Wavell did authorise Stirling to resume planning operations in Albania and
prepare the ground for a general revolt, but it was laid down that the outbreak of any
revolt would remain closely dependent on Wavell's Balkan and Middle Eastern
strategy.47 In late October, at the time of Italy's invasion of Greece, Wavell then
instructed Stirling to encourage his Albanians to begin small-scale guerilla operations.
A handful of small bands duly crossed into Albania from Greece and Yugoslavia and
a few small actions took place.48 But the subsequent release of 5,000 rifles from stocks
captured in North Africa was as far as Wavell was willing and able to go. SOE was
never authorised to proceed with the full revolt. The Chiefs of Staff in London did
agree in principle to Oakley-Hill's plan when it was submitted to them in December,
but they then referred the matter to Cairo where Wavell promptly dismissed it.49 As
R.G. Searight informed SOE London on 25 December, the 'gist' of the 'views of the
Commander in Chief was that 'more good can be done in Albania by continuance of
guerilla warfare against Italian lines of communication than by [a] general revolt
which would lead to requests for substantial... aid which he cannot afford to give...
As regards food and clothing priority must be given to the Greeks'.50
The premium placed by British diplomats and military commanders on
sustaining the Greek war effort also explains why SOE failed to illicit either a Foreign
Office statement about Albania's post-war independence or permission to involve
King Zog in its plans. In the autumn of 1940, soon after taking charge of SOE's
Albanian plans, Stirling had travelled to Istanbul to begin work on forming a
representative committee from the Albanian exiles and emigres living in Turkey. He
soon began urging SOE's main headquarters in London (SOE London) to have Zog
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approached to act as a figurehead around whom the exiles and resistance might
develop.51 On Stirling's behalf, SOE London pressed the Foreign Office to permit the
king's involvement.52 The Foreign Office was not enthusiastic, however. Already it
took a poor view of Zog. In August, unimpressed by Zog's rapid flight from Albania
and his ongoing and ostentatious occupation of an entire floor of the Ritz, Lord
Halifax, the then Foreign Secretary, had considered banishing him to the United
53States. But diplomats were also increasingly conscious of, and sensitive to, strong
strategic and diplomatic grounds on which to oppose SOE's appeal. As war clouds
began to form over the Balkans in 1940, and aware that the Greeks had long laid claim
to large parts of southern Albania, the Foreign Office appreciated that Britain had little
to gain at that time by giving the Greeks cause for concern over Albania's future.
Thus a statement issued in October by Churchill to Stirling's Istanbul
committee was carefully worded by the Foreign Office to avoid any kind of
commitment to Albania's territorial integrity. It was confined to saying simply: 'HMG
have the cause of Albania very much at heart'.54 And when both Zog and SOE
proposed, after the Italian attack on Greece, that the king fly to the Balkans and rally
the Albanians there, that plan promptly foundered when the Foreign Office refused to
support it. Zog had not helped his case when he subsequently refused to be flown out
to Cairo at the end of November. But after bouncing the proposal off its
representatives in Greece, the Foreign Office soon appreciated how much the Greeks,
concerned for the future of their traditional claims in southern Albania, opposed
anything that suggested a British commitment to Zog or Albanian nationalist
aspirations. Metaxas, the Greek Prime Minister, opposed the plan completely,
claiming that Zog was so unpopular that his presence in the Balkans could only help
the Italians. Greek territorial aspirations explain Metaxas's absolute refusal to
consider anything that might lead to the restoration and recognition of an independent
Albania under Zog. Yet British diplomats across the Balkans also urged against the
plan and the final word came from Wavell, who shared concerns that Zog's presence
in the Middle East would be unwelcome.55 As SOE's R.G. Searight observed in
January 1941, 'the governing factor in [the] minds of [the] authorities' in Cairo was
that 'nothing should be done to prejudice the Greek will to win'.56 SOE's War Diarist,
recording Stirling's opinion that Heywood was biased politically in favour of the
Greeks, expressed sympathy for the general's position. 'One might comment that
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General Heywood must, at present, be in a delicate position, as he can hardly do
otherwise than support, or appear to support, the claims of the Greeks with whom he
is co-operating, and who have served the Allied cause so well'.57
Stirling, Amery and Oakley-Hill also fail to mention in their memoirs how
serious were the physical difficulties that prevented Heywood and the British Military
Mission in Greece from delivering arms and other supplies to guerillas in northern
Albania. Oakley-Hill's plan envisaged a rapid march by Gani Bey Kryeziu and his
men to the northern town of Kukes; they would then have to receive supplies there by
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air. As one of SOE's men in Athens wrote to London in December 1940, however,
the forces Britain had dispatched to help the Greeks were wholly incapable of
delivering that kind of extra assistance to the Albanians. After discussions with RAF
and Foreign Office representatives in Greece, he reported:
The dropping of arms, supplies, clothing and money by parachute
from RAF planes is out of the question for the following reasons:
(a) There are not enough planes to spare.
(b) There is no reserve clothing or food to spare in Greece
(c) Italian rifles and ammunition cannot be brought from Egypt for
at least 3 weeks.
(d) The RAF have not got the equipment for dropping supplies from
the air and would have to get it from England.
(e) The unreliability of the weather, and particularly the sudden and
unpredictable formation of cloud over the Albanian mountains
makes it impossible to arrange a rendezvous with the object of
dropping supplies with any certainty of being able to keep it.
The SOE representative noted that the RAF liaison officer in Greece 'emphasised that
it was not his wish to be uncooperative, but that under present circumstances it was
quite impossible for the RAF to fall in with the proposals made by [SOE in]
Belgrade'.59 Even when Wavell's rifles appeared to be en route from Egypt, there had
been little change to this basic problem of finding the means of delivering them to the
guerillas. By the end of the year, SOE's representatives were resigned to trying to
send the rifles into Albania overland, via Yugoslavia.60 By the end of the first week of
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January 1941, Stirling had agreed with Heywood that the revolt should be 'postponed
until conditions [are] more favourable'.61
It appears from SOE files that GHQ Middle East and more senior observers
were also conscious of the possible repercussions of a failed revolt. In late January
1941, Heywood informed Ian Pirie, one of SOE's principal men in Athens, 'that
higher authorities' considered it 'essential' that an Albanian revolt 'should not be
attempted without an at least 80% chance of success'. GHQ Middle East, Heywood
had explained, felt that 'the only time for such a revolt is simultaneously with a major
Greek advance'. Of such a development, however, there was 'no indication
whatsoever'. In fact, the Greeks seemed to have become 'completely bogged' against
the Italians after their early run of success. For this reason, and because the RAF was
patently unable to provide support, Pirie reported, GHQ Middle East, 'with their
professional confidence in the superiority of regular over irregular troops, feel that the
revolt would be crushed. The deterrent effect of a crushed revolt upon the spirits of the
people in occupied territory is exactly what higher authorities even than Mideast
[GHQ Middle East] are supremely anxious to avoid'.62
Seen, then, in the context of British strategy and diplomacy and problems of
logistics and lack of resources, Heywood's opposition to Stirling's revolt may be
easier to understand. Indeed, there is no evidence to suggest that Heywood was as
squeamish about encouraging Albanian resistance as Stirling makes out. 'I hope you
do not feel that Heywood is being obstructive' Ian Pirie reported to SOE's planners in
Belgrade in early 1941. 'It is quite clear... that his instructions are very definite. As an
example of his anxiety to help us he tried to get us 30 squirts [sub-machine guns] out
of the thousand delivered here for the Greeks, and tell the Greeks that these had been
short delivered'.63
Although Amery and Oakley-Hill claim that the situation was conducive to a
successful revolt in the spring of 1941, no significant development had occurred by
then that could have allowed the British Military Mission in Greece to offer SOE's
planners greater assistance. Down to April, Heywood and the RAF remained unable to
surmount the problem of delivering substantial amounts of material to guerillas in
northern Albania; nor was any instruction forthcoming from Wavell to allow SOE to
proceed with its planned revolt. Nor, indeed, was there any alteration to the British
government's refusal to make any statement on Albania's independence or future
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frontiers. SOE records reveal that in February a limited 'plan' was 'prepared and
approved in principle by General Heywood for the co-ordinated operations of bands of
Albanian irregulars in several districts in Northern Albania, under the leadership of
the exiled chiefs who are working under our direction in Yugoslavia... These bands
would be of anything from several hundreds to a thousand men, and the objectives
would be the continuous cutting of telephone communications, the blocking of roads,
the destruction of bridges, attacks on police and military posts and the capture of
material'.64 It was thought, however, that 'much depended on whether or not they
were supplied with the requisite arms and ammunition'.65 When the time came to
move, Gani's party still lacked direction, had no chance of supply from the air or
political support from London and carried only as much food, weaponry, ammunition
and explosives as could be loaded on to the backs of a handful of mules. 'We had no
formal or detailed orders', Oakley-Hill recalls, 'just a general brief to raise as much
wind against the Italians as possible all over the north'.66
Contemporary records confirm that SOE's planners considered a major revolt,
rather than a series of minor acts of resistance, to be the only effective way of
harnessing northern Albania to the Allied war effort. Yet records also demonstrate that
neither Stirling nor Oakley-Hill acknowledge in their memoirs what both had stressed
to higher authority at the time: that northern Albanians were not suited to sustaining
any kind of significant resistance without substantial outside help and convincing
grounds on which to come out to fight. That analysis is well set out in the plan drawn
up by Oakley-Hill with Stirling's support in late 1940 and shelved in January. The
essential 'pre-requisites' for a successful revolt, as laid down by Oakley-Hill, were as
follows:
(a) The presence in Albania of a leader or leaders in whom the
Northerners would have confidence.
(b) The moral support of Britain, to whom they look, and have
always looked, as to no other Power, for the eventual
satisfaction of their claims to just treatment.
(c) Linked with (b) some proof of the friendly intentions of Greece
towards the country as a whole.
(d) The provision of some arms, and particularly rifles and
ammunition.
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In the preamble to his plan, Oakley-Hill stressed that the 'Northern Albanian does not
take readily to mere brigandage for pay. He is very attached to his own home and his
own part of the country and requires a sufficient stimulus to make him leave it and
take up arms'. In addition, 'owing to his feudal background and clan system he is
dependent on the chiefs of his clan and obedient to them. To convince the chiefs is to
obtain the support of the people, but the chiefs are similarly dependent on higher
leaders in whom they have confidence'. Oakley-Hill considered that the necessary
stimulus 'could best be provided by the prospect of a successful struggle for the
independence of Albania'. Only 'the big stakes, which are their only real interest',
would induce important leaders outside the country to return and lead the revolt. In
short, if there was to be a successful Albanian revolt, Britain had to provide the
necessary moral, material and political support to convince northern Albanians, both
inside and outside the country, that it was worth their while taking part.67
Other old Albania hands, when tapped for their thoughts by Section D and
SOE in 1940-41, echoed this assessment. One was Stirling. In a long paper drawn up
in August 1940, after a lightning tour of SOE's Balkan outposts in Athens and
Belgrade, he pointed out that the 'actual fighting must be done' by the 'mountaineers
of the north-east and centre' of Albania. These, he observed, were 'divided into
distinct clans who will only fight under their own chieftans'. The only way of uniting
them, he considered, was by securing Zog's 'approval and general blessing' for their
efforts. 'In spite of the blood feuds with which King Zog is entrammelled, in spite of
the unpopularity of his later administration, he is the only pivot around which all
classes and creeds can centre'.68
Another Briton with Albanian experience was Lieutenant Colonel Edmund de
Renzy Martin. As another inspector of Zog's gendarmerie, he had worked with
Dayrell Oakley-Hill in Albania for many years before the war; in 1940 he began work
in SOE's Spanish Section.69 In a report on Albania he wrote that year for SOE he
noted the 'prestige of the Englishman in Albania' and that Zog, he suspected, was 'the
only man who can unite all classes and tribes of Albanians, in spite of his previous
misrule'. But he also felt that while many Albanians 'would revolt against the Italians
if they knew Great Britain was behind them... they would not do so for their own
leaders alone'. He concluded: 'I doubt whether a general revolt can be brought about
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unless the Albanian, who is no fool, is promised that Great Britain will see to it that as
a consequence he will some day regain his independence... [The Albanians] argue
that to remain quiet they are fairly safe whoever wins, whereas to revolt means certain
death to those caught and to many others also'.70
This cautious assessment of the conditions required for a successful revolt was
not, it may be noted, of the kind made by Section D's men in Belgrade during the
spring and early summer of 1940. Before Stirling joined the project in July, Section
D's planners had consisted almost exclusively of Amery, Sandy Glen, John Bennett,
Fred Lawrence and Ralph Parker. Glen, the assistant naval attache in Belgrade, was in
his late twenties and a lieutenant commander in the Royal Navy; Bennett was a young
civilian lawyer; Lawrence was a captain in the Royal Tank Regiment who, according
to Amery, had once been on holiday to Albania. Parker, Belgrade correspondent for
The Times, could claim a little more knowledge of the place and had, it seems, been
responsible for placing Section D in touch with the Kryezius.71 Overall, however,
Section D knew little of Albania before the likes of Stirling and Oakley-Hill were
brought on board, by when the plans had built up a certain momentum.
That lack of knowledge, combined with the demand from London for
'urgent... immediate action', undoubtedly helps explain the early planners' apparent
lack of interest in the political implications of what they were doing and the
consequences of failure or success. Certainly the planners were not oblivious to the
conflicting political views of the Albanians with whom they were in touch. On 10
May, Julius Hanau informed London of the good news that Section D was now in
touch with several exiled Albanian leaders in Yugoslavia; the bad news, he added,
was that they divided themselves into three rival political groups: Zogist (pro-
77
monarchist), anti-Zogist, and communist. But beyond uniting as many Albanians as
possible against the Italians, Section D considered the long-term resolution of the
divisions between them a task of little importance. Until Stirling arrived to take
charge, no consideration was given to the formation of any kind of committee of
exiled representatives that might have broadened the resistors' appeal and given them
a degree ofpolitical legitimacy.
It is possible that Stirling's hopes for Zog as a unifying factor may have been
misplaced, however. Certainly it seems possible that Gani Bey Kryeziu, the Albanian
exile whom Section D and SOE came to place at the centre of their plans, was
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motivated to participate by a passionate desire to seize power in Albania for himself.
According to Julian Amery, Gani and his family were 'moved by a common hatred to
the Italians' and thus 'welcomed the prospect of British support in their struggle
against the Italians'.73 Yet, from the outset, British planners may have misread Gani's
interest in what they were trying to achieve and grievously underestimated his
ambition. Gani's desire to overthrow Zog is now well documented. In fact, it was
precisely that desire that had seen Gani and his family exiled in 1927 in the first place,
after they were revealed to be plotting Zog's downfall. Shortly afterwards, Ceno Bey
Kryeziu, Gani's elder brother and head of the family, was assassinated in a Prague
cafe. Possibly Zog's agents were to blame; undoubtedly that was the feeling at the
time.74 In 1931, as Bernd Fischer shows in his study ofZog, Gani was then revealed to
be 'undoubtedly making preparations' for the assassination of Zog and demise of his
government. From his home in Gjakova he had assembled 'several hundred Albanians
on the frontier... two heavy guns and a number of machine guns, [and] hoped to use
the chaos which would undoubtedly have followed Zog's death to overthrow the
Tirana government'. It is likely that Gani's preparations had been made with
Yugoslav assent; as Fischer notes, it is evident 'that he had spent time in Belgrade and
that he was receiving money from that government'.75 The enterprise never went
ahead. Nine years later, in May 1940, Amery mused hopefully in a memorandum for
Julius Flanau that Gani's professed willingness to seek a 'reconciliation with Zogu...
suggests for the first time in 1,200 years that there may be a possibility of obtaining
co-operation among the Albanian chieftans'.76 In his memoirs, Amery stresses again
that Gani proclaimed to the British that he had dropped his opposition to Zog and
supported the idea of a broad-based resistance movement.77 But Gani's hatchet-
burying line may simply have been for show. In December 1940 the Foreign Office
heard 'indirectly' from a Yugoslav official in Belgrade that Gani was receiving 'a
subsidy of 10,000 Dinars a month paid out of secret funds of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs'. The Yugoslavs apparently felt that Gani had 'greater popularity' than Zog
and had 'earmarked' him as 'candidate for the Albanian crown, in the event of the
liberation of that country. The Yugoslavs were not in favour of ex-King Zog, who had
adopted an unfriendly attitude towards Yugoslavia during the latter part of his
reign'.78 The possibility that Albanians like Gani were not driven by a patriotic desire
to help their exiled king was appreciated in London and contributed to scepticism
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there about Zog's worth. The same month that the Foreign Office heard of Gani's
financial arrangement with Belgrade, Victor Cavendish-Bentinck, the FO appointee
who chaired the JIC, in a casual conversation with one of SOE's officials 'said
jokingly that he thought it most desirable that we should leave King Zog at the Ritz. I
replied that our information was "that all Albanians, whether they liked Zog or not,
agreed that he was a unifying force, and should be got as near to Albania as possible
as soon as possible". His answer was that he did not agree with the argument, as a lot
of little chiefs now fighting in the hope that they might become Zogs would lose heart
if Zog himself appeared, and it became clear that in the event of an Albanian victory
Zog would be restored to his throne'.79
Bernd Fischer suggests that, in the Foreign Office's refusal to use Zog to
encourage resistance in Albania in 1940-41, '[i]t is possible that an important
opportunity was missed'.
Although Zog's flight and the character of his family and regime
made him unpopular in many circles in Albania... [he] could
certainly still command considerable support. It is true that few in
the Orthodox community in the south and in the Catholic
community in the north, and few of the Kosovars, would have
resisted the Italians for Zog. Still, to the Moslem majority - of
which Zog was a member - he remained the only figure of national
stature.
Fischer claims that there were 'indications... that an active resistance posture on
Zog's part would have encouraged resistance in Albania' (although he does not
specify what these indications were). 'As it was', Fischer concludes, 'all the British
planning and negotiation to encourage Albanian resistance at this stage came down to
one rather pathetic operation in April 1941'.80 Yet SOE's plans, it may be argued,
would have come undone even if the venture had been accorded greater political
purpose and support, Germany not over-run Yugoslavia and Gani Bey Kryeziu's
expedition not been accompanied by advancing Yugoslav troops. In a paper of
December 1940, Edmund de Renzy Martin suggested several obstacles that might
stand in the way of a successful revolt. One, he considered, was the problem of
maintaining and moving large numbers ofmen around northern Albania.
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In spite of the Italian training of the Albanian army for 12 to 15
years, there is not nearly enough knowledge or discipline to enable
large masses of men to be moved about with precision. Food and
munition supplies for large numbers would provide almost
insuperable difficulties. The good targets provided by ill-disciplined
masses would be a heaven-sent opportunity for the Italian Air
Force... For the Albanians to unite in large bodies incapable of
living on the country or of hiding by day would be to court disaster.
De Renzy Martin concluded his paper by underlining the importance of securing a
'food supply' for the guerillas. 'It might be possible,' he suggested, 'to arrange for
maize (the mountaineers' staple diet is maize bread and cheese) to be sent in from
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Jugoslavia'. But in drawing attention to the problem of 'food supply', De Renzy
Martin's paper highlights perhaps the most fundamental problem that SOE would face
throughout the war when trying to encourage large-scale resistance in northern
Albania. The assumption that tribal Albania, one of Europe's poorest and most
isolated communities and most basic subsistence economies, was willing and able to
withstand damaging reprisals inflicted by its occupiers and maintain hundreds, if not
thousands, of armed rebels was a major miscalculation.
In the plans he drew up in late 1940 for an Albanian revolt, Oakley-Hill noted
that food in northern Albania was 'reported to be short owing to Italian
requisitioning'. He also considered that, should a revolt be put in motion, a 'supply of
maize and wheat flour, in particular, from outside would be of the greatest value, at
any rate in the early stages'. It is also apparent, however, that he did not consider
'outside' help as an essential and long-term solution to the problem. 'Food supplies
would be provided by the country where the forces are operating and by the capture of
Italian army stores' he believed. Indeed, given de Renzy Martin's suggestion that food
might be channeled across from neighbouring Yugoslavia, it is interesting to note that
Oakley-Hill assumed the Italians would close Albania's border with Yugoslavia once
it became clear to them what Gani and his men were trying to do. His plan thus
envisaged RAF support as the only method by which the guerillas could receive
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'outside' assistance. As SOE's War Diarist observed, 'an essential feature of the
plan was the dropping of arms, clothing, food and gold by parachute, as it was
anticipated that as soon as Gani crossed from Yugoslavia into Albania the frontier
would be closed'.83
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Yet without a major effort to channel food to them from outside, probably in
the form of a very substantial and sustained airlift by the RAF, guerillas taking part in
a major revolt in northern Albania could not have committed themselves for long.
'The poverty of the people is unbelievable' noted de Renzy Martin. 'The majority
exist [sic] on the border of starvation. Infant mortality is high'.84 Given these barren
conditions, observed a report ofMay 1940 obtained by Section D in Belgrade from a
Colonel Simic, a former officer in the Albanian section of Yugoslav military
intelligence, a sizeable mass of men moving about northern Albania would be faced
with very serious difficulties. One section of Simic's report commented on the hazards
that would accompany any military operation across the Albanian-Yugoslav border.
Such an operation, he wrote, would necessitate movement
along what are little more than goat tracks, which could be used
only for small bodies of mountain troops. Even these could not
advance at any speed, since the troops could obtain no food supplies
on the way...
Historical proof of this is furnished by the wars of 1912 and
1915. When, in 1912, the Serbian army took the route Djakovi
Prilep [i.e. southwards from south-western Kosovo into Albania: the
same route taken by Oakley-Hill and Gani Bey Kryeziu in April
1941] with a view to capturing [the northern Albanian towns of]
Ljesh [Lesh] and Skutari [Shkodra] the troops had to cover the
entire distance practically without food, and their losses on account
of starvation were very great by the time they reached the sea coast.
Another example is the retreat of the Serbian army in 1915
[from southern Serbia, through Montenegro and northern Albania,
to the coast],
'Albania', Simic emphasised, 'is a very poor country, and... besides small livestock
there is no food to be got there'.85
SOE's failure to take account of such sparseness merely invited the problems
Oakley-Hill and Gani Bey Kryeziu experienced later. Within days of crossing the
border and being joined by some local chiefs and their supporters, Oakley-Hill recalls
in his memoirs, 'the commissariat problem... began to stick out a mile. If several
hundred men moved from place to place they could not be fed by the villagers, who
had only just enough [food] of their own. There was only one answer - to reduce the
numbers of our moving body to a minimum'.86 Gani's failure to raise the Catholic
tribes may also illustrate the precariousness of life in the region. Oakley-Hill notes
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accurately both the widespread fear in northern Albania of anything Yugoslav and that
these particular tribes had long been pro-Italian. Still, hostility to the Slavs,
persecution under Zog and affinity with fellow Catholics may not be the only
explanations for why the tribes sided with the Italians.87 SOE records reveal that its
men in Belgrade had received reports months earlier that the Italians were winning
over the Catholics with cash. 'I know from personal experience that in this poverty-
stricken part [between Gjakova and Shkodra] money plays a big role' noted Colonel
Simic in his May 1940 report. 'For them, poor devils' he added of Albanians in
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general, 'even a piece of underwear represents great value'.
It is likely that the presence of hated Yugoslav troops alongside him in April
1941 lost Gani Bey Kryeziu some friends in northern Albania. It is probable, too, that
Yugoslavia's swift collapse to the Germans that month dealt a blow to the will of
many in the region to resist. Yet the scepticism expressed beforehand by General
Heywood and GHQ Middle East about a revolt's chances of success appears a more
realistic appraisal of SOE's plans than the post-war assessments found in the memoirs
of the planners. Those engaged in the planning had stressed at the time that, without
adequate arms, ammunition and some food and a very significant degree of political
recognition and support from Britain, a revolt in northern Albania would fail. For a
combination of reasons of wider diplomacy, strategy and logistics, not one of those
essential 'pre-requisites' was ever, or likely to be, in place. Moreover, since a neutral
Yugoslavia and a steady flow of supplies across the border were never considered by
the planners as essential, it may be wondered whether the events of April 1941 can
really be said to have robbed SOE's plans of success. As will be seen in subsequent
chapters, a flawed appreciation of why higher authority took the decisions that it did,
and an exaggerated belief in the wisdom of their own thoughts on policy and
operations, extends to the memoirs of SOE officers engaged in later operations in
Albania.
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Margaret Hasluck, SOE and Albania
1942-44
Margaret Hasluck is best known as an ethnographer. Her Unwritten Law in Albania,
published posthumously by Cambridge University Press in 1954, is still the
authoritative tract on the phenomenon of the Albanian blood feud in the first half of
the twentieth century.1 But memoirs and histories of SOE tell of her service in a
different field: her two years' work from February 1942 for SOE's Albanian Section.
For over a year she was the only person in the organisation focused full-time on the
country. Sent to Istanbul 'under an assumed name with disguised appearance and dyed
hair', she liased with Albanian exiles and emigres, collected intelligence and recruited
Albanians for SOE employment against Axis forces in occupied Albania. At SOE
Headquarters in Cairo (SOE Cairo), as the Section grew in size and importance, she
continued to gather intelligence and briefed British officers before they left to assist
the Albanian resistance. In 1944 she received an MBE for her efforts.
Drawing on SOE's files and the memories of some of its officers, this chapter
presents the first detailed account of this brief but eventful period of Margaret
Hasluck's life. Officers whom she taught have written since, and fondly, of a strong-
willed woman who applied herself to the tasks at hand with great industry and
devotion. David Smiley, second-in-command of the first SOE mission to Albania,
recalled that this 'elderly lady... with greying hair swept back into a bun and a pink
complexion with bright blue eyes' reminded him 'of an old-fashioned English nanny.
Full of energy and enthusiasm, she was totally dedicated to her beloved Albania'. Yet
officers with whom she worked at SOE headquarters found such total dedication
difficult to deal with; Jon Naar, the Albanian Section's military intelligence officer,
compared her more to characters played by 'the film actress Margaret Rutherford...
that kind of school mistress type, both physically and mentally'.4 SOE's papers now
confirm that Hasluck was so vocal in predicting that Albania's Partisan movement
spelt doom for the country's future that SOE staff officers, less concerned by the
Partisan threat, feared her emotional and forthright views were more of a hindrance to
their work than a help. Her career with SOE and battles with its staff illuminate some
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of the factors at work on British wartime policy towards Albania, and the intensity of
feeling and disagreement, especially over whether communist guerillas deserved
support, that that policy could induce. They also illustrate the kinds of problem
encountered when secret organisations find themselves stumbling through new and
confusing worlds, then discover the experts selected to guide them have limits - and
minds - of their own.
By February 1944, when Hasluck resigned from SOE, its staff officers knew
well that she opposed any policy that favoured Albania's Partisans over
anticommunist groups. That opposition may have been less evident had Hasluck not,
when replaced as Head of the Albanian Section in the spring of 1943 by Major Philip
Leake, retained responsibility for sifting and summarising intelligence for SOE's main
headquarters in London and other decision-makers. This offered her an important
platform on which to put over her own views. As shall be seen, she used it freely to
express her conviction that, on political grounds, the Allies should be less eager to
support those fighting the Germans and more sympathetic towards those refusing to
do so. 'You will know already that I have little sympathy with the [Partisan
movement]', she informed London on 1 January 1944, 'because it lets itself be led by
the nose by the Communist section'.5
In February 1942, when John Bennett, then of its Yugoslav Section in Cairo,
brought her into the organisation, SOE knew little enough of Albania and would have
been hard-pressed to predict the conflict of interests that emerged nearly two years
later.6 By 1942, SOE had identified from the pattern of Axis influence and expansion
a number of countries potentially suited to its unique brand of underground warfare. It
had also identified a need within SOE for expert advice, such as that which Bennett
expected from Hasluck, on many of those countries. She had then been living in Cairo
for nearly a year, having fled Athens ahead of Germany's triumphant sweep through
the Balkans in the spring of 1941. Cairo was also from where SOE's Balkan
operations were then launched and directed, although these were still early days: that
same German sweep had carried away all of SOE's earlier Balkan plans and severed
most of its contacts. Greece and Yugoslavia were now under German control; and the
Greek defeat had allowed Italy to consolidate its occupation of Albania. By 1942,
however, rumours and reports of resistance throughout the Balkans were beginning to
grow and with them SOE's interest in its value and potential. In late January, SOE
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London asked SOE Cairo to verify 'a long story of unrest and rising in Albania'
obtained from the Allied Press correspondent in Jerusalem. SOE had had no one
focused on Albania since the previous spring and Bennett's approach to Hasluck came
a few days later.7 In early March, London cabled Cairo again, this time about the
possibility of encouraging that unrest. On 25 March, Hasluck left for Istanbul to open
up lines into Albania and find volunteers from Turkey's Albanian community to be
specially trained, with a view to SOE returning them one day to their homeland.8
The credentials of this accomplished and studious woman, who had spent
nearly two decades in Albania between the wars, may well have appeared strong to
Bennett and SOE Cairo. Born Margaret Masson Hardie on 18 June 1885, she was a
farmer's daughter from Drumblade, in Moray, Scotland. Educated at Elgin Academy,
she then took first class degrees in classics from Aberdeen University and Newnham
College, Cambridge. In 1911, she arrived in Anatolia as the first woman to be
nominated for a studentship at the British School at Athens (BSA), joining her first
dig under Aberdeen's eminent archaeologist and classical scholar, Sir William
Ramsay.
In Athens she met Frederick William Hasluck, Fellow of King's College,
Cambridge, and leading light at the BSA; they married at her home in Scotland in
1912. During the First World War, alongside her husband and other members of the
BSA, she worked in Athens for British Intelligence (albeit in a minor role, although
Compton Mackenzie would write of her working along similar lines in London in the
autumn of 1915 and she herself would later boast, as she had a tendency to do, of
having smuggled messages between Athens and London in her garters).9 Tragedy
followed: in 1916 Frederick's ailing health took the couple to Switzerland, where they
lived in a series of sanitoria until he died in 1920 at the age of forty-two.10 Returning
to Britain, she devoted herself to assembling and editing his notes for posthumous
publication, most notably those that became Athos and its Monasteries and the
acclaimed Christianity and Islam under the Sultans.11
Only when most of that work was done did Hasluck return to her own career
and interests and develop the specialised knowledge for which SOE recruited her. In
1921, with a travelling fellowship from Aberdeen University and the 'zeal for folklore
studies' that R.M. Dawkins, writing her obituary, would attribute to her collaboration
with Frederick, she threw herself into fieldwork in Macedonia and Albania where her
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husband had studied the Bektashi, a Dervish sect.12 In the opinion ofMarc Clark, she
became 'the first west European scholar, female or male, to do systematic, sustained,
ethnographic work' in large parts of the region.13 Clark's short essay, a recent
contribution to a collection on women scholars and travellers in the Balkans, is the
only published biography of Hasluck available of any kind, other than Dawkins's
obituary. It is penetrating about her personality and pre-war life and work. From 1923
she lived in Albania and it is clear from Clark's research that she journeyed all over
the country, alone, in all weathers and by all modes of transport, spending whole
seasons in the mountains. Collecting folktales and songs was a constant passion but
her extensive notes and data covered a wide variety of topics: from local dialects,
coinage and customs, to witches, blood feuds and botany. She sent dozens of artefacts
to Aberdeen's Marischal Museum. Had she only published more and for a wider
audience it is possible that she would have become as well known as her
contemporary, Edith Durham, Edwardian author of High Albania and The Burden of
the BalkansIndeed in methodology and commitment she far surpassed Durham,
who never learnt the language and spent just a fraction of Hasluck's sixteen years in
Albania.
IfHasluck's academic background and her years in Albania were clear in 1942
to SOE Cairo, less so might have been the strength and intimacy of her bond to
Albania and its people and of her personal interest in their fate at the hands of the
warring powers. By the time of the Italian invasion in April 1939, Albania was
effectively Hasluck's adopted home. For nearly twenty years she had watched it
become a place of relative peace, monarchy and established order, and, though she did
not think that order perfect and had no special affection for King Zog, counted close
friends among the establishment. The closest was Lef Nosi, a distinguished Albanian
patriot and one-time minister in Albania's first government. He shared her interests in
antiquity and folklore and lived in the town of Elbasan, where Hasluck settled in 1935
and built a house the following year.15 Whether Hasluck was Nosi's 'mistress', as
insinuated by Albanian communist writers after the war, is impossible to say.16 What
is certain is that the couple's pre-war relationship remained significant for Hasluck
throughout her time with SOE. In August 1942, news - 'sad news for me personally'
- would reach her that Nosi, now aged over seventy, had been interned by the Italians
in Italy. '[Sjuspect to them first as a patriot and again as belonging to the Orthodox
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faith' he had apparently been imprisoned when the Italians attacked Greece in October
1940, spending 'six weeks in a common jail in Elbasan' and then 'several more' in
17Shkodra. Worse was to follow. In October 1943 Nosi became a member of the so-
called Council of Regents, the puppet Albanian rulers set up by the Germans.
Hasluck's efforts to protect the Regents from Allied condemnation as collaborators
proved fruitless and only worried SOE about where her loyalties lay. In 1946,
Albania's new communist rulers tried Nosi as a traitor and shot him.
Hasluck's relationship with Nosi might help explain why she was expelled
from Albania in April 1939: an incident that also reveals something of the difficult
personality SOE encountered later. According to Hasluck, the Italians, on the eve of
their invasion and suspecting her of being a spy, had demanded that Zog expel her.18
Albanian communist historiography is more certain on the matter. Enver Hoxha, the
country's post-war communist dictator, accuses both Hasluck - 'this long-term British
agent' - and Nosi - '[who] must have been an agent of the Intelligence Service,
because he lived and collaborated with an Englishwoman' - of having spied for
Britain.19 Typically, neither Hoxha nor any other communist writer provides any
evidence to support the charge. For their part, SOE's papers only confirm that in April
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she left for Athens. But as Clark writes, though she was probably not a spy in any
official sense,
Hasluck would not have helped her case by claiming, as she often
did, to have high-level contacts and influence, or by telling people
of her earlier work with British Intelligence. Given her travels, she
was indeed well positioned to spy. There is, however, no evidence
that the Foreign Office formally employed her as such. There was
probably no need. She liked to gossip, and she had an obvious
interest in staying on good terms with British officials. During their
occasional meetings she probably told them everything she knew.
Moreover, if the Italians wanted her to leave, 'Zog may have been happy to oblige.
Lef Nosi was not in his favour, as evidenced by restrictions on Nosi's travel, and
Hasluck was quite capable of making her own enemies. Barely a year before her
expulsion she had described Zog as "an enigmatic personality given... to politely
deluding his visitors'".21
Clark's study of Hasluck's two years in Athens, from 1939 until 1941, reveals
more of this brisk, abrasive persona. The BSA, to which she returned, provided Clark
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later with 'a mine of anecdotes; everyone with the school has a Hasluck story'. But
he found the most vivid, if unflattering, picture of Hasluck in Olivia Manning's novel
Friends and Heroes, the third and final volume of Manning's Balkan Trilogy, set in
9-3
Athens in 1940-41. Clark reveals that Hasluck, who crossed paths briefly with
Manning whilst in Athens during the war, was the inspiration for Manning's character
of Mrs Brett, who 'bustles through the book organising social events, talking loudly
and rudely, gossiping and expounding, denouncing her enemies and celebrating her
friends... Brett's courage and vitality, her taste for adventure, her eagerness to tell the
tale, her fascination with 'wild' people, her vanity and flirtatiousness, her aggressive
curiosity and determination to probe others' lives - these qualities are routinely
attributed to Hasluck by family and colleagues'.24
Grounds now exist on which to challenge the claim, found in Julian Amery's
account of his own wartime activities with SOE, that Hasluck had played a notable
role in Athens in 1940-41 for Section D and SOE during the earlier period of planning
on Albania. In Sons of the Eagle, Amery states that Section D's Athens office
recruited her in the spring of 1940 to be an 'adviser' on the country.25 In SOE's files, a
memorandum of Hasluck's from 1943 suggests she 'briefed' Albanians in Athens as
early as August 193 9.26 And in a post-war letter to the archaeologist and historian Sir
John Myres, Hasluck even claimed she began that work almost immediately after
arriving in Athens in the spring of 1939: a year before MI(R) and Section D hatched
their plans for encouraging resistance in Albania.27 Perhaps her activities in Athens
were and have been exaggerated, for nothing in SOE's extensive Albanian files
suggests she ever worked for Section D or, before Bennett approached her in 1942, for
SOE. Even the confidential Personal File kept on her by SOE gives no indication of
any earlier Section D or SOE role, confining itself to stating that she was employed in
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the British Legation's Press Office for the duration of her Athens stay.
There is another possibility. Hasluck may well have worked in Athens (and
perhaps earlier, despite Clark's scepticism) in some shape or form for Britain's Secret
Intelligence Service (SIS, known more familiarly as MI6). SOE's files reveal that, in
Athens in May 1940, SIS's 'principal contact for Albania' was 'a lady' whom Section
D's London headquarters felt its Athens office might approach through SIS for 'expert
advice' on the country. Unfortunately the censor has carefully blacked out the
woman's name and it will remain hidden until the day the wartime records of SIS are
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released. Further evidence to support the SIS theory may be the indication that SIS
later warned SOE in London against Hasluck's recruitment.30
Quite how SIS knew of Hasluck or their grounds for caution are not stated. It
was not long, however, before SOE officers expressed regret over having brought her
on board. Neither the concern of those officers, nor much in fact of Elasluck's first
year's work for SOE, has been evident before now, although Julian Amery's brief
assessment, that she 'worked tirelessly to glean information' from Albanians in
Istanbul and despatched to Cairo 'a continuous series of reports, memoranda, and
telegrams', is certainly correct.31 That correspondence now lies open for public
inspection in SOE's files, details all aspects of her work in 1942-43 and confirms that
she threw herself into the task with spirit.
These papers shed further light on her abilities; they also reveal that her efforts
met only with mixed success and soon drew criticism from her superiors in London.
By the end of May 1942, Hasluck had found four young Albanians willing to be put
through training at the British parachute and sabotage school in Palestine. Two more
were brought on board by the time the party left for the school in July. Yet two other
volunteers had backed out at the first mention of parachuting, while even those who
wanted to go were under pressure to stay behind from elders among the exile
community less keen to work with the British. Trustworthy couriers willing to carry
messages to and from Albania were as hard to obtain. The first Hasluck despatched
was 'an old man of Dibra, one-way only', at the end of April.32 Over the next few
months, a few more couriers followed. Some went to contact guerilla leaders believed
to be active, among them Muharrem Bajraktar, a northern Albanian chieftain reputed
to be in occasional touch with General Draza Mihailovic, the Chetnik leader in
southern Serbia. Six hundred gold sovereigns were also sent. It was a slow, dangerous
business: by November, only two couriers had succeeded in making the return
journey; at least one other had been caught and imprisoned.33 It was also largely
reliant on the good will and patronage of prominent exiled and emigre Albanians: only
in February 1943, and from Cairo, would Hasluck at last send out an Albanian courier
prepared to do only SOE's work.34
SOE officers in London held Hasluck at least partly responsible for this
apparent lack of progress. Letters and notes circulated inside SOE London reveal that,
by June 1942, Major Peter Boughey, of SOE's Balkan and Middle East desk and a
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chief recipient of Hasluck's correspondence until late 1943, already feared she was
'not the right person for contacting agents and recruiting men to return to Albania'. In
fact he considered her 'incapable of the job'. He had not been pleased to hear from
SIS that the Italians were aware of SOE's work with Albanians in Istanbul
if
(Mussolini's son-in-law, Count Ciano, apparently refers to it in his diaries). Nor was
Boughey much impressed by the sound of the two Istanbul moneychangers to whom
Hasluck had paid a substantial commission (a third of the first four hundred
sovereigns had gone straight into the moneychangers' pockets) to help send her
couriers and the rest of SOE's money to Albania, or by the methods by which she
professed to have won over her Albanian volunteers for specialist training in
Palestine. 'According to her own correspondence', he wrote on 24 June to Lt Col
James Pearson, Head of the Balkan and Middle East desk,
these recruits were in an almost starving condition, with a large
number of debts. She approached them with a gift of money, new
clothes and promised that their debts would be paid and that they
should go and have a happy time in Palestine. It would appear
almost unreasonable for these people to refuse such a glowing vista
in front of them, even though in the end it would lead them to the
mountainous hills of Albania! This form of recruiting does not
enhance my confidence, either in the recruiting officer or in the
recruits themselves'.
Boughey was especially concerned that news of poor security and the use of money
'in a way not calculated to obtain respect' might jeopardise SOE's hopes of a Treasury
grant to fund future work in Albania.36
Not all of Boughey's criticisms are fair, as Hasluck's contact and intelligence
work was hampered by several factors out of her control. For one thing, she could do
little about the poor availability of accurate, up-to-date information, and observed as
early as April 1942 that Istanbul was unlikely to provide the torrent of useful
intelligence that SOE had hoped it would:
The sources are scanty and not always reliable. Trade between
Albania and Turkey has completely ceased so that Albanian
merchants no longer come through, bringing solid news. A few sick
people come with their attendant relatives, who bring scraps of
information, but these make erratic couriers. "Tomori", the Fascist
paper published at Tirana, half in Albanian and half in Italian, has
58
not arrived lately and is unlikely to arrive any more. Letters come
through fairly quickly...
She added that most news stories necessarily came from 'the Balkan Press Translation
Bureau, AP, United Press and Reuters'.37 Not until after the first British officers sent
into Albania in 1943 began transmitting and carrying documents out of the country
direct was SOE to see a significant improvement in the quality of intelligence
available.
Her contacts in Istanbul were of similar poor quality. As Hasluck explained to
Cairo, three types of Albanian lived in the city: those that had emigrated for good and
become Turkish subjects, those that were living as members of the Albanian colony,
and those that had fled Albania as refugees at the time of the Italian invasion or since.
Even those that were now Turkish subjects were impeded in their ability to visit
Albania by Italy's controlling hand over the issue of visas, while the 'poverty and
humble position' of those that made up the colony ruled them out of any useful
employment by SOE. Among the refugees were a good number of army officers and
men of political standing, but even when dealing with them Hasluck was hindered by
the fact that, since their arrival in Istanbul, 'the exiles have all lost their tempers and
quarrelled among themselves. They have separated into little groups, the members of
one group not being on speaking terms with any other'.38 Most Albanians she
approached refused or proved too busy squabbling to help, or tried to make their
assistance conditional on British compliance with their own demands. Others
informed the Italians ofHasluck's activities.
Her efforts were also handicapped by having little to offer, other than money,
to prospective informers, intermediaries or recruits. In March 1942, on leaving for
Istanbul, Hasluck had been 'instructed [by SOE] that she must not give any political
undertaking and... must aim at getting in touch with people who in the interests of
OQ
Albania's future would work against the Axis forces'. But finding Albanians
prepared to fight blindly for the Allies, without any assurance as to what the Allies
might have in store for Albania's future should they win the war, was easier said than
done, as other SOE officers discovered. More anxious to allay the concerns of Greece
and Yugoslavia, both of which laid claim to swathes of Albanian territory, the Foreign
Office heard SOE's appeals for some form of guarantee of Albania's post-war
independence and/or frontiers effectively with deaf ears, rewarding them at best with
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statements worded so carefully that SOE's work scarcely benefited and left Britain
prey to frustrated Albanians willing to play it off against others.40 This may well
explain stories of Hasluck's alleged 'ruthlessness' when dealing with Albanians, as
told to Dale McAdoo of the American Office of Strategic Services (OSS) - broadly
speaking the American equivalent of SOE - in the autumn of 1943. McAdoo, who
was in Cairo at the time busily setting up an Albanian desk for OSS, had contacted
several of the Albanians with whom Hasluck had been in touch. As he wrote to his
superior in October 1943:
She has apparently approached every important Albanian in the
Middle East with various half-baked schemes... [Many] claim to
despise her. [Qemal] Butka, who seems to have been her chief
victim, claims that she is crazy and takes a truly sadistic pleasure in
pointing out that Albania is finished, that the Greeks are going to be
given new territory because they are more adroit at dealing with the
all-powerful British, and that the will of Great Britain is not to be
questioned by mere Albanians.41
Hasluck was not the most tactful or patient of people, while it is quite probable that
she resorted to warning Albanians in the strongest terms of the repercussions for their
country should they refuse to help the Allies win the war. Indeed, SOE officers later in
Albania would adopt that very approach to exert leverage. Butka, meanwhile, was an
awkward customer, an 'ex-Mayor of Tirana, politician and intellectual' living in
Palestine and described by SOE as 'very loth to accept money, and... continually
agitating to be allowed to go his own way and follow his profession of architect in
Turkey or Egypt'.42 Hasluck herself wrote of her dealings with him: 'after an eight
hours' day I just have not got the physical strength to see somebody who is so touchy
that you have to watch, not merely every word you say, but even every breath you
draw, in case he takes offence'.43 SOE had once toyed with, but ultimately been
unable to support, an idea of Butka's for a recognised Albanian committee-in-exile.
The stories told to McAdoo may say more about Butka, his friends, and their grudges
against and lack of faith in the British, than they do about Hasluck. McAdoo himself
would later regret having spent so long 'courting the Nostalgic Exile Faction in a
sterile campaign for recruits'.44
Indeed, the style and content of her reporting, which was discursive, often
opinionated and heavy with conjecture and anecdote, appears to have been enough to
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cause SOE officers in London to lose patience with Hasluck and confidence in her
abilities. It certainly may explain some of the looser criticisms made of her by an
increasingly irritated Peter Boughey. One early report from Istanbul merely told 'a
queer story' of an Albanian who had recently arrived in Vienna from Turkey to be
confronted by the Viennese authorities with the fragments of a confidential letter he
thought he had torn up on the train. 'At first sight this seems a traveller's tale',
Hasluck warned. 'On reflection one notes that any one who wished to destroy a
compromising letter in a train would go to the lavatory to do so unseen and would
most probably drop the pieces down the pan. It may be, then, that... the Germans have
arrangements slung under the lavatory pans for catching incriminating papers'.45
But Hasluck was not a trained intelligence officer. While working for SOE she
undoubtedly displayed a loss of objectivity through intense and intimate immersion in
her chosen subject. Some of her techniques in the selection, analysis and presentation
of data were better suited, perhaps, to ethnographical research. But her audience
expected fact that was hard, fast and to the point, with an indication that her work on
establishing lines into Albania was secure, making progress and professionally done.
Mildly diverting travellers' tales and lists of the difficulties she faced were not so
welcome. Nor, for that matter, was Hasluck's unsettling response in June 1942 to
news that the Turkish authorities knew of SOE's recruitment of 'Albanians to be
parachuted back into Albania'. When informing London, Hasluck evidently hit the
wrong note by making light of the leak and arguing that the Turks had no right to
complain as such recruitment had precedents. 'Childish', scribbled Boughey next to
one passage of Hasluck's letter that struck him as particularly flippant. ('Besides', she
had written, 'who spoke of parachuting? There is no documentary evidence of it.
Several of us have started making fun of the idea, saying that the Palestine party [i.e.
the Albanians earmarked for training in Palestine] were [sic] only asked about it to test
their courage'.) 'I give up' noted Pearson at the top of the page.46 Eighteen months
later, reactions inside SOE London to Hasluck's incoming correspondence remained
much the same. 'The usual waffle', wrote Boughey across a letter ofHasluck's of late
November 1943.47
Despite Boughey's belief that 'anyone with a rudimentary knowledge of the
Balkans, and of our work, could undertake the preliminary stages of our work back
into Albania far better', Hasluck was not replaced.48 He had identified something of
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her erratic, irregular and emotional nature, but underestimated the value perceived by
SOE Cairo of having recourse to first-hand knowledge and experience of Albania.
Indeed, her retention may serve as a measure of the paucity of experts on Albania that
SOE Cairo had to hand. When laying its earlier plans in 1940-41, SOE had relied
heavily on the advice ofW.F. Stirling, the former adviser to Zog, and Dayrell Oakley-
Hill, the former inspector of Zog's gendarmerie. By 1942, however, Stirling was in
Syria with a British Military Mission, Oakley-Hill in Germany in a prisoner-of-war
camp and there was no one else available, other than Hasluck, whom SOE Cairo felt
had the right qualities and was in the right place at the right time. As Cairo wrote in
her defence in April 1943: 'She is the only person in the Middle East with a
knowledge of the Albanian language, Albania and Albanians'. Without that 'intimate
knowledge... it is quite impossible for us to obtain either the information necessary to
plan operations or to be able to direct the operations of parties inside the country'.49
That month SOE Cairo despatched its first mission to Albania, Hasluck having
contributed much to its preparation, if little to the decision to send it. After returning,
via Palestine, to Cairo the previous summer, she had continued to collect and collate
intelligence and draw attention to Albania by passing reports to SOE London of
growing resistance to the Italians, together with suggestions that the Allies somehow
send the resistors help. But the decision to aid and encourage that resistance owed
most to the general move in Allied strategy towards providing greater assistance to
Balkan guerillas everywhere. As the Chiefs of Staff instructed SOE in March 1943:
An intensified campaign of sabotage and guerrilla [sic] activities in
the Balkans during the spring and summer is of the first strategic
importance in order to impede the concentration and consolidation
of German forces on the Eastern Front. Apart from direct assistance
to Russia in this way, SOE operations must also be directed towards
interrupting the despatch of oil, chrome and copper to Germany. At
a later stage, they must also be co-ordinated with Allied plans. After
the elimination of Italy, we must be ready to develop the maximum
pressure on Germany's vital interests in the Balkans.50
The mission's departure also owed a little to the enthusiasm of its twenty-four year old
commander, Major Billy McLean, for exploring a country that SOE still considered,
more or less, unknown territory. But Hasluck did play a significant role in briefing
McLean about what SOE knew, which admittedly was not a lot, of which Albanians
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might be contacted and trusted and where in Albania they might be found.51 She also
identified what targets, such as chrome mines, there were to attack. And she persuaded
McLean not to parachute into western Macedonia and head west to contact Muharrem
Bajraktar, as he had initially proposed, but instead drop to northern Greece and lead
his mission into southern Albania where he might find other guerilla bands. Though
little was known of them, these bands seemed to occupy a less dangerous and more
accessible region. McLean duly dropped into Greece, crossed into southern Albania
and, in May 1943, found a Partisan army in the making. But if the switch led,
unintentionally, to SOE's first contact with Albanian resistors being made with
communist-led guerillas, it may have saved the lives of McLean and his team. Days
before McLean left North Africa to parachute into Greece, another SOE mission,
under Major Cliff Morgan, dropped to the spot McLean had first proposed. Morgan
and his w/t operator, hoping to contact Mihailovic's Chetniks, disappeared on
arrival.52
Shortly after McLean's mission went in, SOE Cairo began to address a few of
the limitations of its one-woman Albanian Section by appointing trained staff officers
to appropriate posts in planning and organisation and by replacing Hasluck, in May
1943, with Philip Leake as Section Head. Though Cairo would come to share some of
Peter Boughey's concerns, at this stage these changes merely reflected the growing
demand for more action in the Balkans and, with more missions in the pipeline, the
corresponding need for a larger Section run on more regular operational lines. Leake,
for his part, was thirty-seven years old, Oxford-educated and a former schoolmaster,
and knew little of Albania. But he was descended from the intrepid Lieutenant
Colonel William Martin Leake, who travelled widely and wrote much about the
region in the early nineteenth century, and had several years' experience of SOE staff
work and a fine reputation as an intelligent and likeable man of balanced and careful
judgement. He assumed overall responsibility for the day-to-day functioning of the
Section and for ensuring its operations reflected Allied policy and plans, as
communicated to SOE by bodies like GHQ Middle East, the Foreign Office and the
Chiefs of Staff.
From May 1943 until she left the Section, Hasluck remained in Cairo working
as Leake's assistant in a variety of roles. One of these was to brief and teach the
rudiments of the Albanian language to young SOE officers destined to be sent into the
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country. Those officers, few of them then even half her age, would recall Hasluck
with fondness, albeit mixed with a certain benevolent amusement. In Cairo they came
to know her affectionately as 'Fanny', a reference to the many younger women known
by the initials of the First Aid Nursing Yeomanry (FANY) who worked for SOE in a
variety of coding, mapping and other administrative jobs. Some of the FANYs
themselves found Hasluck intimidating.53 Even Hugh Munro, a Gordon Highlander
and fellow Scot, who 'got on famously with her' before leaving for Albania in 1944,
also 'got one hell of a bollocking off her once for barging into her room without
knocking'.54 But if she could lack a certain warmth, the fuss and motherly interest she
tried to take of her officers is clear. Peter Kemp, who spent over six months in Albania
with SOE, remembered 'a grey, birdlike woman in middle age whose frail appearance
concealed extraordinary energy and determination... Her love for Albania gave her a
special affection for us... we were "her boys" and in the field we would sometimes
receive signals from her, giving us the map co-ordinates of some beauty spot nearby,
where we could enjoy a picnic'.55 Marcus Lyon, who spent nearly two years in
Albania with SOE and the later Allied Military Mission, recalls Hasluck sending him
and the rest of his mission out of their language lesson and into another room 'while
she talked to [the mission's medical officer, Captain] Jack Dumoulin. When we came
out she... was saying [to him] earnestly: "Now you must keep them away from the
women. Syphilis you know'".56
Despite Hasluck's efforts, it still seems most officers felt much as Peter Kemp
has written: 'that it was into an utterly unknown country that we were about to launch
ourselves'.57 And though missions were often assembled and sent off with such haste
that there was simply not enough time to give anything more than the briefest of
briefings, Hasluck did not always conceive of the exigencies of guerilla warfare. This
is especially evident from her attempts to teach officers the language. 'An enchanting
old lady', wrote the actor Anthony Quayle, who spent the first three-and-a-half
months of 1944 in Albania with SOE, and 'a great authority on the ancient laws and
language of the Albanians... but gave us little instruction in the kinds of questions we
were most likely to need - questions such as: How deep is the river? Can the mules
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get across? Where are the enemy? How many of them are there?' Instead, her choice
of phrases, topics and teaching methods was rather eccentric. Sitting before her in
Cairo, in the hour-long language lessons they just had time to attend, her bemused
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pupils found themselves translating texts from the small Albanian-English Reader she
had had published in 1932. The texts consisted entirely of nursery rhymes and
folktales Hasluck had herself collected from adults and children in Elbasan. As she
argued in the Reader, folktales justified their selection as texts 'because Albanian
literature is still very scanty and folk-tales are accepted as one of the best mediums for
learning to speak a language with a scanty literature'.59 For Reginald Hibbert, who
dropped into Albania in December 1943, 'it was a bit like having Enid Blyton in
charge'.60 One particular tale, entitled 'Kocamici' (pronounced 'Kotsa-mitsi') and
authored by Lef Nosi, she apparently had officers learn by heart. It told of an elderly,
childless couple who adopted a mouse as their son, called him Kocamici, and then one
day were distraught to discover he had fallen into a cooking pot boiling on the stove
and had died. Several lines of the story are then repeated:




Kocamici fell in the pot,
The old woman tore out her hair,
The old man tore out his beard.61
The exercise had bizarre consequences for more than one British officer whose
memory, at a later moment of crisis, seized on what little of Hasluck's Albanian had
managed to sink in. Marcus Lyon, who parachuted into the country in December
1943, recounts of his arrival:
Albania was approaching fast and... I came down with a crash into
a high bush... [then] heard... a man running towards me in the
snow. A bearded character covered with bandoliers and wearing a
goatskin coat came towards me... I tried to remember some
Albanian but the only thing I could think of was "Kocamici ra ne
vorbet" - the nursery rhyme Fanny Hasluck had taught us in our one
Albanian lesson.62
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Anthony Quayle defused a heated council ofwar between rival guerilla leaders, at the
moment one of them began to loosen his revolver in its holster, by breaking in
suddenly to recite the same line.63
Despite Peter Boughey's belief that anything Hasluck had to say was fairly
useless or irrelevant, Reginald Hibbert has suggested that she could have answered
'any number of questions' on Albania had the SOE officers at her feet only known the
right questions to ask.64 And it is now clear that Leake and his staff did find her a
mine of useful information when she was handled the right way and pressed on the
right topic. Jon Naar, the Albanian Section's military intelligence officer, worked
closely with Hasluck in the winter of 1943-44 and 'spent long hours going over maps
and other documents in her flat'.65 He recalls that she proved 'enormously helpful' in
his allotted task of planning and plotting SOE operations in Albania.66 'Leake and
others said get all you can because she is one of our few resources... But she was
generous with her information, and I got in some really specific discussions about
terrain because we were looking for the kind of roads where ambushes might be
carried out... She'd ramble on saying "Oh yes, we had a marvellous picnic around
that area", but I could get fairly specific information about not only the terrain but
[also] what kind of people might be living [there]'.67
Naar adds, however, that Leake 'did kind of warn me that, number one, she
was a bit eccentric and, number two, her bias was certainly very heavily right-wing'.
It was to be that 'right-wing bias', reflected in her stance on which Albanians the
Allies should support and which should be condemned as collaborators, that SOE
came to deem an intolerable threat to its ability to execute Allied plans. This was a
matter that appeared to Allied observers and policy-makers to be coming to a head by
the end of 1943. Until then, British policy towards Albania had been largely non¬
committal. In line with a 1942 agreement over global spheres of influence, Britain had
primacy over the Americans when it came to Balkan strategy and, accordingly, took
the lead in developing Allied operations in Albania and the policy that guided them.
But since Britain refused to recognise any exiled Albanian monarch, government or
committee on the grounds that none were respected or united enough, the first SOE
mission sent to Albania was able to pledge support to any Albanian willing to fight the
common enemy. Indeed, little was known about Albanian guerillas or what divisions
might exist between them until that mission stumbled upon the Albanian Movement of
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National Liberation (the Levicija Nacional Clirimtare or LNC: the so-called
'Partisans').
This was the movement to which Hasluck, by the end of 1943, had become
unashamedly hostile. Set up largely on the initiative of Enver Hoxha's new
Communist Party of Albania in September 1942, the Movement of National
Liberation had proclaimed itself open to all Albanians, regardless of religion, ethnicity
or politics, who wished to fight all Fascist invaders and traitors and set up a free,
democratic and independent Albania. And to begin with, combined resistance had
grown. SOE officers reported to their Cairo headquarters that, although unease and
occasional clashes were evident between certain sections, the cohesion of the Partisans
seemed fairly strong. Intelligence summaries compiled in Cairo by Hasluck expressed
surprise at 'the pro-Russian sympathies' of some of the Partisans but demonstrated
little concern.68 'Communism of an apparently innocuous kind has recently made
headway but it has not disturbed the unity of the guerilla elements' read an SOE
'Appreciation' on Albania, drawn up very probably by Hasluck, of June 1943. 'As a
concession to the Communists all guerillas give the clenched fist salute, and in return
the Communists wear the eagle of Albania in addition to the red star. The Communists
represent only about 20% of the Movement of National Liberation, but make up for
their lack of numbers by their activity'.69
Yet the collapse of the Italians in September 1943, followed by the immediate
German occupation of Albania instead of the hoped-for Allied invasion, saw this
coalition fall apart and civil war break out. Sensing that their immediate fate might lie
now in their own hands, Albanians across the country turned their attention to seizing
or securing post-occupation power. With the influence of communists among the
Partisan leadership growing steadily, supporters of the exiled King Zog (Zogists)
stopped fighting and split from the movement. Soon they opened talks with the anti-
Zogist but fiercely anticommunist Balli Kombetar (BK). Set up in November 1942 as
a direct response to the rise of the Movement ofNational Liberation, broadly speaking
the BK was a moderate, liberal party that sought to safeguard what it saw as Albania's
true borders and pre-war social, economic and political structure (except for King
Zog). Though the BK had taken part in some early attacks on the Italians it had
stopped fighting too, anxious to conserve its strength for the coming struggle against
those it felt posed the greatest threat: the Partisans. At the end of October 1943, the
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BK's central council reached an accommodation with the Germans; by December,
much of the movement had slipped into open collaboration and joint German-BK
bands were in action against the Partisans. Keen to fan the flames of civil war and so
minimise resistance, the Germans also set up a puppet government, united against
communism, under a collection of respected elder statesmen known as the Council of
Regents. Other 'Nationalists' (to use SOE's collective term for most Albanians
unsympathetic to communism), including the Zogists, preferred to remain aloof:
maintaining contact with Germans, outright collaborators and SOE officers, but
staying neutral until concrete grounds convinced them of the best way to jump.
With personnel now attached to guerilla bands the length of the country - by
mid-September 1943 there were eight British officers and fifteen NCOs in various
missions around Albania - SOE was faced with the problem of how to respond. In
October, SOE infiltrated Brigadier E.F. 'Trotsky' Davies to command those missions
and clarify this confusing picture for the benefit of Allied policy-makers. His
nickname notwithstanding, Davies was a regular, military-minded and mostly
70conventional officer of the Royal Ulster Rifles who had joined SOE in August.
Initially earmarked for Yugoslavia but switched to Albania, he parachuted into the
country on 12 October. By mid-December, he had met leaders from all three principal
groups - the Partisans, BK and Zogists - and had reached a decision on which
Albanians to support, based on an assessment of the short-term military gain to be had
from giving help to those that deserved it. On 17 December 1943, in a message
transmitted to SOE Cairo, Davies urged the Allies to condemn the BK and Zogists as
well as the Regents as collaborators and give all-out support to the Partisans, the only
Albanians still fighting the Germans. Both the BK and Zogists, Davies stressed, had
failed to fight the Germans despite repeated promises and opportunities to do so and
were employing Britain's failure to denounce even the Regency government as
evidence ofAllied sympathy, while mixed German and BK forces were now attacking
the Partisans.
On hearing in Cairo of Davies's proposals, however, Hasluck took against
them at once. As she wrote to SOE in London in early February 1944:
On 17.12.43 Trotsky signalled that we must denounce certain
Albanians by name. On receipt of this signal Major Leake paid me
one of his rare visits and said that it only remained for us to obey
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Trotsky loyally. I replied that I was a civilian and owed my loyalty
to common sense; that Trotsky had not been long enough in the
country to judge fairly, and that I should fight his signal [of 17
December] until more support came in for his view.71
This reaction was in keeping with the vigorous defence she had mounted of the
Regency government since October.
Both Hasluck's views on the issue and her ability to voice them can be
illustrated by her Fortnightly Intelligence Summary of 15 December 1943, circulated
as far as the Foreign Office in London and described by Reginald Hibbert as an
'eloquent apologia for the Regency government'.72 Writing two days before Davies
advised all-out support for the Partisans, Hasluck argued that the government's
decision to work with the Germans deserved to be seen not as reflecting any political
or ideological alignment with the German cause, but as a patriotic attempt to ensure
the protection of order and stability in Albania. She concluded:
The lines of the government's policy would meet with our warm
approval ifwe were not at war with the country whose armed forces
now occupy Albania... They have further appealed to the youthful
to avoid civil war and to preserve intact the Albania with which
they, the elderly men in the government, have done but which they,
the young, are to inherit tomorrow. Indeed, these elderly men must
be greatly pained as they watch the chaos into which the guerilla
movement has plunged the country... They grew up to struggle for
independence, many... by guerilla war... a few like Lef Nosi... by
years of imprisonment, internment and exile. Independence
achieved, they set their faces, Moslems as much as Christians,
towards the West and they won for themselves and helped the
younger generation to win a certain degree of western civilisation...
Now they see the clock put back to 1920 or earlier, arms again in
every man's hand, human life counted as naught, and anarchy
rampant.
They would be less than human if they did not ask if the
benefit to the Allied war effort which accrues from the run-away
tactics of the guerillas is worth the political and economic damage to
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the country which they cause. "
In other of her correspondence and to SOE staff officers with whom she worked,
Hasluck was less implicit in acknowledging the stated desire of the Regents to defend
Albania from communism. To SOE London she warned openly that the Partisans were
not to be trusted as they clearly had more on their minds than a patriotic desire to
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simply rid the country of Germans. As evidence, she pointed to recent Partisan
propaganda directed against the Regents that contained, as she wrote in January 1944,
unfounded 'personal abuse of the character and patriotism of men who have been
known to me for 20 years... It is now plain as a pikestaff to me that we can never
satisfy the LNC... Personally speaking, I can never believe another word they say'.74
She also drew attention to a secret Partisan circular, brought out of Albania at the end
of November 1943, that indicated the Partisan leadership had instructed its units to
'eliminate' the BK and impress on the people that the BK had compelled the Partisans
to take that step. She wrote on 6 December: 'I maintain that, ifwe align ourselves with
the men who produced this LNC circular, we shall do grievous mischief to our own
war effort. The only policy for us is quiescence'.75
But however much Hasluck tried to vouch for the Regents and excuse their
behaviour, all that was irrelevant for SOE. As Philip Leake's answers to an internal
questionnaire, circulated amongst the Cairo Country Sections by their new
commander in December, make clear, SOE's job was to support any Albanians
committed to fighting the Germans and not to worry about anything else:
Q. 1. What is your military object?
Answer. The military object of [the] Allied Military Mission,
Albania, as defined by [the Commander-in-Chief, GHQ Middle
East], is to kill Germans.
Q.2. What political assumptions are you at present working on?
Answer. That HMG is not interested in Albanian internal politics
and that the Mission is free to afford assistance to whatever
elements it considers are resisting or are likely to resist the Germans
irrespective of their politics.
Q.3. What political and military questions do you require a firm
directive on in order to function without continual reference to
higher authority?
Answer. None. The present position is that the Head of the Mission
[i.e. Davies]'s political views have been accepted by the Foreign
Office who do not propose to change their policy unless he should
so recommend.76
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Transmitted three days later, Davies's proposals to break with the BK and Zogists,
condemn the Regents and only support the Partisans were wholly in line with this
brief. That the Partisans, as Davies himself suspected, may have deliberately
precipitated the outbreak of civil war mattered little. No one but the Partisans were
fighting the Germans; the Germans were being aided by BK and government forces:
those were the facts on which Davies felt compelled to act. Hibbert writes that
Hasluck's 15 December summary 'puts the anti-LNC [i.e. anti-Partisan] case
admirably, better and more convincingly than we usually heard it put in Albania. But
of course it was the Germans who had put the process of political and economic
damage in train, not the guerillas and Partisans, and the only purpose in sending
British officers to Albania was to step up the fight against Germany'.77
On receipt of Davies's recommended policy, Hasluck's defence became
desperate. On 19 December 1943 she wrote to London disagreeing 'profoundly' with
the proposal to censure the Regents, 'not because two of them [Lef Nosi and Mehdi
Frasheri] have been for so long my friends, but because I think it would be the highest
unwisdom to take such a step'. Again she portrayed those two as patriots and men of
honour, but this time added she was certain they must have been 'threatened with a
German concentration camp' to have agreed to sit on the Council. No evidence existed
then (or exists now) to suggest that they had ever been threatened in this way; indeed,
no rumours of any sort of coercion appear to have reached Cairo. (Bernd Fischer's
recent work on captured German documents does suggest that the Regents were
threatened with a full military occupation of the country if they proved obstructive or
reluctant to help, although the extent to which this explains the Regents' willingness
to collaborate is unclear.)78 Hasluck, however, was adamant: 'The Germans are simply
fiends incarnate. They have taken the best men in the country and forced them into the
last possible position they would have chosen except under some dire compulsion'.
She concluded: 'Germans or no Germans, I am sticking by my friends in their hour of
trial'. On receiving Hasluck's letter, Major Eddie Boxshall, of SOE London's Balkan
desk, highlighted that sentence and, summing up the essence of SOE's position,
commented against it in pencil: 'But does this really help our war effort!?' Passing the
letter to his superior Lt Col David Talbot-Rice, Boxshall added in a short covering
note: 'I am afraid that Mrs Hasluck's many years of residence in Albania render her
unable to take a dispassionate and detached view of the problems arising out of the
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present position Albania finds herself in'. Talbot-Rice agreed: 'I think we must abide
by Brig. Davies' ideas rather than these'.79
In a final attempt to shore up her case, Hasluck contrived to argue that, since
the Partisan resistance seemed all but finished owing to recent and successful German
drives, the Allies should stop encouraging it and thereby keep the Nationalists on-side.
She first tried this tack in late November 1943, when, making rather selective use of
genuine reports of heavy Partisan losses, she wrote to Boxshall: 'So here go the
partisans of Peza, Berat, Valona and Kicevo. It does not look good, does it? I feel
more strongly than ever, and hope you will agree, that non-intervention on our part is
the only card to play now. Otherwise we get the Balkom [i.e. BK] and all the
frightened people in the country against us'.80 The Partisans were certainly hard-
pressed, but by January 1944 Hasluck had taken to massaging the intelligence picture
to drive her point home. After exaggerating the plight of the Partisans to suggest they
were truly doomed, her Fortnightly Intelligence Summary of 9 January concluded:
'The Albanian Civil War is ending, healing from within. Its disappearance leaves the
Albanians free to think once more of the invader. Soon most of the country will go
Balkom... We must, consequently, reckon with the Balkom for our war effort... we
need not fear this issue'.81 The overseas head of the OSS Albanian Section, Harry T.
Fultz, a civilian who had spent many years managing the American Technical School
in Tirana before the war, read his copy of Hasluck's summary with amazement and
alarm. On 18 January, to the overseas commander of all OSS Balkan sections, Major
Robert Koch, Fultz carefully pointed out how the summary was 'directly at variance
with reports' sent out ofAlbania by Allied officers and warned:
Whoever wrote the summary seems to have overlooked facts and
come out strongly for Zogists and Balkom. Some of the alleged
facts are based, it would seem, definitely on propaganda leaflets
rather than on sober unbiased reporting of bits of evidence as it is
collected... Almost the entire presentation seems to have been
distorted in an attempt to make out a case for individuals and
factions who do not have a very good case to date.
The next day Koch raised the matter with Lieutenant Colonel Bill Harcourt, Philip
Leake's superior. Harcourt 'agreed with Mr Fultz'.82
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In fact, moves were already underway to limit Hasluck's influence and
intelligence duties inside SOE, where it is apparent that she and Leake did not see eye-
to-eye. As Jon Naar recalls, 'she was very emotional and... hostile to anyone such as
Leake who would even consider working with "those people" - i.e. the Partisans'.83
On 18 January 1944, Leake wrote to the commander of SOE's Balkan Sections in
Cairo: 'The present situation is that Mrs Hasluck functions independently of the
Section Head and is responsible without reference to him for compiling the fortnightly
Appreciation and handling all matters concerned with propaganda, a state of affairs
which is obviously absurd'. He recommended that he (Leake) take over control of
propaganda and compilation of the Appreciations, leaving Hasluck as 'general advisor
on Albanian affairs'.84
Hasluck put up a brief resistance, complaining to Eddie Boxshall on 9
Lebruary that she was not prepared to give 'unthinking or "shut-eye" loyalty such as
subordination to [Major Leake] would require. He does not suffer correction easily,
and I think he needs a little. I am afraid I think stubbornly that, if there is to be one
voice in [SOE's Albanian Section], it had better be mine'.85 But the outlook was
bleak. Naar recalls of Hasluck's despair - and of a flash of wry humour - when he
visited her home:
She had a most incredible apartment: wonderful Victorian decor,
full of bric-a-brac, I remember; wonderful art deco lamps; a real
mishmash of stuff. She also had a parrot, which was very articulate,
called Winston [and] always kind of butting-in... I asked "Why did
you call him Winston?" and she replied "It's the only time I ever get
any kind of feedback from the Prime Minister".86
By mid-February she had decided to resign. In a final note to Boxshall she wrote: 'our
association has ended... I could not reconcile my conscience to doing what was asked
07
ofme, so there was nothing to be done except to go'.
Although Hasluck failed to save the Regency government from being
condemned, SOE and the Foreign Office in London decided in January 1944 not to
follow Davies's advice and denounce other Nationalists. The decision owed less to
any sympathy for the Nationalists' stance than to a belief that the political and
resistance picture was simply too confused to justify all-out support for the Partisans.
It also owed something to a hope that the Nationalists would somehow see the error of
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their ways and fight the Germans. That hope proved vain. Throughout 1944 the
Zogists remained on the fence and the Regents, BK and other Nationalists continued
to collaborate, while the misjudged policy of prolonging the presence of SOE
missions with Nationalist groups heightened the innate distrust in Partisan minds of
Allied motives. In November, when the Germans finally left Albania, the Partisan-
Nationalist civil war was coming to a close and a communist regime seized power. In
spite of the help the Partisans had received from SOE, anti-British fears were
embedded in the communists' outlook. Hostile to the west, the regime then ruled
Albania with a terrible hand for over forty years.
Given the nature of that regime, with hindsight it may be tempting to see
Hasluck's warnings as justified. It was clear during the winter of 1943-44 that the
Partisans hoped to overthrow the old order and that they did, to quote Hibbert,
'employ a selective terror designed to divide the ordinary villagers from those of their
local leaders who could be classified as Ballist, nationalist or simply "reactionary"'.
Secret circulars, like the one Hasluck latched onto in December 1943, which
suggested the Partisan leadership was deliberately heightening the stakes by launching
an offensive against the BK, were genuine. And though, as Hibbert shows, the total
quantity of British arms sent to the Partisans throughout the war was small, the
weapons, funds and training provided by SOE did prove valuable to the early
organisation of the Partisans and their ability to survive German and BK attacks that
winter. As is now generally accepted, once they had survived, the Partisans underwent
such astonishing growth the following spring that their seizure of power was made all
but inevitable.88
Should Allied policy-makers have heeded Hasluck's advice, ceased supplying
the Partisans the previous winter and stood aloof, on the grounds that sending arms to
Albania heightened civil war? The question is academic: by concentrating on the war
against Germany rather than on any future conflict with communism, by promising
help to those fighting the Germans and by committing SOE missions to Albania,
British policy towards the Balkans had largely precluded Hasluck's plea for non¬
intervention. At Tehran in December 1943, the three Great Powers had agreed that
Tito's Yugoslav Partisans should be supported to the greatest possible extent; Albania
was not mentioned, but the agreement reflected Britain's professed policy of helping
any Balkan guerilla, regardless of his politics, to kill Germans.
74
Yet care should be taken not to see Hasluck as especially prescient of what a
successful Partisan movement had in store for Albania. During the winter of 1943-44
it was far from clear even to British officers in Albania that the Partisans were set on
establishing such a hideous regime as the one that eventually took power. Well into
1944, as Reginald Hibbert remembers, few SOE officers there considered communism
in Albania 'to be very serious':
The Partisans wore the red star and spouted communist slogans, but
it was rare to encounter even a senior Partisan who could talk
intelligently about communism or any other political theory. Until
the spring of 1944 it was impossible to believe that the Partisans
could win control of the country or that, if they did, the country
would find itself under a communist dictatorship. The Albanian
Communist Party was clandestine and very small. What we found
ourselves dealing with was the National Movement of Liberation...
We could see that the top-most positions tended to be held by
professed communists; but quite a few of these were unconvincing
communists, and they were well diluted in the hierarchy by men
whose communist loyalty was paper-thin, or non-existent. And the
young men and women who provided the bulk of the [rank-and-file]
were simple peasants or townees who saw themselves as patriots,
working for the overthrow of a bad old order and the introduction of
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a new progressive regime.
Hasluck was unlikely to have been ignorant of the meaning and implications of
communism. But it may be wondered if her intense and stated opposition to the
Partisans, on the grounds that they were all communists, was more a symptom than a
cause of her desire to invoke sympathy for her friends and the pre-war Albania she
cherished. As Jon Naar recalls, 'she did know a lot of Albanians... all what she called
"the right people" and they were indeed rightwing. She was obsessive in her anti-
communism and warned vehemently against our having anything to do with the
[Partisans], all of whom, she said, were agents ofMoscow'.90
Hasluck's 'plague on both houses' scenario also implies that, on political
grounds, the Partisans should have received no more than the same Allied treatment
accorded that winter to the Regents, BK and other Nationalists. Most Allied observers,
however, asked the question: on what grounds were the BK and other Nationalists
entitled to the same Allied treatment as the Partisans? Despite strong rumours that
suggested Partisans everywhere had been ordered by their leaders to turn on the BK, it
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was clear that the BK and other Nationalists responded readily and worked willingly
with the Germans to remove the Partisan threat during the winter of 1943-44. Indeed,
Nationalist resistance was virtually at an end long before the BK's central council
issued orders to its own members on 7 October 1943 to cease hostilities against the
Germans.91 It was true that some Nationalists had once fought Axis troops, and might
have done so again had their leaders not removed them from the battle to refocus
against the Partisans. But it was also true that, though the Nationalists knew the
Allies' proclaimed war aims, virtually none protested publicly against the Germans or
Q9
even the puppet government. Instead, as anxious as the Partisans to be in a position
of dominance after the war, they sought German help to safeguard the old order,
knowingly putting their own interests before those of the Allies. 'They are thus
declaring themselves openly anti-ally and must be considered as quislings' wrote an
anonymous observer in SOE London in early 1944 of Balli Kombetar forces
collaborating with the Germans. 'It would seem to be time that we disillusioned the
gentlemen who direct Balkom [i.e. BK] of the idea that they can sow quislingism
today and reap bouquets from the Allies tomorrow when the Germans withdraw'.93
The Partisans, by contrast, were openly anti-German and there was no doubt
that the Germans were as hostile towards them as they were towards the Allied
powers. As Harry Fultz of OSS wrote in February 1944 of the idea of withholding
arms from the Partisans, at least until their leaders agreed not to fight the BK:
Were the policy placed into effect... it would result in the LNC
Partisans being denied arms and ammunition by the Allies while the
Ballists [i.e. BK] would be operating under no such handicap. The
Balkom [i.e. BK] receive arms and ammunition from the Germans.
They would continue to receive arms and ammunition as well as
technical assistance and training. If hard-pressed, undoubtedly they
would receive the support of German troops. The Partisans on the
other hand could expect to operate with steadily diminishing
supplies of ammunition and of other essentials. In certain specific
instances and areas there have been occasions when well-armed and
well-supplied Ballists aided by German troops have swept over
hungry, ragged Partisans reduced to their last few rounds of
ammunition.
Fultz added that, were the BK, Zogists and other Nationalists resisting the Germans
instead of helping them or staying neutral, more German troops would have to
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garrison the country to keep order. Instead, 'perhaps [the German troops] who are not
in Albania are today over at the Anzio Bridgehead killing Americans and British
while we try to figure out ways to teach recalcitrant Partisans "a sharp lesson'".94
Many SOE officers attached to Partisan units in the field expressed similar sentiments.
The words of Captain Brian Ensor, on Britain's failure in early 1944 to condemn
collaborators, can suffice as an example. 'When, during the dark days of last winter,
the enemy was most active [and] conditions at their worst' he reported later, 'it was
Albanians who, by their knowledge of the country and their help as soldiers, made the
job of the Germans fighting us so much easier... The fact that these Albanians
belonged to the Balli Kombetar party, who were being treated as harmless naughty
boys by the British, made us ashamed'.95
Margaret Hasluck never applauded the Nationalists' policy of collaboration.
When 'Trotsky' Davies pressed British policy-makers to denounce all collaborators
and aid only the Partisans, however, she sympathised instinctively with the
Nationalists' plight and proved unable to maintain the detachment desired of her by
SOE. As a confidential note found in her Personal File reads, 'her very intimate
acquaintance with Albania led her to follow, perhaps somewhat too closely, her own
ideas when they did not happen to coincide with HMG's policy'. Another note in that
file records her recommendation for an MBE which concludes of her two years' work
for SOE: 'Throughout, Mrs Hasluck has shown the most remarkable energy for her
years and has devoted her gifts in intellect and knowledge unsparingly without regard
to hours of work'. That assessment seems accurate also. Indeed, when she resigned,
already seriously ill with advanced leukaemia, SOE considered privately that
overwork might have exacerbated the condition.96 After spells on health grounds in
Switzerland, Cyprus, London and Scotland she finally moved to Dublin, where she
died on 18 October 1948, maintaining her sympathy for Albania's Nationalists at the
hands of Britain's wartime policy until the end.97 It is hard to avoid concluding that
that sympathy stemmed more from an emotional attachment to the Albania she had
known before the war, than from a balanced appreciation of Allied war aims and the
Albania of 1943-44.
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Chapter Three
SOE and British policy towards resistance in Kosovo1
1943-44
For over forty years, Major Peter Kemp's wartime memoirs have remained the
principal primary published source recording British attempts to foster resistance in
German-occupied Kosovo in 1943-44.2 Dropped by SOE into Albania in August
1943, Kemp had received orders to make his way north to Kosovo. There, that
December, he established contact with representatives of the strongly anti-Serb and
anticommunist Albanian majority. In No Colours or Crest, published in 1958, he
describes how impressed he had been by those Albanians' pro-Allied attitude and by
the potential, in particular, of Gani Bey Kryeziu, with whom SOE had last worked in
1941. But Kemp also recalls his shock and dismay at receiving further instructions
from SOE headquarters in January 1944 to break all his contacts and keep out of
Kosovo. He claims that British policy-makers, anxious to maintain good relations with
Tito's Yugoslav Partisans, had ordered that break after Tito protested against his
activities. This explanation for Kemp's withdrawal is reproduced without question in
Noel Malcolm's acclaimed Kosovo: A Short History. Neither Reginald Hibbert nor
Bernd Fischer dispute or address it in their equally well-received studies of wartime
Albania.3
Illuminating Britain's wartime handling of one of Europe's most internecine
territorial disputes, this chapter re-examines how and why Kemp's contacts in Kosovo
came to be made and severed. It argues that his withdrawal cannot be seen as a
measure of Britain's commitment to Tito by January 1944. By clarifying the priorities
that defined Britain's contrasting policies in Albania and Yugoslavia by 1944, it also
illustrates the limited view from the field that SOE officers often had of the policy¬
making process. Kemp's approach to Albanians in Kosovo, which the Axis had
annexed to Albania from Yugoslavia in 1941, had been in line with SOE's task of
discovering the resistance potential of any Albanian, whatever their ideology or
ethnicity, within the new 'Greater' Albania. His withdrawal from the province,
however, was neither precipitated by any protest from Tito nor reflective of any over¬
riding policy favourable to the Partisans. Aware ofmore deeply entrenched diplomatic
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grounds on which to avoid becoming embroiled in the issue of Kosovo's future, and
alarmed by fresh reports of ethnic and ideological tension in the province, British
decision-makers had seen that no-one would gain very much by SOE taking sides.
Certainly Britain's commitment to Tito was substantial by 1944. When the
first SOE mission to Yugoslavia was put ashore on the Montenegrin coast in
September 1941, the plan had been to cultivate Draza Mihailovic, the royalist general
and guerilla leader about whom SOE had received encouraging reports. But from
1942, as Britain sought to adjust to the emergence of Tito's powerful partisan
movement, that policy changed dramatically. Partisan efforts against the occupying
Axis forces grew as Mihailovic's 'Chetniks' became increasingly pre-occupied with
fighting the Partisans. At Tehran in December 1943, Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin
agreed that 'the Partisans in Yugoslavia should be supported by supplies and
equipment to the greatest possible extent'. On 8 January 1944 Churchill penned a
letter to Tito informing him that Britain was drawing to a close its contact with
Mihailovic and would, from now on, help only the Partisans.4 Brigadier Fitzroy
Maclean, commander of the British Military Mission to Tito, delivered the letter in
person. On 20 January he parachuted to Tito's headquarters at Bosanski Petrovac in
western Bosnia and handed over the letter, 'written on Downing Street paper and
complete with a signed photograph', in which the Prime Minister assured Tito that
'we British have no desire to dictate the future government of Yugoslavia... I am
resolved that the British Government shall give no further military support to
Mihailovic and will only give help to you'.5
In No Colours or Crest, Kemp implies that the scale of this commitment
explains why British policy-makers appeased Tito's sudden protest against his
activities in Kosovo. And SOE was certainly unaware until January 1944 of any
cardinal need, diplomatic or otherwise, not to work with Albanians in Kosovo. Indeed,
Kemp's very arrival in the province illustrates how closely he was working to the
policy guiding SOE of fostering resistance among all Albanians wherever they were
and whatever their politics.
That policy had changed little since Major Billy McLean led the first SOE
mission (code-named CONCENSUS) into Albania that spring, with instructions that
reflected the Chiefs of Staffs desire for greater resistance in the Balkans and how
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little anyone knew of the situation McLean would find. As McLean noted on 29
March, the five tasks of his mission were:
(a) To transmit regular information on the military and general situation
in Albania to Cairo by w/t [wireless telegraphy];
(b) To contact existing local guerilla organisations and to "lay on" the
disruption of the chrome and Trans-Balkan routes;
(c) To organise an "area system" with dropping places, and also to
recruit mobile guerrilla bands for immediate operations, and later
large scale operations;
(d) To work up "contacts" between Greece, Jugoslavia, and Macedonia,
with a view to British liaison in the Balkans;
(e) To arrange a method of getting people out from Albania, and
reception committees for further infiltration parties.
The 'focal area', as regards targets and guerilla operations, was laid down as central
Albania. That was where most of the mines were located, the principal towns and lines
of communication lay and the most useful contacts were thought to be. It was also
considered 'strategically well placed for liaison with British officers in Macedonia and
Southern Serbia'.6
Although exploring and encouraging resistance there was not made explicit in
McLean's brief, those instructions contained the immediate origins of SOE's
subsequent work in Kosovo. McLean was left free to investigate targets and the
possibilities of fostering resistance apparently anywhere within the borders of the
enlarged Albania: that is, the entity created by the Axis in 1941 that included most of
Kosovo and parts of Macedonia and Montenegro. On arriving in southern Albania he
duly drew up a plan for more officers to be sent in to open up the country and work
with real or potential resistance groups wherever they might be found. Transmitting
details to SOE Headquarters in Cairo on 29 July, McLean stressed that, as part of the
n
plan, a 'mission to go to the Kossova area' was 'most urgently required'. When four
new SOE missions dropped to him on the night of 9-10 August, he earmarked Kemp's
STEPMOTHER mission for Kosovo at once.8
Although the idea to send someone there was apparently McLean's, Kemp
accepted the job eagerly. Indeed, his initiative and enthusiasm played their own part in
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driving him on to the province and seeing him work hard to ensure his mission was a
success. He writes in No Colours or Crest that in Cairo he had seen McLean's signal
suggesting that a mission be sent to Kosovo. On arriving in Albania he had told
McLean: "[tjhat's where I should like to go - it's bound to be interesting, that
frontier".9 Kemp's memoirs paint a picture of a swashbuckling romantic more
interested in adventure than politics. In 1936, aged twenty-one, he had come down
from Cambridge to read for the bar but instead left for Spain to join the Carlist
cavalry. He claimed later that, while his conservatism had dictated his choice of sides,
it was really the promise of danger and excitement that impelled him to join in the
conflict; nevertheless, he became a convinced anticommunist. Transferring to the elite
Spanish Foreign Legion, in which he served as an officer, a rare distinction for a non-
Spaniard, Kemp was decorated for gallantry and several times wounded, finally being
put out of action in the summer of 1938 by a mortar bomb that almost killed him.
During the Second World War he served almost continuously in SOE. In 1942, as a
member of SOE's Small-Scale Raiding Force, he took part in night raids on the
Channel Islands and continental coast; after Albania he parachuted into Poland and
Siam. These exploits are recounted in his memoirs with modesty and wit but others
who knew him have stressed his qualities as a courageous and experienced soldier and
an intelligent and perceptive man. Andy Hands, an RAF officer who spent twelve
months in Albania with SOE in 1943-44, considered Kemp 'undoubtedly the best
officer in the field', noted his 'keen brain' and admired the 'sound knowledge of both
Albania and Albanians' Kemp developed after arriving in the country.10
But in August 1943 neither McLean nor Kemp knew very much about
Kosovo. Early that month, SOE Cairo passed to McLean rumours of some kind of
Kosovar resistance and a report that two regiments of the Albanian Army stationed in
the province might be persuaded to desert. The source of that information was not
specified but may have been an SOE mission in Serbia. McLean replied that he
thought the resistance sounded communist-led while two deserting regiments might
make a useful 'striking force' against specific targets. He freely admitted, however,
that he had heard nothing from his sources in Albania: 'I do not rpt not know anything
of situation in Kossova area'.11 But before leaving Cairo both he and Kemp were
likely to have been briefed on the success Section D and SOE had had in securing a
base of pro-Allied support in Kosovo in 1940-41. They would have learnt, too, about
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the location of chrome mines both there and just over the Albanian side of the old
border. Exports of chrome from Albania alone were reputed to be sufficient to meet
'all of Italy's war requirements'.12 To this promising picture of important targets (for
chrome was a rare but essential component in the production of high-grade steels and
armour plate) may have been added the hope of establishing links through Kosovo
with SOE's missions in Serbia.
Kemp's instructions were reaffirmed in late October at a meeting with
Brigadier 'Trotsky' Davies, who had parachuted in to take overall charge of SOE's
presence in Albania. Davies' presence in the Balkans, as one of three brigadiers sent
out there that autumn, stands as a measure of the growing importance being attached
by the British to raising the level of their missions in that theatre. But as the Foreign
Office-approved directive issued to Davies confirms, although there was now an
added emphasis on urging rival guerilla bands to unite and co-operate, British policy
in Albania was still to encourage all Albanians to resist the occupying Axis forces:
1. You have been appointed as Officer Commanding the Allied
Mission in Albania with the function of promoting and
organising resistance to the Axis in the country...
2. The policy of His Majesty's Government for promoting and
organising resistance to the Axis in Albania is to support all anti-
Axis elements, wherever they may be, subject to the availability
of aircraft and other resources, provided always that they
continue to combat the Axis actively and wholeheartedly...
3. It is the ultimate aim of HMG to endeavour to reconcile all
resistance groups to each other and persuade them to subordinate
the racial, religious and ideological differences which separate
them, so that all political and constitutional problems may be
settled by the free will of the people when the country has been
liberated.13
Davies's orders to Kemp were in line with this brief. "As you know", Kemp recalls
Davies telling him, "my parish includes not only the old frontiers of Albania, but the
new regions incorporated into the country by the Axis; that is, the whole of Kossovo,
the western fringe of Macedonia from the Vardar valley to Lake Ohrid, and a small
corner ofMontenegro. I'm going to send you to make a reconnaissance of those areas.
I want you to be my eyes and ears. I want to know all about the political situation,
85
with particular reference to the chances of starting resistance among the Albanian
irredentists".14
The 'irredentists' were passionate supporters ofKosovo's permanent secession
from Yugoslavia to Albania. They were, therefore, anathema to all Serbs who saw
Kosovo as the cradle of modern Serbia. And, as will be seen, concern among British
observers about the nationalism of those Albanians did contribute greatly to the
decision to pull Kemp out ofKosovo, although not quite in the way Kemp suggests in
his memoirs. But it is debatable whether Davies or anyone else in SOE really knew
enough in October 1943 to have identified the irredentists as a distinct group with
which Kemp could deal. In the long debriefing report he wrote in Bari the following
spring, Kemp remarked simply that Davies 'told me that he would be sending me up
to Kossovo... to make a recce of the whole area'.15 In his own memoir, Illyrian
Venture, Davies does not mention the irredentists either, writing only that he sent
Kemp to Kosovo 'to increase our influence in that area and give me information of
what was happening there'.16
In the event, Kemp's contacts were to be almost exclusively with the
irredentists. Based on the headquarters of Flight Lieutenant Andy Hands' SPINSTER
mission, in the village of Dege in the extreme northeast of Albania, he made two trips
into Kosovo. The first, and shortest, he did alone. It lasted four days: from 14 to 17
December 1943. The second, on which Lieutenant John Hibberdine, a young Scot
who had dropped at Dege on 19-20 December, accompanied Kemp, lasted three
weeks: from 1 to 22 January 1944. On both occasions Kemp stayed in the German-
garrisoned town of Gjakova in southwestern Kosovo, a few miles from the old
Albanian border. And both trips were made under the protection of Hasan Bey
Kryeziu, with whom Muharrem Bajraktar, a northern Albanian nationalist leader, had
placed Kemp in touch in early December. Hasan's brother was Gani Bey Kryeziu.
After Germany's conquest of Yugoslavia in 1941, Gani and a third brother, Said, had
retired to Belgrade where they had lived for a time under German protection before
being handed over to the Italians and imprisoned. Hasan was allowed to stay in
Gjakova. Consequently, in the winter of 1943-44, he was able to shelter his guests and
introduce them to various local notables.
The Kryezius and these notables were the contacts that Kemp claims in his
memoirs had proved intolerable to Tito, after Partisans in Kosovo brought them to his
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attention. Mostly collected around Hands' base at Dege, the Partisans had made no
secret of their hostility towards Kemp's work with non-communist Albanians in
Kosovo. By January 1944 he already suspected the Partisans of trying to sabotage his
first trip to Gjakova by betraying his presence there to the Germans. On the occasion
of his second trip, Kemp states, they sent a report on his activities to Tito. The report
was then passed 'with a strong protest' by Tito to the 'headquarters' of the British
Military Mission working with him in Bosnia, thus bringing about the decision from a
'higher quarter' that Kemp should keep out of Kosovo. Kemp received word of that
decision on 24 January. It arrived two days after he and Hibberdine had held talks
with Gani Bey Kryeziu, who had escaped from Italy in late 1943 and made his way
back home. That meeting had elated the two SOE officers: Gani had promised to help
them in any way he could. Kemp recalls his and Hibberdine's subsequent
consternation when the order to withdraw came through:
The signal that shattered all my hopes came over the evening
wireless 'sked' from Cairo. Its opening words are fixed forever on
my memory. 'Kemp to break tactfully all contact with Kryezius and
Irredentists'. The message went on to explain that my activities in
Kossovo were causing an 'unfavourable impression' among Tito's
Partisans and ended with the sentence, 'Our relations with Jugoslav
Partisans are of overriding importance'...
With horror and incredulity Hibberdine and I read and re-read
the decoded words on that dirty bit of paper... [T]o desert the
Kryezius now at the very moment when, exhorted by Cairo and
ourselves, they had taken up arms for the Allies, was not only base
but foolish.
'And so,' I stormed to Hibberdine, 'we are to ditch Gani Beg,
the one man in this part of Albania who really means to fight the
Germans and has got the guts and ability to do it; the one man who
can rouse the Kossovars to fight...'
'If Cairo's relations with the Jug Partisans are really so
important,' added Hibberdine, 'why the hell didn't they warn us off
before...?'
Kemp adds that he 'drafted a "Most Urgent" signal, begging at least to be allowed to
keep in touch with Gani Beg now that he was in arms against the Germans; the answer
17
was a categorical No'.
But Kemp was far removed from the policy-making process in January 1944,
and recently released records do not support his post-war account of how and why his
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mission came to be withdrawn. In the first place, it seems unlikely that Tito had any
personal involvement in compelling British policy-makers to bring Kemp's activities
in Kosovo to a close. Tito would not have been in very close contact with Partisan
units in and around Kosovo in January 1944. Not only was he nearly a hundred and
fifty miles away in Bosnia but also, for most of the month, on the run, in harsh winter
conditions that would have made it very difficult for him to maintain contact with
anyone. According to Milovan Djilas, then a member of Tito's Supreme Staff, a
German offensive from 7 January had scattered Tito and his staff, forcing them to
spend two weeks marching 'through the forests and across the mountains' the forty or
so miles from Jajce to Drvar.18 When Fitzroy Maclean found him on 20 January at
Bosanski Petrovac, ten miles on from Drvar, Tito had only just arrived there from
Jajce.19
More significantly, the 'in' signals log of SOE's Yugoslav Section in Cairo
contains no 'strong protest' from Tito or any other message sent by the headquarters
of the British Military Mission in Bosnia complaining about Kemp. What the log does
record, however, is a short and slightly corrupt message from Major Anthony Hunter's
SOE mission that was working that January with Yugoslav Partisans at Berane in
southern Montenegro. Berane was just forty miles to the north of Andy Hands and the
Partisans at Dege in northeast Albania. Transmitting on 17 January, Hunter referred to
complaints made by an 'Albanian delegation here' and asked for 'information ref.
British mission said to be intriguing with both sides' in Kosovo. He wanted to know,
too, about a certain 'Captain David': a British officer said to be working with
Albanians 'co-operating with Fascists'.20
Hunter's message made no mention of Tito. Indeed, no news appears to have
reached the British of any statement by Tito about SOE's activities in Kosovo, or of
any indication that he even wanted to reclaim the province for Yugoslavia. At Jajce in
November 1943, Tito and the Anti-Fascist Council for National Liberation had
proclaimed a new federal Yugoslavia, assumed sovereign rights to ruling the country
and denounced the exiled king and government.21 But Tito had also declared that the
new Yugoslavia was to be founded 'on the basis of the right of every people to self-
determination, including the right to secede or unite with other peoples, and in
22
conformity with the true aspirations of all the peoples of Yugoslavia'. In what seems
to have been a deliberate ploy by the Yugoslav partisans to skirt round what was a
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potentially very divisive issue, Kosovo's position in that federation was to remain
vague, even to the Albanian and Kosovo partisans, for many months.
Hunter's thin appeal for information about SOE's work in Kosovo certainly
caused alarm among observers in Cairo. It seems very likely that this was the 'protest'
Kemp claimed later had come from Tito. SOE's Yugoslav Section at once sent a copy
of Hunter's message to its Albanian opposite number asking to know what it was all
about: who was the British officer reported as 'co-operating with Fascists' in Kosovo?
The Albanian Section knew from reports received from Kemp and Hands that the
Kosovo partisans at Dege were in touch with Berane. Major Philip Leake, Section
Head, drew the appropriate conclusion. He explained that the officer was Peter Kemp
and in touch with nationalist elements in Kosovo.24 Kemp himself was later informed:
'[Yugoslav] partisans [at] BERANE have been receiving unfavourable accounts [of]
your activities - presumably from [the] Kos[ovo partisans]'. ~ But Hunter's message
was not itself responsible for provoking the order for Kemp to withdraw. A greater
impact on observers in Cairo was made by Kemp's own reports. These laid down his
conviction that, given the ethnic balance and tensions in the province, widespread
resistance could be waged only by the Albanian irredentists and achieved only if an
Allied declaration could be issued about Kosovo's future.
Before demonstrating that impact, however, it is instructive to clarify how and
why Kemp came to make that assessment. And SOE records and other papers in
private hands confirm that he and Hibberdine had quickly become aware how hated
were the Serbs and Partisans by the majority of Albanians in Kosovo. '[T]he scene of
another Serb atrocity' wrote Hibberdine in his diary of the home of the Dobrushi
family, with whom he and Kemp stayed in the village of Rogove (Rogovo) from 14 to
17 January. 'In 1941 when they were withdrawing north a Serb band of regulars called
in here and forced the owner of the house (the elder brother of the present owner) to
give them food and clothing. When they had eaten, in gratitude for his hospitality,
26
they took him outside and shot him in front of his wife and children'. Kemp, while
in Gjakova, was apparently shown an 'original Serb document, dated 1938,
advocating wholesale deportation of Albanians from Kossovo and replacement with
Serbs'.27
The two officers also saw how fear and ethnic hatred bred distrust of
everything communist. This was illustrated clearly by the situation at Dege, where
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Andy Hands was supplying the few ragged bands of Albanian Partisans that heralded
from Kosovo. Unpopular among their own people, who feared that their activities and
ideology posed a serious threat to the more agreeable status quo, these bands had been
forced to seek shelter over the old border. But they were not very welcome in northern
Albania either, as Hibberdine noted. 'The partisans here are not local people and are in
fact disliked by them. Communism is not popular as communism means Tito and Tito
means Yugoslav interference'.28 (Anti-Serb feeling also explains why Mihailovic and
SOE missions attached to him made little progress in fostering resistance in Kosovo.
The predominantly Serb Chetniks were loathed and feared by the majority of the
29
population in the region.)
Kemp and Hibberdine also saw how Germany had managed successfully to
minimise resistance by incorporating most of Kosovo into Albania in 1941 and by
recognising 'Greater' Albania as an independent country in 1943. 'The majority of
Kosovars preferred a German occupation to a Serb' Kemp reported later. 'The Axis
powers had at least united them with their fellow Albanians, whereas an Allied victory
would, they feared, return them to Yugoslav rule'.30
Such sentiments explained the willingness of many Kosovo Albanians to
collaborate with the occupying Axis forces.31 In September 1943, for example, several
prominent Kosovar Albanian officials formed the so-called Second League of Prizren,
named after another group of leading Albanians who had met in 1878 at the time of
the Congress of Berlin to press their national interests on the great powers. This new
Second League attracted perhaps as many as 15,000 members; many of its leaders had
worked closely with the Italians and continued to work with the Germans after the
Italian collapse. As Noel Malcolm writes, the League's appeal, however, 'was
primarily to Albanian nationalism (and, as a by-product of that, to anti-Communism,
given that the Communists were seen as aiming at the restoration of Yugoslav rule),
and not to pro-German sentiment as such'. Statutes were drafted proclaiming the
League's chief intention as 'the defence of the liberated areas [i.e. from Yugoslavia]
and of other areas of the former Yugoslavia'. An armed force was raised (which, some
of the League's apologists claim, was used only against the Chetniks; others have
argued that it was engaged in cleansing Kosovo of Serbs and Montenegrins). And an
executive committee was created with the Kosovo Albanian politician Rexhep
Mitrovica appointed chairman.32 A leading figure on the central committee of
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Albania's Balli Kombetar party, Mitrovica had never been keen on the Italians, who
imprisoned him in 1942. He did see, however, that the party had much to gain from a
good working relationship with the Germans. In November 1943 he became head of
the new German-sponsored government in Tirana.
There is no evidence that Kemp and Hibberdine ever leamt much about the
Second League of Prizren during their time in Kosovo, other than that such a
movement possibly existed. It was clear to them, however, that all Albanians they met
in Gjakova sympathised with the League's primary aim. 'I should make it clear that
the Irredentists do not form a single party', Kemp stressed later 'but rather a group,
drawing all their support from all parties but the Communists'. They clearly formed
'the most powerful group' with support 'among every class, profession and
occupation in the area'. Hibberdine recorded in his diary in early January: 'Peter and
I were discussing the people of Djakovica last night and came to the conclusion that it
is not the large landowners in this part of the world who give the drive to the
Irredentist movement, but the small people - shop owners, clerks, artisans; and these
small people show a determination unlike any other Peter has seen in Albania'.
Chatting days later with Ejub Binaku, their local bodyguard and guide, Hibberdine
and Kemp were told: 'Rexhip Mitrovica is so far from being a collaborates [sic] that
if he came to Djakovica tomorrow Ejub would have no hesitation in taking us to his
house'.34
From their tortuous talks with notables in Gjakova, the two officers also came
to see that few Albanians were prepared to put aside their fear of the future and risk all
for the Allied cause. Hibberdine's diary provides something of the flavour of those
discussions, with a long description of a meeting he and Kemp held in the town on the
evening of 7 January. Sulejman Riza and Sulejman Bey Kryeziu, both influential and
respected Kosovo notables, and Fuad Dibra, the colonel commanding the Albanian
Army in Kosovo, were all present; so, too, was Ejub Binaku. Kemp and Hibberdine
had stressed already their wish to leave Gjakova and explore the rest of Kosovo and
suspected that these men, whose assistance they required to do so, were stalling.
Hibberdine scribbled in his diary:
[The conference] started with promises to help us as much as they
could, apologies for our prolonged stay here, and tales of the
badness of the weather. We were told: it was only a matter of a
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week of two before the Irredentist group declared against the
Germans and came out into the open prepared to fight; meanwhile
they were willing to commence small actions of violence and
sabotage at once. A conference was to be held of the Irredentist
group to decide their position, the Albanian army [in Kosovo] is to
prepare plans for attacking the Germans as they withdraw from the
Balkans and is to start training irregulars in the use of arms. So far
so good. But their plans with regard to our immediate future were
far less pleasing. The weather, the political situation, etc, all so
many arguments which we could not easily rebuff because of our
lack of information were used to persuade us to withdraw to Dega
[Dege] until the weather cleared, and the political situation eased
(although what exactly the political business is or has to do with it, I
can't say). A great argument ensued, Sulejman Riza gesticulating
wildly and pleading with us to have confidence in him... the
Colonel silent except for an occasional spasm of laughter and one or
two short phrases, Sulejman Beg [sic] looking like a prosperous
butcher and saying nothing, Ejub scowling and obstinate and saying
plenty, [and] Peter and I getting more and more angry... However
we were beaten in the end, mainly by Sulejman Riza's generous
gesticulating and calls for confidence. So now we are going to hang
around the Kossovo area for a few days and then return to Dega. As
one last concession they promised us to arrange a conference of all
Kossovars willing to fight the Huns... Some hope. Peter wants to go
home.
Other than the handful of Partisans at Dege, most Albanians in northern Albania and
Kosovo who confessed to be willing to fight offered to do so only when the Germans
began to leave. Men like Ejub Binaku, who promised 'immediate and effective action
on the part of his men', were rare and not nearly enough. Ejub's offer 'was most
refreshing', Hibberdine noted, 'but we considered immediate action too premature'.
The gendarmerie and army commanders from Peje (Pec) with whom Kemp held
discussions were more typical: both promised to keep him 'furnished with information
about the Germans, but neither would commit themselves to any military action prior
to a German withdrawal or Allied invasion'.36
Kemp became convinced that 'no real military action' could be achieved
'without some sort of declaration from the Allies, to the effect that the people of
Kosovo would be able to decide their own fate and form of government after an Allied
-37
victory, by free plebiscite... under Anglo-American supervision'." Nevertheless, he
and Hibberdine remained impressed by the pro-Allied sentiment of the Kosovo
Albanians they met, the pledges of support, albeit conditional, that they received and
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the risks run by their hosts in sheltering and protecting them. And on 9 January, sitting
in Hasan Kryeziu's house in Gjakova, the two officers composed a long message to
SOE Cairo summarising the results of their talks. Hibberdine copied the text into his
diary. Extracts read:
[The] irredentists [are the] strongest group [in] KOSSOVO with
reps and sympathisers [in] all parties except... communists [who
are] few and unpopular due [to widespread] distrust of TITO's
policy [towards] KOSSOVO... TITO wants KOSSOVARS as [an]
ALB minority in JUG or [with] autonomy [only] within [a] JUG
federation... all classes here want KOSSOVO [as an] integral part
[of] ALBANIA... all tell us our presence boosts pro-BRITISH
feeling here as [they] now feel [they are] not forgotten... [The]
greatest fear [here is of the] SERBS... [An A]llied assurance [that
the Allies will] restrain SERB forceful entry here pre-allied control
[of Kosovo would] greatly increase [the] effect [of] anti-Hun
action... KOSSOVARS won't fight for return [of] JUGS under
whom worst oppression [occurred] as evidence shows... [In]
summary [we] much hope [to] organise anti-Hun resistance here...3
That hope then received a dramatic boost when the pair sat down to their meeting with
Gani Bey Kryeziu and his brother, Said, on the evening of 22 January in a village on
the Albanian side of the old border.
Kemp describes in his memoir how he and Hibberdine found Gani and Said in
poor health but good spirits, keen to arrange the trip that the officers wanted around
Kosovo and 'impatient to go into action with us against the Germans'.39 The brothers
explained how they had escaped from prison amid the confusion of Italy's surrender
in September 1943, reached Gjakova only days before and set off at once into the
mountains to find Kemp's mission. Hibberdine's diary reads:
Our meeting was enthusiastic on both sides and we were soon in
serious conversation... Gani showed himself keenly interested and
very enthusiastic about our work. What he said can be summed up
in this remark: "We will make your journey. Give me five or six
days to get things ready. There is nothing I won't do for you"...
[They are] eager to do all they can to unite all parties in the
struggle against the Germans. We'll let them try. I don't think they
realise just how opposed to each other some of the parties are.40
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But Kemp and Hibberdine had high expectations of Gani. He was widely respected as
a leader and talented politician and impressed Kemp as a 'shrewd and careful planner'
who 'would make up his mind quickly and carry out his decisions with speed and
vigour'.41 He had also served as an officer in the Yugoslav army. 'Almost everybody
with whom I had talked in Kosovo, of whatever political opinions, had stressed the
influence of Gani which was second to none' Kemp reported later. 'Moreover, though
he had his enemies, almost everyone admitted his ability, integrity and sympathy
towards the Allies'.42 Gani and the SOE officers went to work quickly. 'Over the raki
and goats cheese we talked late into the night - of suitable targets for attack, of the
stores we should need, of a joint battle headquarters for the Kryezius and ourselves, of
dropping grounds and arms caches'.43 Gani told Kemp he already had a hundred
armed men but could easily raise 'ten times that number' and 'reiterated his
willingness to help us and co-operate to the most of his power'. He agreed, too, on a
plan for a general insurrection in Kosovo 'in one front against the enemy'. Although
an avowed Albanian nationalist, Gani also made no request for any Allied
pronouncement on Kosovo's future.44 Back at Dege, on the morning of 24 January,
Kemp and Hibberdine transmitted the following message to Cairo: 'Saw GANI and
SAID KRYEZIU who [have] escaped [from] ITALY... and [are] now in [the] hills
[with us]... [They have] promised [to give us their] fullest help and fix our journey
within [the] week'.45
The order that Kemp sever all his contacts in Kosovo reached Kemp and
Hibberdine later that day. But while Kemp, in his memoirs, implies that that order had
been influenced by news of the encouraging contact he and Hibberdine had made with
Gani, this seems unlikely. Hibberdine noted in his diary that he and Kemp had drafted
one earlier message, on 19 January, in which they reported they were 'trying [to]
arrange a meeting' with Gani after hearing of his presence in Gjakova. But given the
time taken to encipher, transmit and decipher messages and then send them up to the
proper authorities, no one in Cairo would have known the result of that meeting or
learnt that Gani had 'taken up arms' before the order was despatched telling Kemp to
pull out. Indeed, Hibberdine's diary, in which the full text of the incoming message is
recorded, confirms that the Kryezius were not mentioned by name in the order.
(Hibberdine's reference to that order as a 'bombshell' does suggest he felt the same
shock as Kemp at its receipt.)46
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As SOE records now reveal, however, the earlier report the pair drafted in
Gjakova on 9 January had had a very significant impact in Cairo. Sent by runner from
Gjakova to Dege for onward transmission by Andy Hands (Kemp and Hibberdine had
had no w/t set with them), it was received and decrypted in Cairo by 18 January.
Stressing the strength of anti-Serb and anticommunist feeling and that the future of
any meaningful resistance to the Germans could only lie with the Albanian
irredentists, it shed considerable light for observers there on the current state of ethnic
division in Kosovo. It also included an appeal from the two officers for a 'directive' to
guide them in their work.47 On its receipt, Philip Leake drew up a short paper for
submission to higher authority in which he set out the essence of the political and
resistance scene and the state of SOE's contacts in Kosovo as reported from the field.
He also requested guidance on how to respond. On 21 January, Leake sent the paper
to the Head of SOE Cairo's Balkan Sections, explaining that Kemp and Hands had
established contact in Kosovo 'with Nationalists and Partisans respectively' and
stressing that, 'owing to the delicate nature of the situation, a directive is urgently
required'.4
Leake's paper stands as an accurate summary of the reports about Kosovo that
Kemp and Andy Hands had transmitted to Cairo throughout the winter. In it Leake
emphasised that the situation was 'extremely delicate owing to the existence of strong
racial as well as ideological feeling'. He explained that 'Irredentist feeling' was
'predominant and the majority of the population belongs to Nationalist groups',
though these were 'reluctant to take immediate action against the Germans, as they
wish to reserve their strength for the post-war defence of Kosovo'. Nevertheless,
several leaders had promised to assist with propaganda and intelligence, while action
by Albanian military and gendarmerie forces 'at the time of the German withdrawal'
was still possible. On the other hand, SOE support for the nationalists was likely 'to
cause difficulties with the Jugoslav partisans', while support for the Kosovo partisans
was likely 'to produce action but if injudiciously supplied will precipitate civil war'.
The nationalists were 'anti-Partisan' but as yet there had been 'no fighting between
the two factions'.
No one in SOE Cairo had the authority to issue the directive Leake requested.
Thus the future of SOE's activities in Kosovo came up for discussion the following
day at a working meeting in Cairo of the Special Operations Committee (SOC). It was
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this committee that decided to order Kemp's withdrawal. And it is the existence of
this committee that stands as a measure of how successfully the Foreign Office had
reasserted its influence on SOE operations in the Balkans by the end of 1943. The
Foreign Office had always been meant to exercise political control of SOE activities
through SOE's main headquarters in London while full operational control lay in
Cairo with the local military command, GHQ Middle East. In early 1943, however,
Whitehall began to complain that SOE Cairo, on the encouragement of GEtQ Middle
East, was supporting communist and anti-royalist guerillas in Greece and Yugoslavia
at a level unacceptable to Foreign Office policy. In September, after great debate,
often at the highest levels, it was agreed that the 'main policy for SOE' was to be
settled in London, between the Foreign Office and SOE with reference if necessary to
the Prime Minister and War Cabinet. GHQ Middle East would retain 'sole control and
direction' of 'the execution of the SOE policy' in Greece, Yugoslavia and Albania
since they were 'operational theatres', but receive political guidance about operations
in those countries from a newly created committee, based in Cairo. This would act as
'the normal channel' through which the Foreign Office would express its views.49
That committee was the SOC. Its members included local representatives of SOE and
GHQ Middle East and the British Ambassadors to Greece and Yugoslavia. In this
way, although SOE Cairo now received its orders directly from GHQ Middle East, the
Foreign Office was able to keep a close eye on SOE's Balkan activities and play a
direct role in discussing and approving the policy that guided them. By January 1944
the SOC's number also included Christopher Steel, a career diplomat and former
Counsellor in the Cairo Embassy who was then working as the permanent political
adviser to SOE Cairo. In line with that appointment SOE had agreed that Steel would
be granted 'completely free access to [SOE Cairo] files and... kept as fully as possible
in the picture in regard to all activities in the countries with which he is concerned'.
He had also been specially authorised by the Foreign Office to act for Albania on the
SOC 'in the same way as the Ambassadors to Greece and Yugoslavia' giving him a
unique ability to comment on policy and ensure that the interests of the Foreign Office
were upheld.50
As the minutes of the working committee's 22 January meeting record, it was
Steel that played the decisive role in recommending that Kemp's activities in Kosovo
come to an end.
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Mr Steel referred to the position of KOSSOVO which was a bone of
contention between the Serbs and the Albanians, and which had
been handed back by the Germans to Albania. We had at present a
LO [Liaison Officer] both with the Nationalists in that area and with
the Albanian partisans. It was important that we did not get involved
in any disputes over this territory, especially in view of its
sentimental value to the Serbs, and it was therefore proposed to
withdraw the LO with the Nationalists.51
The committee agreed with Steel that the 'LO with the Nationalists should be
withdrawn'. SOE complied with the ruling. Kemp received the bad news two days
later. Neither Leake's paper nor his appeal for a directive was specified in the minutes
as under discussion. However, Steel's comments, together with his correspondence
with Leake during this period, suggest he and Leake worked together so closely that it
is impossible to believe he had not seen Leake's paper or discussed the matter with
him before the meeting.
Subsequent decisions confirm that Steel and the SOC agreed that British
interests had something to gain from maintaining healthy relations with Partisan units
in and around Kosovo. Days after Kemp was told to sever his contacts with
nationalists and irredentists, more orders followed for Andy Hands, again authorised
by the SOC, instructing him to remain in touch with the Kosovo Partisans.52 Steel, in
his role as SOE's political adviser, also personally approved an increased subsidy for
them of 1000 sovereigns. On 7 February the SOC's working committee then minuted
its agreement with all points raised in a paper by Philip Leake recommending
ST
continued contact with the Kosovo Partisans. " Drawn up at the SOC's request, this
paper had stressed that the Partisans were few, poorly armed and unpopular 'owing to
the strong nationalist and conservative feeling which prevails in North Albania and
particularly in the Kosovo area'. It had also conceded, however, that there were
several advantages to be had from continued contact with them. These included the
desirability of having a friendly route out of northern Albania into Yugoslav partisan
territory and the value of having friendly forces on hand to attack the chrome mines,
harass the Germans and provide intelligence in northern Albania and Kosovo.
Moreover, Leake felt, severing contact with them might well have 'a disagreeable
impression' on Tito's partisans. By contrast, there was 'no risk of this contact
embroiling us with [the] Jugoslavs over the Kosovo question' since the Kosovo
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partisans 'represent Jugoslav as well as Albanian interests and are largely under
Jugoslav control'.54
Yet decision-makers in Cairo were also aware in January 1944 of the priority
the Foreign Office had long given privately to assuaging Yugoslav claims to Kosovo.
This is implicit in Steel's reference to the 'importance' of recognising Kosovo's
'sentimental value to the Serbs'. It is also illustrated by the fact that Steel and the
SOC's working committee, rather than the main SOC, authorised Kemp's withdrawal
and did so without pause to analyse the competing claims to the province or even refer
the issue to London. The main SOC had been established 'to consider what changes
were necessary in policy which had already been laid down'.55 The working
committee, on the other hand, was 'a daily committee, under the SOC, charged... with
co-ordinating day to day operations in accordance with HMG's policy in Greece,
Albania and Yugoslavia'. It 'was not intended to deal with matters of policy but to
ensure that appropriate action in accordance with agreed policy was taken on
important matters arising out of signals received by SOE'.56 And in this case, recent
discussions in Cairo had underlined for diplomats and other observers the importance
of avoiding any clash with Yugoslavia over Kosovo.
Those discussions had taken place in October 1943 and been precipitated by
another, earlier, appeal from Peter Kemp. In late September, weeks before setting foot
in Kosovo but anxious to maximise his mission's chances of success, Kemp requested
Cairo to secure an official declaration on the province's future. From discussions in
Albania since August, he reported later, he had come quickly to appreciate 'the urgent
importance of the Kossovo question to all Albanians' and the potential value to SOE
of securing such a declaration:
It is no exaggeration to say that it was a burning anxiety in the
minds of all I met - even of people living a long way from Kossovo;
people of such widely differing views as Enver Hoxha, Mustafa
Gjinishi57, Ymer Dishnica58, Vasil Andoni59, Halil Maci60, to name a
few of them, all agreed on the importance to Albania of a just
settlement of the Kossovo problem - which they all agreed could
only be secured by a return to Albania of Kossovo. They all pressed
me to obtain from the Allies a simple declaration, not that Kossovo
would be returned to Albania, but simply that the future of Kossovo
would be settled by plebiscite held under Allied supervision in the
area; alternatively they requested a declaration from the Jugoslav
Government in London that they would consent to such a plebiscite.
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All of them impressed upon me that without such a declaration the
work of any BLO [British Liaison Officer] in Kossovo would be
extremely difficult, if not impossible.61
Kemp discovered that the Atlantic Charter, issued by Churchill and Roosevelt in
August 1941, was not enough for Albanians. The Charter proclaimed 'certain
common principles in the national policies of their respective countries on which they
base their hopes for a better future for the world'. These included respecting 'the right
of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live' and the
establishment of a peace 'which will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in
safety within their boundaries, and which will afford assurance that all men in all the
lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want'.62 But Albanians wanted
greater assurance as to the state of Albania's post-war borders, Kemp felt. On 29
September he transmitted to SOE Cairo a message 'requesting a declaration by the
Yugoslav Government that the people of Kosovo would be allowed [a] free choice
between a JUG or ALBANIAN Government in accordance with the Atlantic Charter'.
SOE's Albanian Section in Cairo received Kemp's appeal on 2 October. Judging it a
matter of potential effect to policy, it accordingly drew up a paper 'requesting that an
approach be made to the Yugoslav Government asking them to issue a statement that
the people of Kossovo should be allowed to decide after the war whether Kossovo was
to be part of Yugoslavia or Albania'. That paper was passed to the relevant decision¬
making body in Cairo, the main SOC, which duly pronounced the fate of Kemp's
appeal after considering it on the morning of 13 October. 63
As the minutes of that October meeting show, Kemp's request for a
declaration was dismissed out of hand after the briefest of discussions. Only Ralph
Stevenson, the British Ambassador to Yugoslavia, spoke, and that to say simply 'that
it was unlikely that the Yugoslav Government would accede to such a request, nor
was it desirable that such a request be made. It had already been made clear that any
questions regarding frontiers would have to wait until the peace conference'. The
committee 'agreed that no approach should be made to the Yugoslav Government
concerning the future of Kossovo'.64 SOE transmitted to Kemp the bad news: 'Regret
that prospect obtaining declaration from HMG or JUG GOVT regarding future
KOSOVO or other disputed districts at present absolutely nil. You should therefore
take line that such problems outside your competence as you are concerned with
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military matters only'. The message was repeated to 'Trotsky' Davies: 'SOC rpt SOC
has ruled that there is no rpt no prospect of any declaration by HMG or JUG GOVT
regarding KOSOVO district'.65
As Foreign Office records reveal, Stevenson's comments were wholly in line
with the importance Whitehall had attached for some time to avoiding any
commitment to recognising any of Albania's borders even before Kosovo had been
shorn from Yugoslavia. In 1940 the Greeks had opposed much of what SOE was
planning in Albania, fearing that such activity, backed by Britain, might jeopardise
claims to what the Greeks termed Northern Epirus, the southernmost part of Albania.
The Albanians with whom SOE was working hoped for some kind of assurance that
their country, once free of the Italian occupier, would remain intact after the war. But
the Greeks were judged to be the more vital allies and, to please them, the Foreign
Office deferred to their concerns and turned down SOE's appeals for a statement on
Albania's borders. As Philip Nichols of the Southern Department minuted in February
1941: 'it has long been a cardinal point in our policy over Albania to march in step
with the Greeks'.66
That perceived diplomatic need for a non-committal policy on Albania's
frontiers was reinforced when the Axis incorporated most of Kosovo into Albania in
1941. In June 1942, Lord Glenconner, the Head of SOE Cairo, passed an appeal from
Margaret Hasluck for some form of declaration on Albania's independence. The
Foreign Office, however, now conscious of Yugoslav desires to reclaim Kosovo,
refused to move. Hasluck had hoped a favourable declaration might again give
encouragement to Albanians to resist.67 Pierson Dixon of the Southern Department
replied that while the government looked favourably on the idea of an independent
Albania after the war 'we do not feel that the moment [for a declaration to that effect]
has yet arrived'. He concluded: 'the SOE angle is not in itself sufficiently weighty to
justify us in making such a declaration now'.68 Sir Orme Sargent, Deputy Under¬
secretary of State, shared Dixon's concern. He wrote in July: 'if we make a
declaration of policy we are likely to stir up a small hornet's nest, for the Greeks and
the Jugoslavs will, whatever reservations we may make, feel that they must not miss
the opportunity for staking out their claims... The most it could do would be to enable
SOE to enlist a few more agents... On the whole therefore I should be inclined to
leave the declaration alone for the moment'. The Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden,
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minuted his agreement. Even when a statement was finally made in late 1942, after
more SOE pleading and the Foreign Office having conceded that Britain was 'now on
the offensive in the Mediterranean', it carefully avoided any reference to Albania's
future borders.69 While Britain wished to see Albania 'freed from the Italian yoke and
restored to her independence', Eden announced in December, 'His Majesty's
Government regard the question of the frontiers of the Albanian State after the war as
a question which will have to be settled at the peace settlement'.70 And when
'Trotsky' Davies, on the eve of his departure for Albania, appealed for a fresh official
statement of encouragement and praise for the Albanian guerillas the opportunity was
taken to reaffirm the official line.7' 'The policy of HMG remains as explained by my
right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in his statement on 17th
December 1942', Churchill declared to the House on 4 November 1943; 'that is to
say, we wish to see Albania freed from the Axis yoke and restored to her
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independence. The frontiers will of course be considered at the Peace Settlement'.
This remained British policy towards Albania's borders for the rest of the war.
And although interested diplomats and desk officers were neither blind to the issues at
stake nor unsympathetic to Albanian claims, few had doubts as to Kosovo's probable
post-war fate. In July 1943, Arnold Toynbee's Foreign Research and Press Service
(FRPS), part of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, completed a study entitled
'The Albano-Yugoslav Frontier. This conceded that the border created by the
Germans in 1941 'did approximate justice from the ethnic point of view'. In February
1943, however, the FRPS passed to the Southern Department a draft of its study
'Albania as an International Problem'. It contained a brief passage on the Albanian-
Yugoslav frontier that concluded: '[i]t is very probable that at the end of the war a
reconstructed Yugoslavia will reclaim the territory lost to Albania in 1941'.73 Denis
Laskey, the Southern Department's Albanian desk officer, highlighted that sentence
and minuted in April: 'In paragraph 11 it is said that Yugoslavia will "very probably"
reclaim the territory lost to Albania in 1941. I should have thought that this could be
regarded as virtually certain'.74 Douglas Howard, Head of the Southern Department,
agreed, and incorporated Laskey's minute when replying to the FRPS with his formal
comments on the draft.75
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Suspecting that the Allies had it within their power to secure the allegiance of
a people whose paramount concern was for a future free from Yugoslav domination,
Kemp lamented the absence of any declaration. He recalled in April 1944:
In several signals I impressed upon Cairo the urgency of this
problem and the importance of a declaration, but each time I
received the same reply - that there was no prospect of any
declaration on the future of Kossovo either from HMG or the
Jugoslav Government, and that I must take the line that such
problems were outside my competence as a soldier. Such a directive
could only have been given by people wholly unfamiliar with the
situation in the field. This political problem was so bound up with
the military situation that neglect of it rendered sterile any attempts
at military action...
I believe that the chances of organising some military activity
against the Germans in Kossovo may still be good, given some
Allied encouragement to the Kossovars on the lines... suggested...
True, the Irredentists would prefer to sit on the fence and do nothing
until the Germans began to withdraw or the Allies to land in the
Balkans but I think that, given such a declaration, we could have
forced them into action. Without it we can expect nothing, since we
are offering them nothing to fight for, and so we are leaving the
field open for German propaganda to convince them that, if the
Allies win, they will revert to Jugoslav rule.
Cairo's advice that he 'tactfully avoid' questions concerning Kosovo's future was
pointless, he believed, for 'it was quite impossible to avoid them, as they were
invariably the first questions put to me by everyone I met in the area - of whatever
party. I hedged as best I could, calling to my help the already overworked Atlantic
Charter, but although I avoided committing HMG in any way I could not succeed in
swaying the Kossovars on to our side sufficiently to take up arms for us. They did not
trust our post-war policy towards them'.76 That distrust was fair enough. That Kemp
was ever allowed to proceed to Kosovo had everything to do with the fact that
diplomats and other observers never realised the full state of tension there until after
he crossed the border in December 1943.
Kemp's conviction that a pro-Partisan policy had been at work was also
reasonable, given that Cairo had told him on 24 January that his contacts were having
an 'undesirable... effect on JUG partisans'. It added two days later: '[our Relations
with JUG partisans [have] overriding importance'.77 But this explanation for his
withdrawal was misleading. For one thing, British sensitivity to the Kosovo 'issue'
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clearly predated the emergence of Tito's Partisan movement. But it is also now
apparent that Kemp's withdrawal was effectively accompanied by a ban on all SOE
operations in Kosovo, whether in support of nationalists or Partisans. Neither SOE nor
the SOC in Cairo proved themselves in favour of encouraging resistance in Kosovo
for its own sake. That is, neither recommended blind support for the Partisans
regardless of its impact on local tensions. In his 21 January paper on the state of
SOE's contacts in Kosovo, Philip Leake advised strongly that the whole situation be
handled 'with utmost caution and all support and contact... be cut off at the first sign
of civil war'.78 At their 22 January meeting, Steel and the SOC 'agreed in discussion'
that the presence of any liaison officer in Kosovo 'was not essential either for
intelligence or military purposes'.79 And Kemp fails to acknowledge in his memoir
that the instruction despatched to him to keep out of Kosovo applied equally to Andy
Hands. The full text, recorded in Hibberdine's diary, reads:
No ops in KOSSOVO area [are to be carried out] against
ALLATINI mines or other targets [as we] consider [them]
inadvisable owing [to the] danger [of] starting civil war. For
HANDS and KEMP also continued contact with ALB Nationalists
and Irredentists [in the] same area [is considered] undesirable in
view [of its] effect on JUG partisans. KEMP [is] to break tactfully
with Nationalists etc and return to SPINSTER HQ.80
When Hands duly received orders to remain in touch with the Kosovo partisans, he
was instructed to 'break off contact at the first signs of further political complications'
and placed under strict orders to operate only 'within the old Albanian border'.81
Although contact was renewed with Gani Bey Kryeziu later in 1944, the ban
on SOE operating in Kosovo remained in place for the rest of the war. Noel Malcolm
writes that '[t]he British policy of cold-shouldering the Kryezius remained in force
from January until June 1944, when contact was renewed and plans for organizing
89
resistance in Kosovo were formed once again'. This is incorrect. No plans for
encouraging resistance among Albanians inside Kosovo were ever revived. In April,
the British Military Mission in Serbia reported a statement from Tito that Kosovo's
future would be settled by plebiscite after the war. The report had no obvious impact
on the policy guiding SOE in Kosovo. That SOE ever re-established contact with
Gani owed something to Billy McLean's return to Albania in April and his new
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Foreign Office-approved directive to encourage nationalists in northern Albania to
work with the Partisans and fight the Germans. It also owed something to the dramatic
stance that Gani was prepared to take against the Germans, which saw him qualify for
Allied arms. But Gani's decision to base himself in northern Albania rather than
Kosovo was also important. When Major Tony Simcox began receiving drops for
Gani, he remained 'restricted' to operating only inside Albania's pre-1941 borders.84
In the summer of 1944, Gani opened a guerilla campaign against the Germans
in a corner of northern Albania and south-western Kosovo that provides an important
coda to Kemp's activities there the previous winter. It was certainly not a general
revolt of the kind that SOE had planned in 1940-41 and that some of its officers, as
shall be shown in subsequent chapters, had hoped for in 1944. Pre-occupied with the
threat posed by the Partisans and unwilling to risk damaging reprisals, no other
Albanian nationalist leader in northern Albania proved himself prepared to join Gani
and gamble on fighting the Germans in the way that the Allies wanted. Indeed,
compared to the efforts of the Albanian Partisans to the south and Yugoslav Partisans
to the north, Gani's campaign was tiny in scale. In consistency and commitment to
Allied war aims, however, his efforts rivalled those of any Balkan guerilla and
impressed all on the Allied side who saw or heard of them. For some observers, it also
seemed to confirm the promise SOE had identified earlier both in Kosovo and in him.
Contemporary reports confirm that all SOE officers who worked with Gani
agreed he was pro-British, prepared to serve the Allies unconditionally and hoped, by
doing so, to win their approval and a degree of recognition for Albanian claims to
Kosovo. On being evacuated to SOE headquarters in March 1944, Kemp had pressed
his view that Gani was 'the outstanding political figure' in Kosovo, 'very pro-British
and seems a most able and intelligent man with a sound grasp of statecraft. I think he
could do a great deal for us as he has great influence... and - what is rare in the
Balkans - a high degree of integrity'.85 When McLean and his mission contacted Gani
again in June, as Reginald Hibbert writes, 'they heard from an Albanian nationalist
what every BLO in the north had long been waiting to hear - an unqualified
declaration of readiness to fight the Germans at once in whatever way the Allied C-in-
C might direct'.86 McLean reported after their meeting:
GANI BEY KRYEZIU, with his brothers SAID and HASSAN, is in
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the mountains West of DJAKOVA. His influence is considerable,
on both sides of the border... though it is not certain whether he
could raise the 2,000 rifles at which he used to be valued. The
KRYEZIUS live as outlaws, publicly denounced by the HUNS
against whom they have recently fought two actions, killing seven
and wounding four: they are thus the only NATS now fighting the
HUNS. As NATS and landowners they have refused to [join the
Kosovo Partisans]... but... are on excellent terms and actively
collaborating with [them]... They have used their influence with the
peasantry to provide the Partisans with a safe harbour which
otherwise they might not have found, given the anti-Partisan attitude
of the region. At present GANI has mobilised one hundred men,
lacking means to maintain more for any length of time. He has
however agreed to mobilise all he can if other NATS take the field
and till then to undertake alone operations in proportion to aid
supplied by us. Meanwhile he has agreed to begin immediate
sabotage... In general his attitude is most satisfactory and his
written propaganda at which he is most industrious both intrinsically
good and in tune with our own.87
Gani asked McLean for a British officer to be attached to him. McLean gave him the
experienced Tony Simcox, a twenty-six year old veteran of Dunkirk, Tobruk, the
retreat from Burma and seven months with SOE in Albania.88
Simcox spent more time with Gani than any other SOE officer and became as
convinced as Kemp and McLean of his qualities. 'Gani, as an individual, has a most
striking personality', he reported later, 'and gives one the impression of genuineness
and honesty. He is well educated, has travelled the world and is a perfect gentleman...
What has really happened is that a very influential, well educated person has called
together the true patriots... for the purpose of fighting the Germans in order to free his
country, and at the same time gain for his country the right to receive a hearing in the
Peace Conference'.89 Gani had even issued and circulated the following declaration to
all Albanians in Kosovo, and asked McLean to have the British broadcast it in his
name:
You have been misguided by leaders who have told you that Hitler
and Mussolini are the friends of Albania and that the Tirana
Government has its conduct agreed by our Allies. The Germans
have declared Albania independent but how can this be while it is
controlled and administered by Germans? Our friends are the Allies
and the only way to gain their favour is to fight now. In no other
way can we hope to gain future independence and inclusion of
KOSOVA [sic] in Albania. Let us unite regardless of party, clan or
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religion to show the world that we want our independence by
helping the Allies to fight those nations who wish to domineer the
smaller nations.90
'He has a genuine faith in... British Foreign Policy', Simcox commented later.
'[LJittle does he know his own fate'.91
Simcox also found himself in the midst of a small but escalating guerilla war.
Again, this was exactly what Kemp had hoped for in January and McLean in June.
'G.B. [Gani Bey] is very active' Simcox wrote to another SOE mission in northern
Albania on 8 July, 'and has killed some Huns in offensive raids and there is no doubt
that he ought to receive some assistance. In the meantime he is spending his own
fortune in supplying and maintaining about 100 men... It is difficult for him to carry
out another raid until he can get the munitions (the last raid used all the rounds for the
Bren and the men were forced to buy from the villagers of Deg[e] a further
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supply...)'. All arms duly dropped to Simcox were collected safely by Gani's men -
a notable feat in northern Albania where looting from dropping grounds was
commonplace - and used only against the Germans. By the end of July Gani was
continually in action and Simcox calling in regular airdrops and reporting a 'series of
planned and successful actions which not only proved Gani's genuineness but also
gave him widespread publicity'. Raids and ambushes grew in scale, German reprisals
ever more brutal. Attempts to overrun Simcox's dropping ground and destroy Gani's
mountain base were repulsed with German losses of over seventy.93 A thousand
Albanian volunteers and several hundred troops of the all-Albanian SS 'Skanderbeg'
division were brought in by the Germans but apparently refused to fight him.94
Simcox, with the assistance of Gani's men, blew up several bridges, including one in
Kosovo on the main Gjakova-Prizren road when eighteen German soldiers were killed
as their lorry crossed at the moment his explosives detonated. In August, Gani's force
overran the chrome mines at Kepenek and Kam in northern Albania, destroyed the
facilities, killed or captured over fifty German and quisling troops, and freed over
seven hundred Serb slave-workers forcibly employed in the mines. The Germans
responded by sweeping through the area burning hundreds of houses to the ground.
Hostages were taken from villages along the old Kosovo-Albanian border and hanged
in Gjakova. And all the time Gani's band grew in number, volunteers arriving daily
from towns and villages all over Kosovo and many deserting from quisling units,
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including the 'Skanderbeg' Division.95
'Ultra' decrypts and captured documents, together with records held at the
Bundesarchiv-Militararchiv (BA-MA) in Freiburg, confirm that the Germans
considered Gani a genuine and active threat. A German report compiled as early as
mid-April placed him and his estimated 300 supporters at the top of a list of 'Hostile
Bands'.96 On 16 June, an SOE officer pulled a recent review of the Albanian situation
from a German staff car ambushed north of Tirana. Written by the commander of the
German 297 Infantry Division, the document described Gani as 'a pro-British leader
who had attacked their troops north of the Drin [river]'.97 A decrypted Abwehr
message sent from Tirana to Berlin on 29 June reported a rumour that Gani was
preparing 'to destroy the chrome mines near Gjakova'; the SS 'Skanderbeg' Division
and three hundred quisling troops were being employed 'to liquidate the guerilla
band'.98 On 16 September Billy McLean reported the contents of a bag of documents
captured on the night of 11/12 September from a small German convoy ambushed on
its way south from Scutari (today's Shkodra) to Tirana. Included was a report from the
Sicherheitsdienst in Scutari of information, from its sub-unit in Prizren in southern
Kosovo, that warned of an imminent attack by Gani on Gjakova.99
In mid-September he did indeed lead his force, which Simcox estimated then
as over 1,500 strong, in a significant assault on his hometown of Gjakova. On the
night of 10-11 September, from his bases in northern Albania, Gani and three hundred
men began the attack by over-running the strategic German camp at Zogaj, close to
the frontier with Kosovo. 'It was a very brave advance (such as I could not before
credit the Albanians for) under very heavy enemy mortar and M.G. fire' Simcox
reported, 'and had the effect of causing the enemy to withdraw in disorder'. Gani's
brother Hasan and three hundred other men then stormed and held the mountain pass
at the Cafa Prusit border-crossing; at dawn on 12 September, Gani and the rest rushed
down on to the Kosovo plain, captured all the villages between the mountains and
Gjakova and within hours were at the town's edge. Enemy outposts were bombarded
using captured mortars and artillery and the German barracks and petrol and
ammunition dumps were all attacked and set ablaze. Only German reinforcements and
a shortage of ammunition forced Gani to fall back with his men into northern Albania.
The attack on Gjakova proved to be Gani's last offensive action, however.
Albanian partisans, on the heels of the German withdrawal from southeast Europe,
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now arrived in northern Albania and set about liquidating Gani and his movement.
After retiring from Gjakova, Gani made for the mountains to rest his men and plan for
a second assault; Simcox left for his own camp nearby to prepare and call in more
supplies before rejoining the attack. But Albanian Partisans then arrived unannounced
at Simcox's camp and he and his w/t operator were disarmed and arrested.100 Said
Kryeziu, taken alongside, was fortunate to escape with his life: Simcox's interpreter
was summarily tried as a renegade communist, then stripped and flayed to death in
front of him.101 Simcox managed to send one message to SOE headquarters 'in
defiance' of the Partisan commander who had arrested them:
[On] Sept 19 [this mission] less [Lieutenant Roy] Bullock [was]
captured by Ptsns... [fjorced to load [our own] mules and move by
forced marches. Could gain no reason from Comd Ptsns and was
merely told that he had received orders to remove me from
circulation. We are treated quite abominably by Ptsns who [have]
refused [to] allow us to control [our] HQ kit with [the] result [that]
part [of the] wireless [was] lost and [the] batteries [were] removed
by Ptsns to prevent communication with you... [We] know nothing
of [the] fate of GANI KRYEZIU. We still remain prisoner of
Ptsns.102
Said and the British pair were marched south into central Albania where they were
turned over to SOE officers who saw them evacuated safely to Italy. And with Simcox
out of the way the Partisans went after the remaining Kryeziu brothers. Hasan was
murdered in Kosovo in early 1945; Gani's fate for a while remained unclear. Only in
April 1945 did a rumour filter through to the British Military Mission in post-
occupation Tirana that Gani was being held a prisoner of the Yugoslavs in Pristina.103
The Foreign Office response to Gani's plight underlines the limited
willingness and ability of British diplomats to confront the Yugoslavs over Kosovo.
Ralph Stevenson, by then the British Ambassador in Belgrade, pressed Tito for
information on Gani first in April and again in May. Stevenson emphasised Britain's
interest in his fate, then extracted an ominous statement in early June. Admitting for
the first time that Gani was indeed in prison, the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry stressed
that, as a Kossovar, he was technically speaking a Yugoslav. The implication was
clear: the British should mind their own business in what was an internal Yugoslav
affair.104 This was spelt out to Stevenson in July. 'I have discussed the question of
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Gani Kryeziu on a number of occasions with Dr Subasic,' he telegraphed the Foreign
Office on 23 July. 'He informed me today that [the] Yugoslav Government regards the
matter as a purely internal one. Gani Kryeziu is a Yugoslav subject and it is difficult
for [them] in these circumstances to admit that a foreign government has any right to
intervene. The only answer which [the] Yugoslav Government could return to my
representations would be on these lines and they wish to avoid if possible sending
such an answer to His Majesty's Government. In these circumstances do you wish me
to press the matter any further?'105 Stevenson was also conscious of why the
Yugoslavs might be keener to keep him in prison. The following day he telegraphed
again: 'My own view is that, although there is no doubt about the question of Gani
Kryeziu's record of resistance to the Germans, we do not (repeat not) know what his
activities may have been during the early part of this year. We do know that the
Yugoslav Government have had a good deal of trouble in that part of Kosovo where
Gani Kryeziu is influential and there is at least a possibility he may have been
concerned in it. In these circumstances I do not think we can do more than express to
Yugoslav Government the hope that his record of resistance will be taken into
consideration at his trial'. But although the seriousness of Gani's plight was slowly
becoming clear, Whitehall was reluctant to leave him to his fate. 'It is certainly
possible that Kryeziu has been working for the return of Kosovo to Albania,' Laskey
of the Southern Department minuted on 26 July, 'but this need not stop us asking the
Yugoslavs to deal with his case promptly and to formulate any charges that they wish
to bring against him'.106 Douglas Howard telegraphed Stevenson the following day:
I agree that extent to which we can intervene is limited but I do not
wish to abandon Kryeziu's case without making a further effort on
his behalf. Unless you see objection you should therefore speak to
Dr Subasic on following line.
We certainly do not claim any right to dictate to the Yugoslav
Government how they should treat a Yugoslav citizen. This is, as Dr
Subasic has stated, an internal Yugoslav matter. Nevertheless,
Kryeziu has rendered us considerable services and we know that he
has worked wholeheartedly for the Allied cause. We cannot remain
indifferent to his fate since it is not our practice to abandon our
friends. We hope therefore that his case will be dealt with promptly
and that if the Yugoslav authorities have charges to make against
him these will be investigated without delay and that his record will
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be taken into account in his favour'.
109
Months passed before news emerged that Gani was to be tried on trumped up charges
of murdering Yugoslavs in 1941, collaborating with the Germans and causing
unnecessary Partisan deaths during his assault on Gjakova in September 1944. In
November 1945 British diplomats received word that Gani had been tried, found
guilty and 'sentenced to five years hard labour and the loss of civil rights for five
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years'. The Foreign Office protested, drawing on evidence provided by Tony
Simcox and other SOE officers that challenged every charge against Gani.
Foreign Office files give no indication that Tito's government ever
reconsidered Gani's case, however.109 In May 1946, the Belgrade embassy, having
received no response, informed the Foreign Office that 'particularly in view of the
Yugoslav Govt's official statements about "intervention" which the Mihailovic trial
has occasioned, we are very doubtful of success'.110 One desk officer in London
minuted: 'At the present rate of progress, Kryeziu will have finished his sentence of 5
years imprisonment before we get a reply out of the Yugoslav Govt'.111 At the end of
May the British embassy learnt that 'it was probable that in about six months or a
year's time Kryeziu would be amnestied'.112 The Foreign Office resolved to 'return to
the attack in six months' and did so, and returned to it again twelve months later.113 In
February 1948, however, the Yugoslav Foreign Minister informed the British
Ambassador that Gani was not, in fact, going to be amnestied.114 The embassy
informed Whitehall in October: 'We fear that in present circumstances, when the
Yugoslavs are out to prove they are more Communist than Moscow, any further direct
approach from us is more likely to do harm than good to Kryeziu. Such an approach
would certainly not, at the moment, have any hope of attaining a revision ofKryeziu's
sentence'.115 References to Gani in Foreign Office files die away at that point and no
one on the British side appears to have been certain of what happened to him after
that. 'Gani was in jail when I came to Belgrade as No. 2 in our embassy in March
1945' Sir William Deakin recalled over fifty years later. 'I was instructed to declare a
British interest, and request his release - a step that possibly led to his liquidation'.116
But in Kosovo it is thought that Gani lingered on in the notorious prison of Sremska
Mitrovices until as late as 1951.117 His family in Gjakova believes he was executed on
the last day ofhis sentence.118
Gani's record of resistance and fate may have helped colour the judgement of
SOE officers who called for greater Allied support for him in 1944. Tony Simcox
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argued that, when the Albanian Partisans opened their summer offensive against the
nationalist north, the supply of Allied arms to the Partisans should have ceased. 'We
have let the Nationalists of Albania down', he wrote in late 1944, 'especially Gani
Kryeziu, who has fought well and is sacrificing more than any communist... Allowing
the communists to kill, attack, or provoke their political enemies with our supplies is
as bad as doing it ourselves'. He added:
It is a little late now, but our policy should have been to stop
supplies to the FNC [Albanian Partisans] the moment they used
them against their political enemies and then increased supplies to
people like Gani Kryeziu. In a very short while, the nationalists of
the north would have ranged themselves behind Gani, fought the
Germans well without interfering with the FNC and then claimed to
be recognised as a government. This war has helped communism
due to the large scale destruction, but there is no need for the British
and Americans to help it even further!119
Such arguments, however, fail to acknowledge the strength of the grounds on which
British policy-makers sought to focus on military gain and remain aloof from
becoming embroiled in internal Balkan disputes. David Talbot-Rice, Head of SOE
London's Balkan and Middle East, was one observer better placed than SOE officers
in the field to appreciate those grounds and the value of the Partisans in the war
against Germany. He wrote on reading Simcox's report: 'there is no doubt that
Kryeziu was a far more attractive individual than were most of the FNC [Albanian
Partisan] leaders and he was prepared to take action without any long term political
ends in view but we should, I think, consider the big picture of successful FNC
Partisans operating in the south... and of Tito and his Jugoslavs, operating to the
north. This, I think puts the situation into a truer perspective, however one may
sympathise with Simcox's attitude'.120 Simcox was not alone, of course, in claiming
that an important opportunity had been missed. Peter Kemp believed that a chance to
foster resistance in Kosovo with Gani at its head had, a few months earlier, been
passed over simply to keep the Yugoslav Partisans on side. But the decision in
January 1944 to bring SOE's presence in Kosovo to a close was no less pragmatic
than the decision to continue supporting the Albanian Partisans that summer. It was
true that the Foreign Office was conscious of Tito's value at that time. But the end of
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SOE's involvement in Kosovo reflected considerably more sensitivity to local
tensions and territorial claims than has previously been recognised.
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Chapter Four
Philip Leake, SOE and British policy towards the Albanian resistance
December 1943 to June 1944
At five o'clock on the morning of 7 June 1944, a pair of German Dorniers flew down
the Lunxheri valley in southern Albania and attacked an SOE mission camped outside
the Partisan-held village of Sheper. An SOE officer present reported later that
Lieutenant-Colonel Philip Leake, the Head of SOE's Albanian Section, 'who was
proceeding to the coast that day [for evacuation and] was the only person out ofbed at
the time', was the only casualty, 'killed by the first bomb. He was buried with Partisan
military honours the same morning in the Greek Orthodox Churchyard at Shepr'.1
Critics of Britain's support of Albania's Partisan movement in 1944 highlight
the death of Leake, who had left his desk job a month earlier to drop into the country,
as a tragic turning point. Peter Kemp sees it as 'a most fortunate accident for the
2 • 3Communists'. David Smiley feels Leake's loss dealt 'a bad blow to our mission'. In
June 1944 Smiley had been in Albania as a member of an SOE team trying to
persuade certain anticommunist nationalists to fight the Germans. Had Leake not been
killed, imply Smiley and Kemp, those Albanians might have been allowed more time
and space in which to fight and prove their worth, won British support for their cause
and saved Albania from communism. Instead, so the argument goes, British policy¬
makers became so biased towards the Partisans that the nationalists were
unnecessarily and unfairly neglected and, ultimately, left to be defeated by a Partisan
army equipped with British weapons.
This chapter illuminates Leake's views on policy and resistance in Albania
between December 1943 and the early summer of 1944. It seeks to demonstrate that
Smiley, Kemp and others distort and exaggerate his influence on the decision-making
process and his support for the policies they advocated. Leake, throughout that period,
maintained that Britain should support all Albanians who were committed to fighting
the Germans but avoid any kind of political commitments. Taking sides in domestic
Albanian squabbles, he felt, would only aggravate local tensions, damage relations
with genuine resistors and hamper the Albanian war effort. On these grounds, Leake
argued, the Partisans deserved continued support for as long as they fought the
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Germans. He was also certain that the Partisans could never be reconciled with the
nationalists and foresaw that any British attempt to forge an agreement between them
would only complicate matters. In 1944, however, SOE's ability to affect policy in
Albania was slight. Leake's concerns were not shared by the Foreign Office, which
proceeded to over-commit Britain to the nationalist side.
'Anyone who knew Philip Leake would have liked him and been impressed by
his grasp of affairs and objective and unbiased approach' remembers Marcus Lyon,
who worked with the Albanian Partisans throughout 1944.4 All accounts support that
assessment; Leake was very highly regarded. Born in 1906 and educated at Dulwich
College and Oxford, where he read Modern History as a scholar at Corpus Christi, he
then taught for a time at Dulwich College Preparatory School, where his father had
been headmaster. For a time, the son, too, ran the school, but he did not warm to the
job and, when war broke out, was living in Southampton and working as Education
Inspector for Hampshire and the Isle of Wight.5 Bickham Sweet-Escott, who had a
long career on the SOE staff, then recruited his 'oldest friend' directly into the
organisation in June 1940. Leake received an automatic commission into the
Intelligence Corps and three years later became Albanian Section Head.6 'A gentle,
kindly person with a nice sense of humour, a dry, cynical wit and that "transcendent
capacity of taking trouble" which Carlyle equated with genius', Kemp writes, 'he was
a most capable officer, well fitted for his post as head of the Cinderella of the Balkan
Country Sections'.7
Leake had no specialist knowledge of Albania but the post of Section Head
called more for a man with experience of SOE staff work and he certainly had plenty
of that. For his first year he had worked in its Baker Street headquarters in London,
assisting first the Head of the Balkan Section and then the Head of the African Section
who sent him overseas.8 SOE's War Diary locates him in Lagos in September 1941
working in its West African office.9 While there, according to Kemp, Leake may have
been involved in some capacity with Operation POSTMASTER: SOE's dramatic
capture of two Italian ships off Fernando Po in January 1942.10 Another SOE officer,
however, places Leake that month on board a troopship leaving the United Kingdom
for Durban. From South Africa, according to that officer's memoirs, Leake was
involved income capacity in Operation IRONCLAD: SOE's effort to spearhead the
British capture of Diego Suarez.11 In any event, Leake had certainly arrived in South
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Africa by the spring of 1942 and became assistant Head of SOE's East African
1 9
mission there. The War Diary puts him in Durban, working for that mission, in
May.13 His SOE Personal File puts him in Madagascar in January 1943, promoted
major and working with SOE's sub-mission there, which, for a time, he commanded.
And in May, after a spell running a joint intelligence centre in Cape Town, he was
posted to SOE's Cairo headquarters where he took charge from Margaret Hasluck of
its fledgling Albanian Section. Some weeks had passed since the first SOE mission
went into the country; more were planned and Leake set about recruiting a small staff
and running the Section along more regular lines.14 'He was extremely well organised
[with]... a very quick... logical and linear mind' remembers Jon Naar, whom Leake
recruited in Cairo in November 1943 to become the Section's military intelligence
officer. 'The thing that amazed me most about Philip was that he had the ability to
compose a fairly long memorandum to London or wherever in his head. He never
seemed to have any written notes but he would sit there for forty-five minutes and
simply dictate to one of the secretaries. I was very impressed by that'.
With the recent release of SOE's records, such memoranda now reveal Leake's
opinions on policy at critical points and do much to confirm his qualities, his aptitude
for the role of Section Head and his judicious and careful handling of reports from the
field. 'Leake was a schoolmaster by profession and in character' recalls Naar, 'tending
to be academic but eminently fair in his judgements'.16 His response to the receipt of
Trotsky Davies' proposals of 17 December 1943 is a case in point. Given the
historical significance that Albanian political parties attach today to those proposals, it
17is also a case worthy of detailed examination.
Davies had reported that it was 'imperative' the Allies declare openly for the
LNC Partisans and denounce the puppet government, the Zogists and the Balli
Kombetar. The BK and Zogists, Davies stressed, had failed to fight the Germans
despite repeated promises and opportunities to do so and were employing Britain's
failure to denounce the Regency government as evidence of Allied sympathy with
their anti-Partisan stance. Mixed German and BK forces, meanwhile, were now
attacking the Partisans. According to Margaret Hasluck, Leake's initial reaction to
Davies's proposals was to suggest that SOE would have to obey them 'loyally'. This
response may have been in line with the chain of command but did not reflect Leake's
personal opinions at that moment. When sharing his thoughts officially with higher
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authority days later, Leake agreed with Davies that the Partisans deserved continued
support but also argued that it was too soon for Britain to come out in sole support of
them.
Leake's grounds for opposing Davies' call for exclusive support of the
Partisans are set out in a paper he prepared on 24 December for the Special Operations
Committee (SOC). The SOC was the body of local diplomatic and military
representatives in Cairo which advised GHQ Middle East, the command that
controlled and directed the execution of SOE policy in the Balkans, and discussed all
matters arising out of SOE's operations that were considered of possible affect to that
policy. In his December paper, Leake gave an appreciation of the military value of
Albania, which he considered to be slight at present given the current state of civil war
and that the Partisans were mostly occupied in trying to survive. He also summarised
the pros and cons of Davies's recommendations. One advantage was that continued
co-operation of the Partisans would be secured, which was 'essential to the effective
execution' of SOE's 'operational tasks'. Another was that Britain's support shown to
be genuine; the BK, he noted, were now definitely collaborating. On the negative side,
Leake considered that breaking with the BK and Zogists would end all hope of a
general, widespread uprising at the war's end and frustrate important intelligence-
gathering and other operations in nationalist regions of northern Albania and along the
coast. He also warned that by supporting only the Partisans 'we shall be committed to
a policy of intervention in a purely Albanian conflict and to the support of a
movement whose ultimate success and popular backing are uncertain'. Leake
recommended that no break should be made with the BK or Zogists. The Partisans,
however, should be given ongoing assistance, 'increased publicity' and official
assurance that the BK and Zogists would be supplied only if they 'openly adopt a
policy of active hostility to the Germans'.18
Leake's recommendations met with the approval of the SOC. Discussing
Davies' message in Cairo on 29 December, the committee agreed with the reasoning
in Leake's paper and his suggestion that it would be unwise to break with the BK and
Zogists.19 In London, to where all policy proposals had to be referred for approval, the
Foreign Office, the War Office and SOE all fell in with the SOC.20 A Foreign Office
telegram was duly sent to Cairo concurring with the SOC's recommendation. It was
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duly confirmed as policy on 24 January in the following directive from GHQ Middle
East:
Military support to Albanian guerillas and the actions of British
Allied Liaison Officers in Albania, will be governed by the
following policy:
(a) No declaration will be made in favour of, nor will any open
break be made with, any particular Albanian party or guerilla
band.
(b) The maximum financial and material assistance which, having
regard to other British commitments, can be made available for
Albania, will be given to all guerilla bands, irrespective of their
political allegiance, which are actively resisting the Germans or
are genuinely prepared to do so.
(c) Increased publicity will be given... to the resistance efforts of all
bands resisting Germans.
In accordance with this policy, Allied personnel in Albania were instructed to
'maintain contact with all guerilla bands and individuals actively resisting the
Germans, or who may be induced to assist the Allied war effort in any material
21
degree'. That policy remained in place and unchanged long into 1944. In practice, it
meant that SOE remained in touch with the BK, Legality and other nationalists and
kept working on them to fight the Germans even though the Partisans were the only
movement actually doing any fighting.
Reginald Hibbert argues that the failure to stand by Davies's proposals was a
critical error in the development of British policy. 'Davies [had] put his finger on the
essence of the situation' Hibbert writes, 'the civil war had already begun in earnest
and, from the point of view of the Albanian "nationalists", the Germans were acting in
it as the nationalists' instrument for the destruction of the LNC. Unfortunately for the
LNC, for Britain's relations with Albania and perhaps too for Albania itself, the
Brigadier's mission in Albania virtually ended with this [message]'. A German
offensive had forced Davies off the air and on the run two days after sending his
message. He never qualified his proposals before being ambushed and captured on 8
January, and his disappearance, Hibbert believes, prevented observers outside Albania
from appreciating that civil war had 'irrevocably started'. The autumn and early
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winter of 1943 had seen the first half of the conflict; if the Partisans survived that
winter's German offensive 'there was no way in which the second part could be
prevented in 1944'. Based on the belief that they were not yet locked in a fight to the
death, later British attempts to bring certain nationalists and the Partisans back
together were always going to fail. Hibbert concedes that 'a recommended change of
policy with far-reaching implications could not possibly be accepted in Cairo, and
even less in London, on the basis of a single, summary telegram'. He is scathing,
however, about the 'would-be non-interventionist' view: 'by sending BLOs [British
Liaison Officers] to Albania, Britain had already committed itself to stirring up
resistance... and must expect to be taken over by events if it tried to become non¬
committal'.22
Declaring all-out for the Partisans in December 1943, as Hibbert suggests, may
well have been better for Britain's future relations with Albania, given the
extraordinary growth in size, strength and influence the Partisans underwent in the
spring of 1944 and the fact that most nationalists would never fight the Germans. Yet
Hibbert underestimates the sense of uncertainty surrounding the future of Allied
operations in Albania. He also underestimates Leake's ability to make a well-reasoned
appraisal of the picture as it appeared at that point. SOE's records suggest that Leake's
desire to remain aloof from any exclusive commitment to the Partisans reflected an
accurate assessment of how SOE could best do its job, without aggravating the
political situation, based on the information then available to him.
Recent reports from Davies and other officers in the field had suggested that
the decline in Partisan resistance was almost terminal. As Leake stressed to SOE
London in a long paper on 14 December, three days before Davies issued his policy
proposal: 'little in the way of operations can [now] be expected from the partisans and
none from the Ball[i] Kombetar'. Partisan strength stood at just three tiny brigades,
'each about 200-600 [men] strong', and was confined to a shrinking corner of
southern Albania. These units had conducted virtually no offensive operations against
the Germans since the beginning of November; no evidence existed to suggest they
would even survive the winter, let alone recover and return to the attack. If SOE was
to achieve anything in Albania, it had to keep its options open.23 Davies himself had
stressed in mid-November that SOE 'must be active' even if the Albanians failed to
take any action.24 Leake echoed that recommendation in his 14 December paper:
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The principal operational task of the Mission should be to prepare a
scheme of widespread action to be carried out on the [German]
withdrawal... or an Allied invasion. The dispositions of the enemy
should be carefully observed and plans laid for hindering their
retreat, directing tactical bombing and causing the maximum
disorganisation. One can but hope that when the Germans finally
leave the country the Albanians will be prepared temporarily to sink
their differences in order to speed the enemy on his way.
It follows that there can be no question of withdrawing the
Mission either wholly or in part... It is essential that Albania is
covered by parties capable of maintaining and working up the
proper contacts in order that full advantage may be taken of any
operational opportunities... at the time of the inevitable German
retirement.25
These views remained essentially unchanged, though condensed, in the paper Leake
submitted to the SOC two weeks later. He repeated them in a telegram to SOE London
in early January. The civil war, currently 'in full swing', was 'undoubtedly
precipitated' by the Partisans who did 'not possess the same popular support as in
Jugoslavia' and whose 'ultimate success' was 'by no means assured' and 'influence...
virtually limited to Southern Albania'. He concluded:
It appears therefore that [the] adoption [of] Trotsky's
recommendations would politically involve us in [an] Albanian civil
war possibly on the wrong side and from [the] military standpoint
necessitate [the] abandonment [of] important nationalist contacts in
Northern Albania...
In view of [the] above we felt obliged to advise SOC that
no... open political declarations should be made unless considered
absolutely essential for the continued existence of the Mission...
Before reaching this conclusion we should of course normally have
referred back to Trotsky but as you are aware contact with him was
lost on December 19th.26
Only in the spring of 1944 did SOE begin to appreciate that the Albanian Partisans
who survived the winter were capable of establishing a movement able to inflict
substantial damage on the Germans and secure considerable popular support. A
situation report drafted by Leake in late February again refers to the Partisans as 'in
decline': those in the mountains near Tirana were 'dispersed'; the remainder was
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confined to the southwest and 'seriously threatened by persistent German drives'.
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Today, with a greater understanding of the conditions in which his mission
was living and operating in Albania in mid-December 1943, grounds can be made out
on which to question the objectivity of Davies' judgement at that time. In his memoir,
Illyrian Venture, he neither mentions sending his 17 December message nor his
grounds for wanting a break. But his mission's War Diary miraculously survived the
disasters that subsequently befell Davies and his men, being carried to safety by
Captain Alan Hare, the only officer from the group to survive both the ambush and the
rigours of being on the run for weeks in freezing winter conditions. In February 1944
Hare passed the Diary to Major George Seymour; later that year it was brought out
safely from Albania and passed into the possession of SOE's Albanian Section in
Bari. Since the end of the war the Diary has been in private hands and, until viewed by
the author of thesis in 2002, had not been seen by any writer since Davies' death in
1952. The document records the movements, discussions and deliberations of Davies'
mission and sheds important new light on why he recommended all-out support for
the Partisans at the end of 1943. It also details Seymour's subsequent work in early
1944.
By mid-December 1943, the Diary confirms, the Germans had been
surrounding Davies, his mission, Enver Hoxha and the Partisan command for two
weeks. This was 'affording us a valuable opportunity of getting to know the members
of the [Partisan] Council and they us' recorded the Diarist, Colonel Arthur Nicholls.
But by 17 December the mission was in desperate straits, expecting to be on the
receiving end of an imminent German offensive from which it was far from convinced
it would emerge unscathed. It was also despairing at the absence of Allied broadcasts
that encouraged the Albanians to resist. Extracts from Nicholls' entries for 15, 16 and
17 December read:
Wednesday, 15 Dec 43...
Eden's speech in the House listened to with interest on the wireless.
Once again Jug and Greece are plugged but no mention of Albania.
It's very heartbreaking and discouraging and each time our stock, so
carefully built up, is sent crashing down. Distant sounds of MGs
firing...
1400. E.F.D. [Davies] has long walk and talk in the winter sunshine
with Enver Hoxha. A good deal of ground is covered and E.F.D.
stresses the vital necessity or his getting out [to Cairo] soonest
poss...
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Thursday, 16 Dec 43...
Our appreciation is that the Hun will attack here any minute...
There is virtually nothing between us and the Boche except some
half-baked village idiots. The 2nd [Partisan] Bde and the Italians
have withdrawn... and the remnants are dispersed all over the
countryside and have lost such coherence as they ever possessed.
E.F.D. holds a late Council of War and issues his orders [for]...
Battle Stations and Stand-to tomorrow at first light. Sten guns and
grenades, newly arrived by air sortie are cleaned and issued. We
should be able to give some account of ourselves at least.
Friday, 17 Dec 43...
0600 Stand-to... Country almost uncannily quiet...
0800 Stand-down. Lovely sunshine but very cold. Every effort to be
made to get and maintain max contact with CAIRO over next few
days. Much to say which it is essential should be recorded in case
9R
we are killed or put in the bag.
Frustration and fear of his mission's imminent extinction may well have compelled
Davies to suggest that day to Cairo that he felt the Partisans deserved continued and
exclusive support and better recognition. There was no guarantee that he would ever
reach Cairo to be able to make such an appeal in person.
German pressure, then, may have partly determined the timing of Davies'
proposals to Cairo in mid-December 1943. However, given that there was no
guarantee that the Partisans would survive such pressure either, it may be wondered
whether Davies had not taken his eye momentarily off the ball. In mid-November, he
had advised continued support for those actively fighting the Germans, impartial
treatment of all sides, pending proof condemning those who were accused of
9Q
collaboration, and non-intervention in the civil war. A month later, when he advised
that policy-makers condemn the BK and Zogists, it was clear that the Partisans still
deserved continued support in view of their anti-fascist stance and the concerted
German efforts being made to destroy them. There was also no question that the BK
was working with the enemy: the mission could see and hear them fighting with the
Germans against the Partisans. But by mid-December Davies could not have been sure
that, if the Partisans were wiped out, the Zogists and other Nationalists could not be
persuaded to turn on the Germans. Certainly nothing in the War Diary or in Davies'
reports or memoir suggests he believed that the Zogists, who were not yet engaged in
civil war, or even the BK were wholeheartedly pro-German. Indeed, fighting all
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around them had prevented Davies and his mission from having any direct contact
with any Nationalist leader for over four weeks. It is also interesting to note the
reaction of other SOE officers in northern Albania to Davies' proposals. In early
February 1944 the dying Arthur Nicholls, who had escaped the ambush of 8 January
but suffered terribly while on the run, came up again on air. George Seymour had
found Nicholls hidden and being treated by a friend of Abas Kupi, the Zogist leader.
Impressed with Kupi's professed pro-Allied stance and apparent potential, Nicholls
reported that he felt Davies' December proposals were 'out of date'.30 Seymour, too,
recorded and reported his own 'consternation' on hearing news of the proposed
policy.31
The sidelining of those proposals met Leake's desire to see Britain remain
uncommitted in Albania. However, it also marked the last point at which Leake was
fully behind an important policy decision. No sooner had the SOC's decision to
overrule Davies been accepted, than a new Foreign Office-backed initiative to work
out some form of agreement between the Partisans and Kupi began to emerge. The
idea had first been mooted after Major Billy McLean and Captain David Smiley, the
two senior members of the four-man mission that had first gone into Albania in April
1943, were evacuated from the coast in mid-November after seven months in the field.
In Cairo at the end of that month they expressed their view that to abandon all
Nationalists at that stage would be hasty and, since it appeared to them that the
Partisans had precipitated civil conflict, unjust. They also suggested that the civil war
might be stopped if certain nationalists could be persuaded to fight alongside the
Partisans. 'Our policy should be to back the Partisans with all possible material aid as
they are the only military force worth backing in the country' McLean reported. 'At
the same time, we should maintain contact with the Nationalist groups, and, if
possible, try to stop the Civil War. We should try and ensure that the more anti-
German Nationalists should either collaborate with or enter in the LNC movement'.32
After discussions with McLean in London, the Foreign Office expressed
support for his proposal that Abas Kupi be encouraged to align himself with the
Partisans.33 A gendarmerie officer before the war, Kupi proclaimed himself a loyal
supporter of King Zog and hailed from the king's own region of Mati in northern
Albania. He had also had put up a brief but spirited resistance to the Italian invasion in
1939, been one of Oakley-Hill's irregulars in 1941 and subsequently joined the
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Partisans, a record that so enhanced his reputation that he was appointed one of the
few non-communists on the movement's central council. In late 1943, however, he
had split from the Partisans, ceased fighting and, in the mountains ofMati, established
a pro-Zog party, Legaliteti (Legality). Soon he opened talks with the anti-Zogist but
fiercely anticommunist Balli Kombetar. But if Kupi could be persuaded to rejoin the
Partisans, McLean thought, he might provide a rallying point for other nationalists
prepared to resist the Germans, and thus make the Partisans more representative of
Albanian opinion and reduce the scale and intensity of civil conflict.
Leake shared the view that important military grounds existed for maintaining
contact with Kupi. Although Kupi had not fought the Germans since September 1943,
reports received from George Seymour suggested the situation might change: Kupi
claimed to be planning a national army, many thousands strong. And given his recent
orders to plan for Operation Underdone, a response to what was rumoured to be an
imminent German withdrawal from the Balkans, Leake was especially anxious to
discover what exactly Kupi had to offer.34 In a letter of 7 February to Christopher
Steel, the Foreign Office's adviser to SOE Cairo, Leake wrote:
According to our latest information Kupi, while still not definitely
off the fence, is planning a national force embracing his own
Zogists, the BK and moderate members of the LNC... An offensive
plan is under consideration for a concerted attack on selected
targets. Kupi has impressed the various BLOs who have met him
differently but the consensus of opinion is that he is an upright
patriot who would never collaborate with a foreign occupying
power... In the interests of our BLOs, I should be grateful... that in
pursuance of our tightrope policy, we go as far as we can to please
Abas Kupi without committing ourselves. He is a figure of great
35
importance for intelligence and operational purposes."
Leake repeated this assessment in a paper to the SOC on 12 February. Describing the
situation as 'valuable but requires careful handling', he advised against granting
Kupi's requests for arms, 24,000 sovereigns, Allied recognition of a Zogist
government in exile and a broadcast by Zog urging unity of resistance:
It is impossible to depart from our existing policy of political
impartiality by declaring for Zog without seriously embarrassing
BLOs attached to the Partisans who continue to be the only
organisation fighting the Germans. The BBC is considered in
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Albania to be the mouthpiece of the Government. A broadcast
utterance by Zog would certainly be regarded as a mark of official
support.
Instead, Leake suggested, Kupi should be sent 4,000 sovereigns, some token arms but
otherwise a non-committal response, and that McLean and Smiley be recalled from
a f.
London for attachment to Kupi at the earliest opportunity.
Yet Leake would never be convinced of the wisdom of trying to forge any kind
of reconciliation between Kupi and the Partisans. His first assessment of the idea was
in December 1943, days after McLean had arrived in Cairo from Albania:
It has been suggested that it would be practicable to attempt to
widen the base of the LNC by inducing Abas Kupi and the Zogists
to make common cause with the movement, and if possible, to
persuade Zog to put pressure on Kupi for the purpose. If a really
sincere and effective rapprochement were possible, the prospects of
a speedy end to the civil war would be greatly improved and once
this was accomplished, there is little doubt that both factions would
be prepared to fight the Germans. However, it is more likely that,
though Kupi might comply outwardly in deference to Zog's wishes
and the partisans in their present plight be ready to accept him, in
fact no concrete result would be achieved.
Though the nationalists of Kupi's party are not actually
members of the Ball[i] Kombetar, their views and interests are
practically identical and their support for Zog is due to his value as
an effective counter balance to the growing strength of the partisan
movement. It is possible, therefore, that the sole outcome would be
endless procrastination and prevarication, leading to mutual
recriminations and disputes. The opposition between partisans and
nationalists is too deep and fundamental to be overcome by an
artificial 'combine'.37
Two weeks later, when SOE London suggested that Cairo support Davies' proposals
on the grounds that German policy was to stoke the flames of civil war, Leake replied
emphasising that the situation was more serious than London could see. 'Even
moderate nationalists such as Abas Kupi are strongly and probably irreconcilably
opposed to the partisans'.38
Despite news in January of Seymour's encouraging contacts with Kupi, Leake
summoned little enthusiasm when informed by Christopher Steel of London's support
for McLean's plan.39 The Foreign Office had sent for Steel's views. As the initiative
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came from London it was not discussed by the SOC, but Steel still asked Leake for his
thoughts. He replied to Steel on 8 February:
I do not consider it likely that Kupi would return to the LNC: it has
far too strong a communist tinge and has openly declared against the
Ball[i] Kombetar nationalists with whom Kupi is in close sympathy.
Kupi may and probably will succeed in detaching non-political
elements from the LNC... [but] I am not quite sure how this will
help us. The LNC will be reduced to a 100% communist
organisation and the contrast between left and right be given added
emphasis. Kupi may conceivably be able to negotiate a truce or
modus vivendi... [but] it would be a very uneasy affair owing to the
blood that has been shed and the sharp opposition of outlook and
interests. In short, my view is that the left versus right contest must
be fought out in Albania - the communists do not compromise.40
Replying to the Foreign Office on 12 February, Steel's comments were closely in line
with Leake's. 'I also have discussed [the] political situation in Albania with Major
Maclean [sic] and am familiar with his views', Steel's telegram to London began.
We all here regard him as exceedingly intelligent and level-headed
but... his scheme to broaden the LNC... is now only wishful
thinking.
[Recently] Abas Kupi... has made... proposals of a
superficially most encouraging nature for the creation of a national
guerilla movement. Nevertheless although he now appears seriously
to contemplate active hostilities against the Germans... there is
absolutely no evidence that Kupi would collaborate with the LNC...
He is a staunch anti-communist and I am advised that he would be
much more likely to attract the remaining non-Communist elements
from the LNC to his own organisation... than to re-enter the
former...
I do not think we could attain any results by an ambitious
political manoeuvre such as Maclean proposes which would be
commensurate with the political difficulties into which we should be
drawn.41
But at a meeting at the Foreign Office on 18 February these warnings were brushed
aside. McLean, who was present, considered that there was some force in the
objections but felt there was a fifty per cent chance of his plan succeeding and that
things could hardly get much worse than they were already. The Foreign Office did
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not disagree and wheels were put in motion for McLean's return to Albania to work
with Kupi.42
Steel was right, however. Nothing reported from the field had suggested that
Kupi or the Partisans could or would be reconciled. Tension between the BK and
Partisans pre-dated the Italian armistice; SOE officers had reported open and
widespread conflict between them since. Although it had so far refrained from
fighting the Partisans, there was no doubt that Legality, like the BK, had been formed,
as Leake wrote in December, 'largely... to counter-balance the influence of the
partisans' and that its supporters' policy was 'to remain aloof and consolidate their
strength'. SOE officers had found Kupi 'affable and friendly, but unwilling to commit
himself to any positive line of action'. Leake conceded that Kupi had 'impressed
Brigadier Davies as a sincere patriot and his earlier record supports this judgement'.
But even Davies, Leake wrote, had reported in mid-November that he believed the
'Zogists under Abas Kupi' might yet come to the BK's aid against the Partisans.43
While convinced that the outlook for any kind of agreement was bleak, Leake
was also conscious of the difficulties SOE had experienced when trying to intervene
in similar situations elsewhere in the Balkans. In March he wrote to Major Eddie
Boxshall, who dealt with Albanian matters for SOE London, that, 'while we want to
keep the two parties apart, it is important BLOs [British Liaison Officers] should not
be maneouvered [sic] into the position ofmediators. Experience in Greece shows what
little effect the intervention of a British officer has on the course of Balkan politics'.44
In Greece, in 1942-43, SOE had found itself supporting EAM/ELAS, the communist-
dominated and anti-royalist guerilla movement, and EDES, the royalist guerillas. SOE
had worked hard to persuade these rival groups to fight the Germans instead of each
other and eventually negotiated the 'National Bands' agreement, by which
EAM/ELAS and EDES agreed to co-ordinate their actions with the plans of GHQ
Middle East. It did not last. Civil war erupted again, and escalated. By the end of
1943, as William Mackenzie writes in his Cabinet Office history of SOE, '[a]lmost
every liaison officer was on bad terms with the local ELAS command and was
continually on the run in order to avoid German activity or the movements of the civil
war: the danger of being caught by the Germans was probably less than that of
random murder by one of the contending Greek parties. Activity against the enemy
was at a standstill'.43
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Leake and Steel were not alone in their uneasiness about McLean's plan to
reconcile the Partisans and Kupi. Officers in SOE London, wary of becoming over-
committed again to rival guerilla movements, shared Leake's concerns. David
Keswick, Director of SOE's operations in the Mediterranean, wrote to Colin Gubbins,
the Head of SOE, on 14 February likening the 'pattern of disunity' in Albania to that
seen in Yugoslavia and Greece. If Kupi were armed, he warned, 'we might... find
ourselves tied to the same policy of backing the restoration Right Wing party and the
Left Wing simultaneously with exactly the same results'. He added:
Both Maclean [sic] and his companion Smiley seem to be very able
and level headed men, but they are very young, and are soldiers at
present serving as BLOs with SOE without any experience or
background of politics, and more especially Balkan politics. I am
anxious that we should avoid, if possible, the difficulties we have
experienced in Yugoslavia and Greece, and that our BLOs should
not be given an intricate political task which they are not fully
qualified to perform.46
W.E. Houstoun-Boswall, a regular Foreign Office official who had been on loan as
Political Adviser to SOE London since August 1943, looked back to the days when
SOE's support for EAM/ELAS on military grounds had clashed with longer-term
considerations. Churchill, the Foreign Office and even SOE's Minister, Lord
Selborne, had come out strongly in support of the monarchists on one side, while SOE
and the military pressed the EAM/ELAS case on the other. But while EAM/ELAS
may have been 'the most effective resistance movement in Greece' as the Chiefs of
Staff pointed out in February 1944, ultimately the strategic value of Greek resistance
was judged to be less important than considerations of post-war politics. 7 Caught in
the middle of this was SOE, which became a scapegoat for the Foreign Office who
held it responsible for supporting EAM/ELAS to unacceptable lengths. 'We do not
want a repetition of Greece', Houstoun-Boswall wrote to Gubbins on 28 February,
'nor do we want our officers to be blamed for showing too much sympathy to one
particular resistance group... We should, I submit, tactfully put our point of view as
strongly as we properly can to the Foreign Office indicating what we see to be the
risks of allowing ourselves to be carried away by the enthusiasm and romanticism of
Major Maclean [sic]'.48
130
Even Leake's 12 February suggestion that Kupi be sent some arms and 4,000
sovereigns went too far for some. On 25 February David Keswick in London wrote to
Gubbins and other high-ranking SOE staff officers stating that he was 'not at all happy
about the trend of policy with regard to Albania'. If Kupi was armed 'we may well
have created just such another situation in other Balkan countries - an especially close
parallel is Greece - and may well have fomented an acute civil war without in any
way increasing the discomfiture of the enemy - if anything on the contrary... I
suggest that our policy should rather be continuance of some slight support to the
LNC... combined with a policy of ignoring [all]... other... movements completely'.
Keswick, one ofmany bankers recruited by SOE London during the war (in peacetime
he worked for Jardine Matheson), concluded:
I imagine that if one makes an initial payment of 4,000 sovereigns to
an Albanian, that Albanian continues to behave as he imagines his
benefactor would wish him to behave, in the hope of further reward.
He is likely to continue to do so until he has reached the bottom of
the stocking, but what his action will then be is quite another matter.
In business this is called an advance without security, and it has
always been bad business.49
Others, however, were a little less concerned. On 28 February, the Foreign Office
approved the SOC's recommendation that Kupi be told that McLean and some funds
were on the way.50
Given the strength of opposition in SOE's headquarters in London and of its
own representative in Cairo, it might be assumed that the Foreign Office had hidden
political grounds for persisting in supporting a plan that even its author admitted had
only a fifty-fifty chance of success. 'It was never quite clear whether the main motive
behind the effort to mobilise Kupi was political or military', as Elisabeth Barker
concludes from her study of British wartime policy in the Southeast Europe, 'but on
balance it seems to have been political'.51 Even Leake commented to Steel in February
1944 that he thought there were 'pro-Zog influences at work' in London on policy.
But Steel disagreed, and was right to do so.52 Lord Selborne, SOE's minister, was a
staunch anticommunist and quite possibly this influenced his 'very keen' interest in
McLean's plan despite the misgivings at SOE Headquarters.53 As Reginald Hibbert
has shown, however, there is no evidence available to suggest that the Foreign Office
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'had at that time any specific intentions at all in relation to Albania, other than to
encourage resistance to the Germans in any way that might be effective'.54 It was
naturally uneasy about helping a communist-dominated organisation to seize power,
but at the same time had no intention of coming out in support of King Zog. The
principal hope was that, by working with Kupi, Britain could merely effect some sort
of solution to the civil war, maximise resistance that way and perhaps prevent Albania
from ripping itself apart. That the Foreign Office remained 'rather taken' by
McLean's plan despite many others' concerns was little more than a mark of loose and
wishful thinking and of a belief that Britain had little to lose by trying to bring Kupi
and the Partisans back together.55
Yet the concerns expressed by Leake and others were prophetic. No progress
towards an agreement was ever made before the Partisans launched their offensive
against Kupi and the Nationalist north at the end of June. Kupi knew from George
Seymour, the senior British officer in the north after Arthur Nicholls' death in
February, that he had to commit himself to open and unconditional warfare against the
Germans to be sent Allied arms. But from February onwards he never displayed any
serious intention of moving either wholeheartedly against the Germans or towards
reconciling himself with the Partisans. Seymour's growing frustration with what he
saw as Kupi's deliberate stalling and inaction is now clear from entries in Davies' War
Diary, for which Seymour had assumed responsibility after being handed it by Alan
Hare. Of his dealings with Kupi in March, when SOE Cairo was pressing on its
officers in the field the importance of immediate unconditional action, Seymour
wrote:
Wednesday, 8 Mar 44
G.S. [George Seymour] again sends message to A.K. [Abas Kupi]
for urgent meeting. Why is it that one cannot find a single Albanian
who appreciates the value of "now"? They all pin their faith on
"tomorrow" and act accordingly...
Saturday, 11 Mar 44
2200 Colonel Hyar Cha Ci [Colonel Yahya Chachi, commandant at
Kupi's headquarters] arrives on behalf of Abas Kupi and says latter
has been called away and won't be back for 10 days!
G.S. furious and spends much of the night wondering what
to do... Cairo will be screaming for plans which cannot be given.
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Sunday, 12 Mar 44
Col. H.C.C. arrives at 2230 hrs for discussion but finds that it is not
a discussion so much as a monologue by G.S.
Opening remarks include fact that A.K. made many promises
in past which he has failed to carry out; that A.K. is known to be at
least in touch with "bad" elements even if he is not actively working
with them. G.S. points out that A.K. is an object of acute suspicion
to the Allies and that only A.K. himself can allay those suspicions
by prompt action. G.S. warns that if there is a sudden German
withdrawal A.K. will be left in a queer position and promises of
what he intended to do will carry no weight at all...
Monday, 13 Mar 44
0230 Col. H.C.C. departs with a worried frown and copious notes
promising to his utmost...
Friday, 17 Mar 44...
Letter from A.K. saying he will come and see G.S. on 22 March...
Wednesday, 22 Mar 44...
Today is the great day of the big conference with Abas Kupi. It is
rather spoilt by the fact that A.K. does not arrive and sends no
word...
Saturday, 25 Mar 44...
A.K. comes in again in the evening [after visiting Seymour briefly
the previous day]. We hope that this time we are really going to hear
all his plans. We ought to have known better!! We hear that whilst
A.K. is now ready to fight he will do nothing unless the Allies
recognise Zog and permit him to form a "government" outside the
country. G.S. keeping a firm hold on his temper tells A.K. that he is
a B.F. to try and issue an ultimatum to [the] Allies and asks A.K.
what he intends to do when the demand is refused as G.S. predicts it
most certainly will be. A.K. says he will do nothing except look
after the BLOs in his territory. G.S. now feels that A.K. has made
this move as an excuse for not fighting and intends to wait for an
opportune moment - when the Huns leave - to grab power by a
coup d'etat.56
Seymour reported the result of this conference to Cairo in early April, adding his
belief that Kupi's real aim was to remain militarily inactive and then seize power once
the Germans had gone. He also reported a rumour to the effect that a pact of non-
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aggression between the Zogists and Germans had been signed on Kupi's behalf. On
19 April, Seymour then held another conference with Kupi, but chose to adopt 'a
lighter tone' since he had given him 'such a strafing' last time.
133
[T]he conference was one long roar of laughter, jokes and
badinage... Results as usual negative. A.K. says he will not fight
unless Allies recognise Zog...
After real conference finished A.K., G.S. [and] A.H.
[Captain Alan Hare]... go into "huddle" and A.K. being in
exceptionally good form permits the cat to peer furtively out of the
bag twice. He says:
(a) He is preparing for Civil War after the Germans leave.
(b) That there will shortly be a change or changes in the [puppet]
Govt as [Rexhep Mitrovica] the present P.M. is considered by
other Ministers (all Ballists) to be too lenient to the Partisans
(Communists). The new P.M. is [to be] Fikri Din[e] who is
A.K.'s man.58
Although the Zogist-German pact may have been nothing more than a rumour, there is
no doubt today that Kupi had, at the time, been playing both sides and working to co¬
ordinate a broad coalition against the Partisans. German records and ultra decrypts
confirm that, by the end of March, Kupi was in constant contact with the puppet
government and planning with its members to replace Mitrovica, the Prime Minister,
with Fiqri Dine, a Zogist through whom Kupi believed he could effect a more anti-
Partisan policy. Dine was installed eventually in July.59 The Germans still considered
Kupi unreliable, as they had since the previous autumn, but by May their opposition to
the inclusion of Zogist representatives in the government had waned. Decrypts
implicate Kupi's party at the end of that month in supporting German plans for an
imminent offensive against the Partisans. Messages sent by the Abwehr in Tirana to
Berlin reveal that, after 'successful' negotiations between the Zogists and other
Nationalists, the Germans expected these groups 'to take part' in 'a major action by
German formations... to take the Communists in the south by a pincer movement'.60
After dropping into Albania on 19-20 April and opening discussions with Kupi
at the end of the month, even McLean saw the holes in his January plan. In early May
he reported that Kupi was now insisting he would fight only if the Partisans
recognised the Legality party; a few days later Kupi told him he would fight if Zog
sent him instructions to do so. Kupi was 'very anti-communist', McLean reported,
'and has stated unofficially several times that it is only his unwillingness to quarrel
with the Allies that prevents him from attacking LNC immediately'. McLean was
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'very doubtful of the possibility of a real rapprochement' and feared that 'abortive
talks now would only widen the breach'.61
McLean's mission considered the situation so desperate that it came to
recommend that the Allies adopt a new policy towards the nationalists. Such was the
vulnerability of nationalist society to reprisals, the mission argued in signals drafted
largely by Captain Julian Amery, who had dropped in with McLean in April, that
leaders like Kupi were not suited to a large-scale and sustained campaign that risked
severe retaliation. As the mission explained in a long report of 18 June, tribal chieftans
could not contemplate a large-scale rising unless they knew that it would succeed.
Theirs was an extremely personal system of power: if a rising led to reprisals they
could lose the confidence of local populations and their positions would become
untenable. The leaders, therefore, would not risk embarking on such a venture if they
felt that defeat and everything that could flow from that might be the outcome. A last
minute general rising by the nationalists as the Germans withdrew, the mission
suggested, would be 'a more productive use of Nationalist strength' than 'small-scale
action' and the immediate campaign demanded by Allied policy. The mission felt that
if support were obtained from Kupi and other prominent leaders, including Muharrem
Bajraktar and Gani Bey Kryeziu, the rest of the nationalist north would follow. 'As a
military venture I have no doubt the insurrection would be value for money but of
course it raises political issues which I am not competent to judge' McLean/Amery
concluded. 'I would, however, hazard opinion that unless there is a Nationalist
insurrection and the Nationalists derive its consequent moral and material advantages
they will stand little chance of preventing the LNC from seizing power by force of
arms in the Civil War which after the German defeat only foreign intervention may
avert'.62
That assessment of the nationalists' position was about right. As Reginald
Hibbert writes, the 18 June report 'deserves to be on record as a very good analysis of
the position of the nationalist chieftans in the north'.63 But having realised that the
Partisans and nationalists would never reach some form of agreement, McLean's
mission was effectively suggesting that the British encourage the nationalists to fight a
last-minute campaign against the Germans on the highly political grounds that it could
save Albania from communism. If Leake had not been killed on 7 June, imply David
Smiley, Peter Kemp and Julian Amery in their memoirs, greater sympathy from
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British policy-makers for the nationalists' plight and cause might have been
forthcoming. And it is certainly likely that Leake would have shared the 18 June
assessment of the pressures on the Nationalists to stay neutral, for their steadfast
refusal to resist the Germans or ally with the Partisans was clear enough. But it also
seems likely that Leake would have preferred the policy the British continued to
pursue in Albania: the continued arming of Albanians who were genuinely committed
to fighting the Germans without regard to their politics. SOE papers show that, in the
weeks preceding his death, Leake became progressively more convinced of the
precariousness of the nationalist position but never recommended that Britain should
intervene to protect it.
Even Hibbert assumes that Leake, before he arrived in the field, believed 'the
future lay with a nationalist or Zogist rising' to be achieved by persuading the
Partisans 'to accept their own limitations and think in terms of coalition and not in
terms of domination'.64 Yet Leake's last letter to SOE London, written on 9 May and
summarising his final thoughts on the situation before leaving for Albania,
demonstrates that he had weighed reports of Partisan strength and intentions against
those of nationalist weakness and inactivity and recognised the implications for
Albania's immediate future. And it confirms both his growing expectation of greater
civil conflict and his steady conviction that Britain should not become involved
politically once it began. 'In my opinion we are now embarking on the final phase in
Albania - the end of German resistance and the beginning of [renewed] civil war'
Leake wrote from Bari, to where SOE's Albanian Section had relocated from Cairo.
'As the pressure of the Germans is relaxed, so the offensive attitude of the LNC
towards the Zogists and the Nationalists in the North will increase'. He considered the
Albanian Partisans well placed, militarily and politically, to exploit the situation.
The military quality of the German troops in Albania has recently
declined considerably. The LNC have shown a corresponding
expansion and now apparently feel in a strong enough position to
attempt to impose their will on the whole country. On the military
side they are beginning to organise divisions. On the political side
they are preparing to form a provisional Government. In both these
actions, they are, as always, keeping closely in step with the
Jugoslav Partisans.
136
Kupi, Leake went on, would therefore find himself in 'an extremely awkward
position'. It now appeared that he had grossly exaggerated the size of his forces; in the
face of the Partisans, he would either have to collaborate with the Germans or find
himself isolated. Since Kupi was 'unlikely to collaborate, except in the last resort', for
it would discredit Zog's cause in the eyes of the Allies, he might now agree to a
reconciliation with the Partisans, but whether the Partisans would agree to
reconciliation with him was quite another matter. Leake's letter concluded:
Our problem is of course, to decide what policy we are to follow in
view of the situation which is now developing. In my opinion we are
in an extremely strong position to put pressure on Kupi to induce
him to make an approach to the LNC regarding a possible modus
vivendi. Such an approach would place the LNC in a slightly
embarrassing position as if they refuse they will show their hand as
fomenters of civil war, and accordingly strengthen our position in
relation to them. On the other hand they may be susceptible to the
argument that an understanding with Kupi is worth while since, by
broadening their political base, they are more likely to obtain
definite political supremacy and possibly even recognition. It would
then be up to them to liquidate the Zogist party, if they felt so
inclined, at a later stage... This, for what it is worth, is the line we
are proposing to take.
Leake's final thoughts were on policy once civil war escalated. 'I feel that the time has
come for us to reduce to a minimum our personnel in the field, so that if civil war
breaks out and the military effort of the LNC and Zogists is devoted wholly to slaying
Albanians, we can withdraw from the scene easily and gracefully'.65 Despite Hibbert's
scepticism of the non-committal policy that emerged in January, pulling out of
Albania might not have seemed an unrealistic option at the time. By March 1944 all
SOE missions had been detached safely and successfully from Draza Mihailovic's
Chetniks in Yugoslavia. It was clear that, if the will was there, SOE could execute the
logistics of a large-scale withdrawal with the minimum of discomfort to its own side.
That appreciation of Partisan strength may have contributed to Leake's
decision, taken sometime in mid-April, to visit southern Albania and the Partisan
command. Julian Amery, in Sons of the Eagle, writes that Leake dropped in 'to
mediate' between the Partisans and Nationalists and 'secure' Hoxha's 'agreement' to
negotiations with Abas Kupi.66 David Smiley claims that Leake went 'mainly because
he thought it was his duty, as the staff officer responsible for sending officers into the
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field, to see for himself the conditions under which they worked'.67 Peter Kemp, who
was in Bari in April and early May, suggests it was a combination of those two
reasons. On the one hand, Leake went 'in a last effort to persuade Enver Hoxha to sink
his differences with his political opponents and call off the civil war'. On the other,
Kemp recalls Leake explaining why he felt he personally had to go: '"Peter", he
sighed, "for a year now I've been sitting on my bottom, sending other people into the
field. Now I feel I must go in myself- and apologize'".68
However, as Hibbert writes, 'Partisan fortunes had seesawed so violently that
there was a very strong case for having them appraised by someone authoritative from
Bari who was acquainted with the wider war panorama'.69 And in the light of reports
from SOE officers working with the Partisans, SOE and the Foreign Office's
representatives in Italy seem to have felt, too, that some gesture of encouragement to
Hoxha was both needed and deserved.70 News from McLean of Kupi's continuing
intransigence had only complemented reports that told of the Partisans' growing
resentment of British policy - and of the damaging effect that McLean's presence
with Kupi was having on SOE's relations with them: another unhappy result that
Leake had predicted. By the spring of 1944, as Major Victor Smith reported, the
Partisans had long been disappointed at the lack of official Allied recognition of their
fighting record. To Smith and other officers they pointed out angrily that both Greece
and Yugoslavia had representatives in Italy and that 'Trotsky' Davies had promised
them similar representation as long ago as November. Moreover, the Partisans had had
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a 'General' attached to them then but now the highest-ranking British officer with
them was a major. This was Alan Palmer, who had taken over in April from
Lieutenant Colonel Norman Wheeler as the senior SOE officer with the Partisans.
Palmer kept SOE headquarters well informed of all developments and complaints and
worked hard to stay on good terms with Enver Hoxha and his staff (or Shtab12). But
relations became considerably more strained when the Partisans learnt of the decision
to drop Billy McLean to Kupi. 'This was the signal for a furious onslaught on us by all
members of the LNC', Smith recalled.
Our defences were obviously weak - an insignificant amount of
material was being sent to the Partisans; the propaganda effort...
was shockingly poor; and (most important of all), the existence of a
Lt Col in the North, whereas our Senior Officer was a Major...
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[Major] Palmer, and, in his short absence on operations, myself,
were attacked constantly and vigorously from all directions. We
resisted to the best of our ability, our personal relations with
individual members and especially military commanders remained
good, but finally... [Major] Palmer realised that a serious
T\
breakdown was inevitable unless HQ policy changed radically.
By 1 May, as SOE Bari informed SOE London, it had been decided that, while the
evacuation of representatives for political discussions was 'out of [the] question since
[it is] not our concern [to] interfere [in] Alb[anian] internal polities', Leake would be
infiltrated 'in person to explain our policy'.74 Harold Macmillan, Resident Minister at
Allied Forces Headquarters, agreed a few days later that it was still unwise to receive
a Partisan delegation but felt that perhaps someone from SOE Bari could be dropped
in to report generally on the situation and meet Enver Hoxha.75 Philip Broad, who had
taken over from Christopher Steel as the Foreign Office's adviser to SOE's Cairo/Bari
headquarters, informed Macmillan that Leake was already earmarked to go. 'I know
the officer in question personally and feel sure he will successfully carry out [all]
functions suggested by you'.76
According to Smith, news of Leake's imminent arrival and Palmer's official
appointment as senior officer with the Partisans helped ease the situation.77 It was still
far from resolved, however, when Leake parachuted to Palmer's dropping ground in
southern Albania on the night of 10-11 May. Only six days earlier, Major John Shaw
had dropped also to Palmer, at once been introduced by Victor Smith to the members
of the Shtab and found them still aggrieved at their lack of recognition and suspicious
of British activities in the north. 'They appeared to be intelligent and reasonable in
their views' Shaw reported later, '[but] they then pressed their cause for two and a half
hours with Major Smith on the following lines, which involved constant repetition
which I found somewhat tiresome':
1. When were they going to be allowed to send delegates to the
Allies
2. What was the object of Lieut Col McLean being infiltrated to the
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North when they were the only party fighting the Germans
Leake would have found the Shtab in a similar frame ofmind, but Smith reported that
when Leake arrived, holding the acting rank of lieutenant colonel and bringing
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permission for Palmer to assume the same rank locally, relations with the Partisans
'took an immediate change for the better'. He also observed that Leake's 'obvious
grasp of the situation impressed the LNC greatly'.79
Though Leake's views underwent some modification on arriving in Albania,
they did not change as much as Hibbert suggests or become as considerate towards the
nationalist cause as Amery, Smiley and others suppose. Within days of his arrival,
Leake had confirmed the dramatic growth in Partisan numbers and anti-Axis activity
and his fear that the future was indeed grim for Kupi and the nationalist north. Shaw
records that soon after Leake's arrival the British mission held 'two long conferences'
with the Shtab: one along political lines and the other along military ones.80 On 15
May, Leake then informed SOE Bari that from meeting SOE officers and the Shtab it
was now 'clear' to him that the 'value' of the Partisans had 'greatly increased since
last year'. Their 'fighting qualities and skill' had also 'greatly increased', as shown by
recent operations witnessed by British officers, and they were 'now capable [of]
resisting [enemy] drives and undertaking co-ord[inated] offensive action'. Due to the
collapse of the BK the 'bulk of fighting' was now concentrated against the Germans
and owing to the increased area under Partisan control they were now able to
effectively threaten the enemy's lines of communication. Furthermore, Partisan
numbers were 'rapidly increasing' and they were now supported by the whole of
southern Albania.81 And on 20 May Leake recommended to Bari that Britain prepare
to make a policy change. The 'chief factor' he had identified since arriving was the
'rapidly increasing strength' of the Partisans, which made a 'clash with Kupi likely [in
the] near future' and would destroy the possibility of any agreement between Kupi
and the Partisans. He proposed that the Allies condemn the collaborationist Albanian
government and demand that Kupi and all other Nationalists sever all connections
with the puppet government and 'openly' fight the Germans. If they failed to comply
with these demands then the missions with them should be withdrawn.82 Days later
Leake and Palmer recommended that Kupi be forced to fight by setting him a time
o-j
limit within which he had to act. They thought the end of June a suitable deadline.
That ultimatum again illustrates Leake's steadfast belief that Britain should not
interfere in internal Albanian affairs except to help those Albanians committed to
fighting the Germans. By early June, as Palmer wrote later, he and Leake and Captain
Tom Stefan, the senior OSS officer with the Partisans, 'were all agreed' that the
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Partisan 1st Division was being prepared by Hoxha for a direct assault on the
84
Zogists. (In fact, the attack would be aimed both at the Germans and Kupi, a
deliberate double thrust to demonstrate that the Partisans were not focused solely on
civil war and thereby assure themselves of continued Allied support, which it did.)
Leake had never been under any illusion as to the chances of any real reconciliation
being achieved; as he had suggested to London in May, perhaps the most that might
be hoped for was that, if the Zogists fought the Germans, it might embarrass the
Partisans. But by the end of the month Leake could see that the situation was now far
more serious than that. Kupi had to act at once: after the Partisans hit him it would be
too late. So weak were his resources that it was impossible to expect him to fight a
meaningful campaign against the Germans while trying simultaneously to defend
himself from the Partisans.
While despairing of Kupi's future, Leake's continued planning of future
operations against the Germans with Palmer and the Partisan Shtab underlines the
strictly military factors on which he was basing his deductions and decisions. Indeed,
it is important to acknowledge that Leake's enhanced view of the Partisans' military
'value' was based on discussions with both Palmer's mission and the Partisans. One
strand of the argument that British policy was wrong to support the Partisans as
extensively and exclusively as it did is that SOE officers attached to them were
themselves part of the problem. Julian Amery and others suggest that these officers
were overly and unwittingly biased towards the Partisans and helped persuade the
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higher levels of the Allied command that the Partisans should be backed to the full.
And SOE's records confirm that the Partisans' strength and potential did impress
many officers in southern Albania. Leake's briefing by Palmer on arrival would have
been similar to that given to John Shaw, who had arrived at Palmer's base a few days
before Leake. Victor Smith had quickly brought Shaw 'up-to-date with the situation...
along the following lines':
(a) That our HQ [in Bari] were out-of-date with the situation.
(b) That the Partisans were the only party fighting the Germans.
(c) That their strength was about 10,000 men and that nothing could
stop this figure increasing.
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(d) That the Partisans fought well and that, if they were given full
support and material aid, their war effort would include driving
the Germans out ofAlbania.
(e) That the Partisans were not communists, but that they had a
genuine desire to free their country from the Nazis and that, after
the war, they would allow the people to choose their own
Government.
(f) That they were, in the near future, setting up a Provisional
Of-
Government in Southern Albania, chosen by the people.
SOE reports later that month put Partisan numbers even higher, at 20,000 men
organised in twelve brigades plus miscellaneous battalions with 'numbers growing'.
Yet the officers who made these estimates and saw the Partisans in action were often
experienced soldiers. And several with whom Leake held discussions, including
Palmer and Smith, had been with the Partisans since before the winter and could
appreciate the reality of the enormous growth the movement had undergone since its
days as a small collection of scattered and hunted bands. Even if some officers were
misled by claims that all Partisans were 'not communists', such considerations were in
any case irrelevant. SOE was still under strict orders to support any Albanian,
regardless ofhis politics, just as long as he was committed to fighting the Germans.
That Leake gauged the Partisans simply by their military record and potential
may be qualified by how unlikely he was to have warmed to the character and temper
of the Partisan leaders with whom he had to deal. Like all other SOE officers, Leake
found negotiating with the Partisans tedious and difficult. On 14 May, having met
Hoxha the previous day, Leake described him to Bari as 'more temperamental than
systematic' in his 'complaints [and] demands'. The following day he commented that
the Shtab was inclined to be 'dilatory and oriental'.87 Marcus Lyon noted in his diary
ofmore discussions on 18 May: 'Leake and Alan go up and have trying morning with
Stab [sic]'.88 Indeed, Leake's policy suggestions came at a time when relations with
the Partisans had again started to sour. After the first few meetings, the Partisans
began to demand immediate satisfaction of a number of requests. According to Victor
Smith, who was present, these were as follows:
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(1) Withdrawal of all missions from the north (they did agree,
however, that one or two officers were necessary for intelligence
purposes).
(2) Acceptance of their representatives in Italy.
(3) Written evidence that:
(a) Lt Col Leake was the accredited representative of Allied
HQ.
(b) Lt Col Palmer was in command of all sub-missions in LNC
territory.
At the same time, Leake and Palmer were pressing the Shtab to agree to certain
demands of their own:
(1) [LNC] co-operation in Allied strategy, i.e. destruction of Ls of C
and constant harassing of the Germans.
(2) LNC agreement... [to a] meeting between them and Kupi and,
subsequently, [to a] military pact with Kupi providing that he
attacked the Germans.
(3) The LNC... [to allow] Lt Cols Leake and Palmer to meet Lt Col
McLean...
Smith reported later that, as a result of this deadlock, the Partisans forbade Leake and
Palmer from leaving their Headquarters until the official accreditation demanded by
the Shtab was produced. Palmer advised Bari to suspend all supplies to the Partisans
until freedom ofmovement was restored. Leake refused an invitation to the Congress
of Permet, at which the Partisans proclaimed their new provisional government and
renamed the movement the Fronti Nacional Clirimtare (FNC). When Hoxha and the
Shtab left for Permet and the Congress on 21 May, in Smith's words, 'things looked
pretty black'.89
Relations improved, however, with the arrival by parachute of official letters
confirming Leake and Palmer's positions of authority. Signs of the impending German
offensive, planned in May, then caused the FNC to climb down rapidly from its other
demands. The British mission's first meeting with the new government took place in
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Permet on 5 June; Leake, Palmer and Smith were all present, and Smith recorded that
'agreement was reached on the following points':
(1) Missions would have complete freedom ofmovement.
(2) Specific military targets as given by Lt Col Palmer, conforming
to Allied strategy, would be attacked.
(3) Lt Col Leake should return to HQ [in Bari] and would later visit
Kupi in order to put certain suggestions to him.
(4) Amplifying... (3), LNC [sic] agreed to union with Kupi,
providing he fought the Germans (.. .one or two actions were not
to be sufficient... continuous warfare by Kupi against the
Germans [was] essential if union [was] to be agreed).
The 'suggestions' in point (3) were likely to have included mention of the conditions
imposed on union by the FNC in (4) and, perhaps, the setting of a deadline, assuming
the idea would be seconded by the British authorities. It may be noted that the
Partisans' appeal to have military representatives in Bari was left untouched in this
rather rushed agreement. But although Leake and Palmer lacked the authority to agree
to military representation without reference to policy-makers outside Albania, it is
possible that Leake did promise the Partisans he would raise the matter on his return
to Bari. Victor Smith observed how the Partisans, after impressing on Leake their
strength, 'did... gain satisfaction on the questions of representatives and the bogey of
the North'.90 With the meeting concluded and the German offensive fully underway,
the British mission at Permet broke up. Leake, en route to the coast for evacuation
back to Bari, arrived at John Shaw's camp that evening. He was killed there two
mornings later.91
On the eve of his death, Leake had clearly believed there might still be time for
a last effort at encouraging Kupi to fight the Germans before all-out conflict between
the Partisans and the Zogists broke out. Reports by Victor Smith and John Shaw
confirm Amery's claim that Leake wished to visit McLean's mission and speak with
Kupi as soon as possible. Shaw observed, too, that Leake had 'accepted all
recommendations and statements put to him by the FNC and Missions with him, but
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refused to give any decisions before he had seen Northern Albania'. Leake had also
expressed support for a proposal of McLean's that Zog personally send Kupi
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instructions to fight, although Leake requested that 'no public announcement' be made
• QT
until he had briefed Bari on the 'present position'. Nevertheless, it is clear that Leake
also saw that a Partisan attack on the north was imminent and felt that Kupi's time
was almost up. And when the Partisans opened their offensive against the nationalists
at the end of June, Kupi and other Nationalists, as Leake had expected, were indeed
compelled to muster their resources for use against the northward Partisan advance.
With the exception of Gani Bey Kryeziu, none ever came out to fight the Germans
wholeheartedly.
It is impossible to know how Leake would have responded to the Partisans'
dual assault on both the Germans and the nationalists in June. There is no record in
SOE's files of any contingency planning by him in preparation for such a
development. Possibly he may have wanted to withdraw every SOE mission from
Albania. Possibly, after appreciating the 'value' of the Partisans at first hand, he may
have sought to maintain a limited supply of arms to those Partisan units still in action
against the Germans: the policy Alan Palmer recommended strongly in July. Certainly
Leake and Palmer worked together closely and well. 'A word about Philip' Palmer
wrote to SOE Bari a week after Leake's death. 'It was one of the greatest tragedies in
the rather tragic history of B8 [SOE's Albanian Section], He did splendidly here and I
got on extremely well with him. We were in agreement on all points and he fell in
most readily with any points I had'.94 But given Leake's long aversion to interfering in
internal Albanian affairs it is very hard to believe that he would have supported the
new policy CONCENSUS II suggested. Arming the nationalists before they had
fought and building them up to counter-balance the Partisans were highly political
proposals. To have taken issue with the Partisans' ideological agenda in that way
would have marked a complete departure from the policy Leake had long advocated
of impartial treatment of all sides and arming only those committed genuinely to
fighting the Germans. Certainly, in early June, it is apparent that he believed Kupi
should be sounded out a final time, but it is difficult to believe that Leake would have
recommended supporting him on anything other than convincing military grounds.
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Chapter Five
SOE and British policy towards the Albanian resistance
June to November 1944
In postwar memoirs, several former SOE officers who had worked during the war
with Albanian nationalists claim that, after the death of Philip Leake in early June
1944, British policy in wartime Albania took an alarming turn for the worse. Some of
these writers argue that the headquarters staff of SOE's Albanian Section, in Leake's
absence, starved the nationalists of adequate sympathy and support. Some accuse
these HQ officers of having suppressed reports from the field that spoke well of Abas
Kupi, the Zogist leader. In this and other ways, so the arguments go, the staff helped
secure Allied backing exclusively for the Partisans, who were thus better able to seize
power at the end of 1944.1
This chapter begins by outlining those charges in greater detail, then re¬
examines them, partly in the light of recently released SOE files. These records
confirm that the Albanian Section became increasingly opposed to maintaining an
SOE mission with Kupi as 1944 wore on. They also suggest that attempts may have
been made to suppress reports from that mission. But the charges levelled against the
Section exaggerate the ability ofjunior SOE staff officers to influence policy. The key
decisions in favour of the Partisans were taken above the heads of the Section and
reflected short-term strategic needs and the military situation in Albania. Moreover,
junior staff officers in SOE did not prevent decision-makers from appreciating the
reality of that situation. The chapter suggests that writers who propagate the
conspiracy theory lack knowledge of the decision-making process and distort the
grounds on which SOE staff officers wished to break with Kupi. The most convincing
explanation is that, for most officers on the staff, the continued presence of a mission
with him was merely an unnecessary encumbrance to Albania's war effort.
The main tenets of the 'conspiracy theory' began to emerge in print in 1948
with the publication of Julian Amery's memoir Sons of the Eagle? This recounted the
activities ofBilly McLean's second mission to Albania in 1944. McLean, who had led
the first SOE mission into Albania the year before, parachuted back in April. Now a
lieutenant colonel, he was accompanied by Amery, then a captain, and David Smiley,
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now a major. As discussed in the previous chapter, their mission had Foreign Office-
approved orders to persuade Abas Kupi, the Zogist leader, to resume resistance in
harness with the Partisans.
Within days of opening talks with Kupi, the mission realised, Amery writes,
that the chances of forging an alliance between the Zogists and Partisans were poor.
Kupi professed intense hostility to the Partisans and the mission became convinced
that he wished to preserve his energies for an eventual showdown with the Partisans
and not waste them against the Germans. Yet Amery also recalls that the mission
remained confident it could fulfil its directive. He and McLean were impressed by
Kupi's military strength and potential and felt that, ifKupi fought and other nationalist
leaders in northern Albania followed his lead in a general revolt against the Germans,
wider civil war and communist victory might yet be avoided. Such a revolt, according
to Amery, might have caused the Partisans to 'hesitate before attacking so popular and
strong a leader'. Moreover, it would also have strengthened the hand of what Amery
describes as his mission's 'Headquarters' in the Italian port of Bari, just across the
Adriatic. '[OJnce Abas Kupi was at war, our Headquarters would be justified in
bringing the strongest pressure to bear on the Partisans in favour of reconciliation with
the Zogists.... [A] general revolt offered the best, perhaps the only, means of bringing
the [nationalist chiefs in northern Albania]... to fight the Germans and of averting
civil war'.3
In June the mission secured a verbal commitment from Kupi finally to attack
the Germans. Allied policy stated that no arms could be sent to Kupi before he fought:
he had to attack the Germans first and thus commit himself to fighting. All that was
needed now, the mission felt, was for Kupi to prove he was sincere and then receive
supplies to conduct a larger campaign. On the night of 21-22 June, David Smiley and
a party of Kupi's men then blew up Albania's third largest bridge at a spot called
Gjoles on the main road north from the capital, Tirana. The Germans had been
sending 500 trucks over the bridge every night; they were now forced to use a longer
route more vulnerable to Allied air attack. Amery writes that the mission was content
the operation met the conditions for Kupi to receive arms and confident he would use
them to open a wider campaign and attract more nationalists to his side. To the
mission, it seemed the first step to averting civil war and uniting the nationalists of
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northern Albania had been taken. Plans were drawn up with Kupi; appeals were
transmitted for 'Headquarters' in Bari to drop arms to his men.
Those arms were never sent. Within ten days of the Gjoles action, the Partisans
in southern Albania, where the movement's bases lay and support was at its strongest,
opened an assault on Kupi's forces in the nationalist north. McLean's mission shelved
its plans with Kupi as he mustered all his resources to fight the Partisans. And at first,
Amery recalls, the mission was gratified by the even-handed response forthcoming
from 'Headquarters' to this escalation in civil war. All supplies to Albania, whether
earmarked for the Partisans or Kupi, were suspended. But in early August the mission
learnt that drops of arms and ammunition were once again going to the 1st Partisan
Division. This unit was reported to be in action against the Germans and short of
ammunition; but it was also the one that had spearheaded the Partisan assault on Kupi.
Amery writes that he and his mission considered the resumption of supplies to the
Partisans tantamount to British intervention in an Albanian civil war on the Partisan
side.
Nor was the mission impressed by an apparent 180-degree change of opinion
at 'Headquarters' when Kupi finally opened a small campaign against the Germans in
September. Days later the mission received instructions from Bari that it must now do
nothing to encourage Kupi to fight. Soon afterwards the mission was sent further
instructions to break with Kupi and leave the country. If 'Headquarters' had no
intention of supporting Kupi even when he fought, the mission wondered, why had he
not been broken with much earlier?
Amery also records his mission's further dismay when 'Headquarters' refused
its request to bring out Kupi and some of his followers when the mission left Albania
in October. The mission was convinced that the assistance and hospitality it had
received from these Albanians justified British support in their time of need. Partisan
victory in the civil war was just weeks away and the mission wished to save them
from liquidation. On returning to Bari, Amery and McLean secured permission from
Harold Macmillan, the British minister at Allied Forces Headquarters in Italy, and
Anthony Eden, the Foreign Secretary, to have Kupi evacuated. In the event Kupi
managed to flee Albania under his own steam; but here was a clear example, the
mission felt, of the excessive displeasure felt with Kupi at 'Headquarters'. Indeed,
Amery claims to have detected on arriving in Bari a distinct and unwarranted bias
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there towards supporting the Partisans. A 'genuine enthusiasm' for communism
pervaded and 'responsible staff officers revelled with indecent, almost masochistic,
glee' at the demise of nationalist forces. He found 'alarming... the strange distortion
of men's minds. Never before had there been so many British observers in the
Balkans, and yet never can responsible Englishmen have cherished so many
misconceptions and illusions about the problems of that blood-stained region'.4
Other officers who had worked in Albania in 1943-44 reaffirm these
sentiments. Peter Kemp and David Smiley agree with Amery that, by backing the
Partisans, the British had condemned Albania to a future of communist rule.5 Some
writers go further, point fingers at SOE's Albanian Section in Bari as having been in
some way responsible and speculate over the influence of communist and leftwing
staff officers there. 'While some of the officers in the Albanian section of the SOE
office were well-intentioned, if led astray by insidious Communist propaganda',
Smiley writes, 'others were Communist agents'. As evidence of their activities,
Smiley states that these officers suppressed personal messages that his mission sent
from the field for onward transmission to Anthony Eden. He notes, too, the hostile
reception he received from the Albanian Section in October 1944, recalling how he
was called 'fascist' for having worked with the nationalists.6 Alexander Glen asserts
that the influence of the staff was the crucial factor in the decision to drop more arms
to Hoxha's communists and thus in bringing them to power. He also writes darkly of
unnamed 'colleagues' of Kim Philby who had worked to see nationalists like Kupi
'betrayed'.7 Billy McLean later condemned Major Eliot Watrous, the officer who
replaced Philip Leake as head of the Albanian Section, for having had 'very
progressive views... [W]e felt he was supporting the communist cause against the
o
nationalists at every level'.
In postwar accounts, only three officers on the Section staff are identified by
name: Philip Leake, Eliot Watrous and John Eyre. SOE's records confirm that
Watrous did indeed become Head of the Section after Leake's death; they also show
that several other officers worked on the Section staff in 1944. Leake, soon after
taking command the previous spring, was joined first by the thirty-one year-old
Lieutenant Frank White. An insurance claims inspector in peacetime, White came to
SOE after service on the headquarters staff of the Sudan Defence Force. At the end of
July 1943 he was appointed the Section's first conducting officer, responsible for
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overseeing the movements of other officers before and after they went on operations.
His chief duties were to ensure they attended the proper courses, briefings, and
interviews, were escorted safely to departure points for infiltration into Albania and
were picked up promptly after evacuation. Remarks on White's SOE Personal File
indicate he did his job well: 'Lively personality. Mixes well. Energetic and
enterprising. Most satisfactory'. He became the Section's Staff Captain in February
1944.
Watrous was next to join, to assist in the planning and support of operations.
Only twenty-one years old, he had been commissioned into the Royal Artillery aged
eighteen in 1940. In August 1943, after Staff College in Palestine and two and a half
years at GHQ Malta Command, he joined the Albanian Section on being posted to
SOE Cairo. In November he moved from Cairo to Bari to help run the Albanian
Section's Advance Headquarters, taking charge of sea sorties to the Albanian coast,
the holding and briefing of SOE personnel awaiting infiltration and all liaison with
other organisations in Italy.
In October 1943, Captain James Herratt and Lieutenant George Campbell were
posted to the Section. Herratt, twenty-six years old and recruited originally for
operations, became the Section's welfare officer when no field employment was found
for him. Campbell, eight years older, was an economics graduate of London
University and a teacher before the war in County Durham. He was to work under
Herratt. Their duties, as their title implies, were to deal with the welfare of operational
personnel. They sent out books, mail and other comforts to the missions in Albania,
censored personal mail meant for home and tried to deal with endless minor crises like
finding and despatching new spectacles to replace pairs broken in the field. When the
Albanian Section moved to Bari, Campbell was left in Cairo as its liaison officer with
SOE's Greek Section.
Two more officers, Captain Bill Squires and Captain George Cowie, joined the
Section staff in November 1943. The twenty-six year-old Squires had been in the army
from the age of sixteen, after joining the Royal Tank Corps as an enlisted boy in 1934.
He entered Sandhurst in January 1939, was commissioned into the Royal Tank
Regiment in February 1940 and, by the time he was posted to SOE, had seen two
years' active service in the Middle East. He assumed responsibility for overseeing all
sea operations between Albania and SOE's supply bases on the Italian coast:
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specifically, the sending in of stores and the infiltration and evacuation of personnel.
Squires, like Herratt, appears to have been fresh to staffwork. In October 1944 he was
sent into Albania to work as a liaison officer with the Partisans.
George Cowie's credentials for an SOE staff appointment were strong. Thirty-
two and a Scot, he had been educated at Banff Academy, Robert Gordon's College
and the University of Aberdeen before qualifying as a solicitor in 1936. He had joined
the army from the post of Assistant Secretary of Aberdeen University (after the war he
would be for many years Secretary of Queen's University, Belfast). Commissioned
immediately into the Royal Artillery, he had spent eighteen months as Intelligence
Officer and Adjutant of 126 (Highland) Field Regiment, followed by another eighteen
months as a battery captain in Britain and the Middle East. After a six-month posting
to the headquarters staff of 51 (Highland) Division, during which he took part in the
invasion of Sicily, he joined SOE. Cowie's Personal File contains nothing but
consistently good reports. He was 'good humoured', 'careful and conscientious',
'intelligent' and so on. He worked with Watrous on the operations side and, after
Leake's death, took charge of that area of the Section's work.
In the latter months of 1943, the Section also took on another full-time
conducting officer: Lieutenant Hugh Munro, another Scot. Like Herratt, Munro had
been earmarked for operations; like Squires, he was eventually sent on them, being
parachuted into southern Albania to work with the Partisans in August 1944.
In December 1943 and February 1944, two intelligence officers were
appointed to the Section staff. The first to arrive was Lieutenant Jon Naar, who
assumed responsibility for the collection and distribution of all military intelligence
coming out of Albania and for its use in planning operations. Naar's appointment was
followed by that of Lieutenant John Eyre, who assumed responsibility for the similar
collation ofpolitical intelligence. Both Naar and Eyre were promoted to captain after a
few months in their respective posts. Eyre's background and military and SOE career
are dealt with in some depth in the next chapter. Naar, for his part, was twenty-three
and, as might be expected of an intelligence appointment, was already experienced in
that role. Born in Hendon in May 1920 he had been educated at Mill Hill, the
Sorbonne and the Universities of Vienna and London where he read Psychology,
French and German. He was then commissioned into the Royal Artillery in February
1941. In May, after responding to a notice for French-speaking officers for secret
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work, he was attached to Australian troops fighting in Syria and Lebanon. There his
duties at various times included liaising with the Free French, directing propaganda
against the Vichy French, acting as a political adviser to the commander of the 7th
Australian Division and being employed on counter-intelligence work. Later he was
sent to interview refugees from Eastern Europe on the borders with Turkey. From the
end of 1941 until volunteering for SOE in November 1943, Naar was mostly in Egypt,
planning post-occupation resistance until Rommel's advance was reversed, seeing
some action in the Western Desert and teaching for several months at the intelligence
school at Helwan, outside Cairo. At SOE's Cairo headquarters, as indicated in earlier
chapters, he worked closely with Margaret Hasluck and Philip Leake. In January 1944
he left Cairo to move to Bari to join the Section's Advance Headquarters. The few
comments on his Personal File read: 'Quiet personality. Slow but thorough. French
fluent. German fluent. Italian fair. Very satisfactory'.
In March 1944 there were two more newcomers to the Albanian Section staff.
One was Captain Bryan McSwiney. Twenty-three years old and an old boy of
Ampleforth, McSwiney's medical studies at St Thomas' had been interrupted by the
war and he arrived in SOE via a commission in the King's Royal Rifle Corps and a
three-month course with the Political Warfare Executive (PWE). He became another
conducting officer. The other officer to arrive was Captain John Stubbs. Twenty-eight,
Stubbs had been an accountant in peacetime and had held various platoon, transport
and headquarters posts with the Royal Army Service Corps' infantry brigade company
before joining SOE. He took charge of all matters concerning air support of SOE's
Albanian efforts: he was to help plan and prepare drops of personnel and supplies, for
example, liaise with the various Allied air forces and co-ordinate air attacks called in
by missions in the field.9
Such was the roll call of officers on the staff of SOE's Albanian Section by the
early summer of 1944. A Section Head; a staff captain; an intelligence sub-section of
two officers; an operations element, with designated officers charged with air and sea
respectively; two welfare officers; a clutch of conducting officers; and one officer in
Cairo.10 But throughout that summer, Eliot Watrous, as Philip Leake had been, was
the Section's principal mouthpiece, its representative with whom higher authority
chiefly dealt and corresponded. And SOE files confirm that, throughout the very
period when the Section was under his leadership and is accused of having adopted an
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excessive pro-Partisan stance, Watrous was indeed keen to see policy move away
from supporting Abas Kupi.
During the summer of 1944, much of Watrous' correspondence with higher
authority spoke disparagingly of Kupi's worth and potential. Policy proposals drawn
up on 1 June illustrate the growing emphasis placed by him on Kupi's shortcomings.
Passing on Leake and Alan Palmer's recommendation that Kupi be set a time limit
within which he would have to fight, Watrous warned of the implications of arming
Kupi even if he acted in time. In five months Kupi had failed to build up an organised
political and military party; his forces were weak and his support and influence poor.
'His contacts are extremely doubtful and in some cases include members of
government proved to be collaborating with the enemy'. Watrous also emphasised the
problems that the policy of maintaining a mission with Kupi had already created. The
Partisans were aggravated as 'they now mistrust our motives and consider that the
Allies desire the return of King Zog'. Continued attempts to persuade Kupi to fight
would 'further provoke' the Partisans and increase the probability of civil war
between the two. Six days later, SOE London was sent a telegram by the Albanian
Section recommending that Kupi be abandoned and the Partisans given full support.
Backing Kupi, the Section considered, was 'not worth while now'.11 A letter that
Watrous sent to Boxshall the same day confirms that the gist of the telegram reflected
Watrous' views. 'The LNC have, without doubt, increased enormously during the last
few months; they now represent a strong, well-equipped and well-organised guerilla
force, capable of taking offensive action on a scale hitherto not thought possible...
Further attempts to support Kupi's movement would lead possibly to civil war and
12
certainly cause the Partisans to discontinue operations against the Germans'.
SOE files also suggest that the Bari office may have checked the progress to
higher authority of some reports received from the field. In April, SOE London
instructed the Albanian Section to forward to London by immediate telegram all w/t
messages, with the exception of those dealing with very routine matters, sent out of
Albania by McLean. In June, McLean transmitted a number of messages that praised
Kupi's potential and urged decision-makers to understand why nationalist Albanian
society was best suited to a last-minute revolt as the Germans withdrew. Instead of
forwarding these messages to London by telegram, however, the Albanian Section
only sent them by 'slow bag' (that is, paper copies sent by air). On these occasions,
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instead of the usual delay of two or three days between McLean sending his messages
and SOE London reading them, the delay lasted over a fortnight.
The first 'slow bag' reached SOE's London headquarters on 4 July. It was sent
under a covering letter dated 26 June and enclosed McLean's long appreciation of 18
June in which, as seen in the previous chapter, he gave his assessment of the pressures
at work on Albanian nationalists to stay neutral. McLean had also urged that a policy
decision on whether to encourage a nationalist rising at the right moment, which he
considered 'a more productive use of Nationalist strength than small-scale action',
should be reached as soon as possible.13 The Albanian Section explained the eight-day
delay since its original transmission as due to checking corruptions in the message.14
This excuse is perfectly feasible, particularly when given its length and the workload
of the SOE cipher staff. But it fails to explain why it had not been forwarded to
London by telegram.
A second 'slow bag' reached London on 11 July. The covering letter, which
George Cowie signed for Watrous, was dated 1 July and the bag enclosed four more
messages from McLean, one of which had been transmitted from Albania as far back
as 5 June. Each message expressed McLean's hope in the possibility of fomenting a
late rising among the nationalists. In his 5 June telegram, McLean had repeated a
request for a message of encouragement from Zog to Kupi and again had stressed its
importance. Kupi now considered action against the Germans the 'only sane solution'
McLean felt, 'and [he] will adopt it provided we obtain personal instructions from Zog
as requested'. Failure to obtain those instructions, McLean considered, would give
Kupi the impression that Zog did not want action against the Germans. Kupi, he
warned, might side with the Germans if attacked by the Partisans and not backed by
the British. McLean's second telegram, dated 10 June, was based on word he had
received from Tony Simcox of the Gani Bey Kryeziu situation. McLean now had
'every confidence of [a] NAT rising' but little could be achieved, he felt, 'without
material and financial help'. On 21 June McLean had reported that Kupi now agreed
in principle to fight 'and begin large scale ops as soon as sufficient material available'.
Talks with him had broken down several times over the formula of no supplies before
action 'but eventually Kupi agreed [to] initiate sabotage now and then develop ops
proportionate to aid supplied'. The fourth and final telegram, dated 24 June, reported
McLean's views on the significance of the Gjoles bridge operation. He pointed out
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that the bridge's destruction was the 'first action undertaken by Kupi's forces since
last September and fulfils his promise to undertake sabotage'. But he added that it did
not alter 'the fundamental proposition' that Kupi's forces were 'not suited to
operations beginning on [a] small scale with consequent reprisals' but 'rather... to [a]
general rising in certain districts carefully prepared'. McLean conceded that Kupi's
assistance in blowing the bridge had been 'mainly prompted by [a] desire to prove his
willingness to fight [the] Hun to allay [the] mistrust he feels is implied in our no arms
before action policy. But he will not fight until he receives supplies'. The telegram
also reported that that the 'upshot of our latest talks has been a firm offer from Kupi
[to] organise 8 Bns [of] first line troops each of 250 men to form [a] hard core for [an]
initial rising around which [the] bulk of [the nationalist] forces will be grouped'.15
SOE London was not impressed by the time it had taken these messages to
reach its Baker Street headquaters. Major Edward Boxshall, responsible for Albanian
matters at London's end, wrote to Bari on 12 July:
We cannot but express our surprise that you should not have
repeated to us at an earlier date Lt Col MacLean [sic]'s telegrams
dated 5, 10, 21 and 24 June. Whilst appreciating that parts of these
might have been corrupt and that you had to ask for repetition, we
believe that you could have passed the gist on to us, which was of
considerable interest at the period you received them. Would you
please in future make every endeavour to repeat such telegrams
from MacLean to us by telegram. We would refer you also to our
telegram to you... of 25 April in which we asked you to repeat by
telegram all signals of interest received from MacLean until further
notice.16
Previously, copies of all of McLean's messages had been cabled to London within one
or two days. This was therefore a clear departure from what, until June, had been
normal procedure and flew in the face of a direct request from London. No
explanation or apology from Bari can be found in SOE's fdes.
It is possible that these were the messages that David Smiley alleges in his
memoirs were sent by his mission and suppressed in Bari.17 Smiley actually claims
that that suppression took place later in the year and involved two messages sent for
the attention of Anthony Eden. However, his 1944 diary suggests that the reliability of
the source of that allegation may have been somewhat shaky. Four days after arriving
in Bari from Albania, Smiley wrote:
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October 29...
I have got a lot of dirt out of the office, chiefly from one of the
civilian secretaries, a very nice girl at whom Elliot [sic] Watrous
was trying to make a pass but when he failed was quite bloody to
her, so there is not much she did not tell me - amongst other things
that our messages for transmission to Anthony Eden and other
important people in London were deliberately not sent.18
Smiley appears to embroider this hearsay in his memoirs. He writes that in late August
a personal telegram sent by McLean to Eden pressing for arms and support for Kupi
was 'deliberately destroyed by one of the officers in the SOE office in Bari'. Then, on
the eve of the mission's evacuation in October, having twice had their request turned
down for Kupi to be brought out with them, 'we availed ourselves of a personal signal
to Anthony Eden. As on the previous occasion it found its way into the wastepaper
basket in the Bari office'.19
As its signals log now confirms, Smiley's mission, during its entire time in the
field, had transmitted two messages to Bari for forwarding to Eden. But neither of
these was sent in August and neither was delayed or suppressed. The first was
despatched to Bari on 23 May and asked Eden whether King Zog, then still living in
Britain, might be asked to send a personal message of encouragement to Kupi.20 The
Albanian Section passed the appeal at once to SOE London, which then sent a copy to
21the Foreign Office. Philip Broad, the Foreign Office's representative in Bari, was
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also informed by SOE there. He, too, sent a copy to Whitehall. The Foreign Office
and Chiefs of Staff, reluctant to commit to Zog, turned the request down.23 The second
message, transmitted to Bari from Albania on 25 October, was indeed a last-minute
appeal urging the Allies to evacuate Kupi to save him from the Partisans' clutches.24
But again SOE's files confirm that it was passed at once to Broad who, on 27 October,
9^
then sent it to Macmillan to forward to Eden who was then in Rome. It was not the
fault of Broad or SOE that Eden did not reply until after the mission was withdrawn.26
Exhaustive cross-checking of all messages in the signals log with those passed, 'as
received', by SOE Bari to London and other commands and departments suggests
that, with the exception of those sent by 'slow bag' in June, all other messages were
dealt with swiftly and appropriately in Bari. But while Smiley's source cannot be
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accepted as absolutely sound, it is certainly not impossible that she was referring to
the fate of the messages sent by his mission in June.
SOE files also reveal that another SOE officer recorded concerns about the
pro-Partisan stance of the Albanian Section after he arrived in Bari from Albania in
1944. Major George Seymour had spent almost a year in the country and shared much
of McLean and Amery's sympathy for the nationalists' plight. He was never to
publish an account of his Albanian experiences and was killed in Malaya in 1953. But
in 1944 he did write a long and detailed debriefing report that was released in 1997 at
the Public Record Office. This now suggests that Eliot Watrous, fearing that Seymour
might upset policy by speaking well of the nationalists, had sought to prevent him
from proceeding to London. Seymour's report concludes:
[When] I returned to Base at Bari [in July]... I found the entire
Albanian section biased to an unbelievable extent on behalf of the
Partisans. They were not even prepared to listen to the Nationalist
case and views. I attempted to explain this case but when in the
office I was called a Fascist I realised that the position was hopeless.
I applied to be sent home to state my case there and was informed
by Major Watrous, the head of the Albanian section, that I would be
sent home but not immediately, because at that time a policy was
being decided in London and, if I went home then, it might alter the
whole policy. A truly remarkable statement to be confronted with
after one had spent eleven months working with and studying both
Partisans and Nationalists. That we achieved but little is hardly
surprising.27
Passing on Seymour's report in early 1945, Lieutenant Colonel David Talbot-Rice,
Head of SOE London's Balkans and Middle East desk, drew the attention of his
superior, Colonel David Keswick, to that paragraph. 'You will remember that at the
date to which it refers', wrote Talbot-Rice, 'when Seymour complains that the Bari
office adopted a rather dictatorial attitude, we were complaining bitterly at this end of
?o
the lack of information which we received from our overseas headquarters'.
But even if SOE London had been better informed, if the delayed messages
had arrived on time and Seymour been able to press his views in person at that
moment, it is impossible to believe that they would have had any significant bearing
on policy. SOE's files now confirm that even Watrous and Seymour, in their apparent
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concern about the impact of Seymour's report in London, exaggerated the importance
attached by key decision-makers to political considerations.
By the summer of 1944, changes in Allied command arrangements had seen
SOE - both in Bari and in Baker Street - increasingly subordinated to the regular
military authorities and sidelined in the decision-making process. As has been seen in
previous chapters, the first significant change had occurred in the latter months of
1943, when SOE Cairo was placed directly under the operational control of GHQ
Middle East. One of the main reasons for this was precisely because SOE Cairo was
thought to have had far too much influence and independence already. Lord
Glenconner, a civilian, had been in charge of SOE Cairo since September 1942 and it
was largely a reaction to the power that he and others had wielded that brought these
changes and forced his departure. Major-General William Stawell, a former Deputy
Director of Intelligence at the War Office, replaced him.29 Stawell and SOE Cairo
now received their operational directives from GHQ Middle East and much closer
guidance on policy from the Foreign Office, both in London and through its
representatives in Cairo.
SOE's Balkan activities were harnessed more closely to Allied strategic needs
in 1944. In January, General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, who had succeeded
Eisenhower as Supreme Allied Commander in the Mediterranean at Allied Forces
Headquarters, assumed responsibility for GHQ Middle East and SOE's Balkan
activities. In March Wilson received orders from the Chiefs of Staff to take control
from GHQ Middle East of all special operations in Yugoslavia and Albania and
transfer Stawell, the senior SOE officer in the Mediterranean, from Cairo to a more
central location. Stawell moved to Italy and in April, close to Bari, opened a new
command, Headquarters Special Operations Mediterranean (HQ SOM) to co-ordinate
all British and American special operations in the Mediterranean. Now Wilson's
control of SOE's Albanian and Yugoslav Sections went only through Stawell's new
HQ SOM. Both Sections had already opened advance headquarters in Bari at the end
of 1943 to be nearer their respective theatres. By April each had moved most of their
staffs over from Cairo and was close to full establishment.30
The final significant change in command took place in June, and further
reflected the ever-increasing rhythm of Allied activity in the Balkans and especially
the substantial commitment being made to supplying Tito's Partisans in Yugoslavia.
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Perceiving a need for tighter organisation of all Balkan operations, the Chiefs of Staff
granted Wilson permission on 10 June to establish immediately a new command to
co-ordinate the planning and execution of all air, sea, land and special operations
across the Adriatic. In line with Wilson's earlier recommendation that the 'Air Forces
must have the major part' in those operations, the new body was named the Balkan
Air Force and Air-Vice Marshall William Elliot given command.31 Elliot, a career
RAF officer, was considered a sound, suitable choice as commander. As the Balkan
Air Force's in-house history reads, he had
long experience of inter-service planning in Whitehall on the staff of
the War Cabinet Office and, as a member of the Joint Planning
Committee, had attended many of the important inter-Allied
conferences between Churchill and Roosevelt. He was accordingly
well versed in inter-service matters and the interplay of military and
political problems essential for waging war in the Balkans.
Moreover, from his attendance at the inter-Allied conferences, he
was necessarily familiar with the outline of Allied world strategy
and how the Balkan theatre fitted in to the general design.32
'He will do the job well' noted Harold Macmillan in his diary, after Elliot visited him
en route to assuming his new command.33
By the end of June 1944, responsible to Wilson and based in Bari, Elliot and
the Balkan Air Force were in firm operational control of SOE's Albanian activities.
To discuss questions of policy thrown up by SOE's operations, Elliot chaired and was
advised by a policy committee, as GHQ Middle East had been since late 1943 and HQ
SOM since April. This new committee included local representatives of Allied Forces
Headquarters, the Foreign Office, the US State Department and SOE. And at a
meeting on 17 June to draw up the committee's terms of reference, it was agreed that
SOE's operations in Yugoslavia and Albania would be placed under its direct
supervision.34
It was to be the Balkan Air Force policy committee that chose to halt and
resume supplies to the Partisans in July and refrain from supplying the Zogists
throughout the summer. It also recommended in September the withdrawal of
McLean's mission and agreed in October that Kupi and various others should not be
evacuated. When accounts of SOE's wartime operations in Albania criticise decisions
made by 'Bari' after Philip Leake's death, the distinction is rarely made that, in
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practice, the Balkan Air Force was the responsible authority there, not SOE. As David
Stafford writes, SOE Bari was now 'firmly subordinated to the regular military and...
in fact, now no longer bore any responsibility for operational policy governing
supplies to the partisans, although SOE channels continued to be used for this
purpose'. Having slipped rungs steadily since 1943, it was now confined almost
'exclusively to technical assistance and advice'.35
SOE retained some input into the deliberations of the Balkan Air Force policy
committee. Eliot Watrous occasionally attended meetings to give background
information or explain a certain point. But the only SOE representative to sit on the
committee was Lieutenant Colonel the Lord Harcourt, Head of SOE Bari. A veteran
SOE hand, Bill Harcourt was thirty-six years old, Eton- and Oxford-educated and a
managing director of Morgan Grenfell. He was also very familiar with SOE's
operations in Albania. Sent out to work in its Cairo Headquarters after joining SOE in
1941, he became Deputy Director of SOE Cairo's Balkan Section in January 1943 and
was appointed MBE the following month. In October he went to run SOE's Advance
Headquarters in Bari.36 By May 1944 he was chairing HQ SOM's weekly policy
committee meetings on Albania; in June he took overall command of SOE Bari.
Throughout the summer and autumn of 1944, Harcourt was more deeply involved in
decision-making over Albania than anyone else in SOE. Indeed, to judge by the
Albanian Section's correspondence and the recollections of SOE officers in Bari at the
time, Harcourt shouldered much of the burden of running it after the death of Philip
Leake. All policy papers and proposals put up by the Section had to be seen and
approved by him. He worked closely with staff officers in Bari and with officers
returning from the field. 'He has a very thorough grasp of the political background in
the Balkans, particularly Greece and Albania', wrote Stawell ofHarcourt in late 1944;
'a very definite and forceful personality and commands respect'.38
Neither Harcourt, nor AV-M Elliot nor Philip Broad, the Foreign Office
representative who sat on the Policy Committee, appears ever to have been described
in print as 'communist' or leftwing. From the moment Harcourt and the new Balkan
Air Force assumed control of SOE's operations in Albania, however, they had
inherited the Foreign Office-approved policy that had guided those activities since
January 1944. The emphasis of that policy was on killing Germans, not curbing the
spread of communism. Elliot's directive laid down that his 'primary object' was to
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'contain and destroy as many enemy forces as possible in the Balkans'. And as
summarised in its in-house history, the tasks of his new command in relation to
Albania were:
(a) To endeavour to unite the resistance movements in Albania to
take concerted action against the Germans
(b) To afford such air support as was possible for operations by the
Albanians against the Germans
(c) To carry out a series of harassing raids by British forces on the
Albanian coastline...
(d) To continue sending supplies to Albania by air and... by sea
As the minutes of its meetings make clear, a desire to inflict the maximum damage on
the Germans in Albania was always uppermost in the Policy Committee's minds. So
too was a diminishing hope of achieving task (a) and a growing appreciation that
SOE's continued efforts to persuade Kupi and other nationalists to fight were
undermining the Balkan Air Force's 'primary object'.39
These considerations dictated the response of the Balkan Air Force to the
Partisan assault on Kupi at the end of June. When the Partisans opened their offensive,
the Policy Committee halted the supply of arms to them and appealed to Hoxha to
refrain from fighting Kupi.40 But the fact that certain Partisan units were soon in
action against the Germans once again, and in trouble and in need of ammunition, saw
the Committee agree to despatch limited supplies to those units 'immediately' and
'without prejudice to the future', to quote from the Balkan Air Force history. The
decision was also taken to allow a Partisan delegation to proceed to Bari to negotiate
directly with the Allied authorities on military matters.41
At the time, Billy McLean's mission wondered why, if the Allies were serious
about effecting some kind of reconciliation between the Partisans and Kupi, the
authorities in Bari did not seek to restrain the Partisans further. Amery claimed later
that decision-makers had been merely 'drifting before events', unable to control the
Partisans 42 Others would imply that it reflected the pro-Partisan influence of junior
staff officers in Bari. The real explanation lies partly in the realistic assessment, which
even McLean's mission had made in May, that no reconciliation between Kupi and
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the Partisans was likely. But it lies principally in the fact that a reconciliation was
meant merely as a step towards achieving united action against the Germans, not
saving Albania from Partisan domination. The Balkan Air Force did not wish to
inflame the intensity of civil conflict in Albania, which was precisely why supplies
were only sent selectively to Partisan units proven to be genuinely fighting the
Germans. But nothing in its directive stated that it was required to take issue with the
Partisans' political aims. As Bill Harcourt wrote in December 1944, 'it was decided,
on the information available from all sources, that the value of the FNC actions
against the retreating Germans was such as to render the cessation of all supplies to
the FNC impolitic... The absence of British support for Kupi was not the British
inability to control FNC but the considered opinion of all members of the Policy
Committee, Balkan Air Force, that it would be against the military requirements of the
situation to withhold supplies from FNC and that to supply Kupi with arms at that
particular time could only lead to an intensification of a civil war'.43
It is now clear that the decisions taken in favour of the Partisans in 1944
reflected a realistic view of what the Partisans could do for Allied commanders. By
June, events had proved without doubt that the Partisans could cause the Germans
considerable discomfort. One of the Partisans' most significant military achievements
of the war was the bridgehead they had, by then, carved out on the coast. This allowed
them to receive sea-borne supplies from Italy and harass the coastal roads connecting
Albania with Greece. Its existence soon saw them on the receiving end of a major
German offensive. One unit involved was the 1st Mountain Division, widely regarded
as the finest German formation in Southeast Europe.44
It is also clear that SOE officers attached to the Partisans kept Bari well
informed of these developments. Some, like Philip Leake, did so in cables from the
field. But others, including several senior officers who had spent many months with
the Partisans, were evacuated during May, June and July to Bari where they were able
to make detailed reports and deal with Harcourt, Elliot and others in person. One such
officer was Alan Palmer, senior British officer with the Partisans from May 1944 until
the end of the war. Palmer never published any account of his wartime work in
Albania. But in 1962, at a conference in Oxford on wartime resistance movements, he
did speak a little about his time in Albania. He recalled of the Partisan war effort:
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If one is looking to see what effect on the war the activity of the
[Albanian] partisans had, I think they had their greatest compliment
paid to them [when]... the Germans had to return to Albania one of
their crack divisions - the 1st Mountain Division... and mounted a
very rapid and effective operation against the partisans... [T]hey
cleared the whole of the southern part of the country in a short time
and closed the bridgehead. But partisans being formed militarily the
way they are, they disperse, disappear, reform. And so it was only a
month or less after that operation that they were again formed up
again in groups and being once more supplied by air in greater
quantities and operating still.45
Contemporary reports by Palmer, Leake and other officers successfully impressed on
Bari the scale and value of the Partisan war effort, and the rapid growth it had
undergone since the winter. On the eve of the Partisan offensive into the north, there
was little disagreement among observers in Italy that, at a time when the German
withdrawal from the Balkans appeared imminent, strong grounds existed on which to
maintain and support that effort. An appreciation by Harcourt of 20 June stressed that
the Albanian Partisans were 'the only party which has continuously fought the
Germans' and deserved Allied support as they were 'organised, pro-Allied, and
willing to take offensive action'.46 A paper by Stawell's HQ SOM of 22 June noted
that 'the fact that the enemy has seen fit to launch an offensive on a considerable scale
against the Albanian partisans is proof of the value of their operations and of the
importance which the enemy attaches to the elimination of their br[idge]head, the
disruption of their forces, and the reopening of the two main routes North from
Epirus'. It recommended continued support for the Partisans 'for from a military point
of view it is paying a good dividend'.47
Captured German documents confirm that the Partisans maintained effective
pressure on the Germans. One example is this desperate order of 5 July, issued by the
headquarters in Tirana of the German 21st Army Corps:
Supplies sent to the guerillas by the Allied Air Force have recently
been on a scale which cannot be permanently tolerated. In view of
the decisive significance which a stoppage, or even interruption of
the regular air borne supplies to the guerillas would have on their
organisation and fighting powers, Second Armoured Army has
ordered that a co-ordinated drive against the guerilla air supplies be
carried out with every possible means and by every suitable branch
of the army...
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[A]ll soldiers must be convinced of the importance of the
operation so as to encourage their co-operation. Every suggestion
from whatever source will be reported to Corps, tested, and, if
suitable, carried out. Mobility, imagination and constant change in
methods are necessary. Keeping to one method is generally useless
even if initially successful.
In August a copy of the captured German order was circulated at the most senior
levels of SOE London 'as an important testimony of the value of the work we have
been able to do in Albania'. SOE missions in the field also made detailed reports on
the two-month battle for Dibra, probably the Partisans' largest single action of the
war. The Germans lost as many as four hundred killed by the time the town fell to the
Partisans at the end ofAugust.49
The attitude adopted by decision-makers towards Kupi during the summer of
1944 was a logical extension of that desire to kill Germans while trying to minimise
civil war. Neither Harcourt nor anyone else in Bari shared McLean's confidence in a
nationalist rising led by Kupi, whose poor military potential and pre-occupation with
the Partisan threat had been clear for many months. The Zogists had last moved
against the Axis in September 1943. Nothing had occurred since to suggest the
situation would change. 'The arrival of a Mission headed by a Lt Col gave an
unexpected but considerable stimulus to the Zogist movement' Bill Harcourt noted in
December 1944, 'but in spite of this, little effort appears to have been made by Abas
Kupi to place his organisation on a full military basis'. Harcourt and other decision¬
makers in Bari were considerably less impressed than McLean by Kupi's contribution
to the Gjoles bridge operation. They doubted whether it was more than a token act or
that it really committed him to open war against the Germans. 'The action at Gjoles
Bridge on 21 June was carefully considered by all authorities concerned in Italy'
Harcourt recalled, 'but the conclusion was reached that it could not be considered a
whole-hearted attempt by Kupi to throw in his lot with the Allies. Whilst in no way
detracting from Major Smiley's outstanding success in this operation, it must be noted
that Kupi refused to allow either his or the name of his organisation to be in any way
connected with the action and that the Zogist Commander of the Bridge area refused
at first to permit the operation to be carried out'.50 When Kupi finally fought a handful
of small actions against the Germans in September 1944, the Policy Committee
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dismissed them as a last-gasp attempt at insuring with the Allies and unworthy of any
attention.51
It was also apparent that Kupi had consistently exaggerated the size of his
forces. Reports of how many men he claimed he could put into the field varied wildly
over the months, from 40,000 down to a few hundred.52 In February 1944, George
Seymour informed Bari that Kupi claimed he could raise 25,000 men.53 In May, Julian
Amery reported that he felt Kupi could raise 5,000 poorly armed men from Tirana,
Mati and Kruja, his principal regions of support.54 In July, McLean then asked Bari
for arms to supply 2,000, none of whom had yet taken the field.55 To onlookers in
Italy this did not look impressive and compared poorly with the tens of thousands of
Partisans reported already to be under arms in the south.
Added to this picture of weakness and prevarication were strong indications
throughout the spring and summer that Kupi was turning to the Germans for help
against the Partisans. There has never been any doubt that Kupi associated with
Albanians who collaborated with the Germans. Nor has there been any doubt that that
association became a military alliance after the Partisans advanced into the north. A
broad based front was formed in which Kupi allied himself with Gjon Markogjoni
(who had collaborated with the Italians), Mustafa Kruja (who had collaborated with
both the Italians and the Germans), and Fikri Dine (the leading member of the
German-backed Council of Regency). But there has long been disagreement over how
far Kupi went in his dealings. Smiley writes that 'the BLOs attached to the Partisans,
repeatedly told by them that Kupi was collaborating with the Germans, had absorbed
these lies and signalled them to Bari. We all knew that at no time did Kupi
collaborate'.56 As shown in the previous chapter, however, decrypts and captured
German documents do now confirm that, albeit through intermediaries, Kupi dealt
with the Germans.
For their part, SOE records confirm that Bari certainly suspected Kupi of, at
the very least, indirect collaboration. Commenting on Partisan reports from as early as
February 1944 that accused Kupi of direct collaboration, Bill Harcourt wrote later:
It is no more than possible that he personally never conversed with a
German, but collectively his organisation, which boasted the
inclusion of high-ranking Officers of State, was tending more and
more to collaboration. One statement which led to accusations by
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the [Partisans] was made by a German deserter, Gefr. Forster who
claimed to have seen in a German HQ a document purporting to be a
pact of non-aggression signed on behalf of both Kupi and the
German Commander. This statement was made by Forster on the 13
April [ 1944] and supported a rumour to the same effect which had
been reported by Lt Col Seymour on 3 April.
Harcourt also noted the 'coincidence' in June of a major German drive starting against
the Partisans 'at an opportune moment for Kupi'. This was especially interesting,
Harcourt considered, 'in view of the meeting which Kupi had had, just prior to that
date, with Mustafa Kruja and representatives of Fiqri Dine and Mehdi Frasheri
[Dine's predecessor as Regent], Dr Saddedin, head of the Albanian Red Cross in
Tirana and not himself a Partisan, recently stated that such a drive was in fact
proposed to the Germans by Kupi's Committee'.
SOE records also indicate that word of Kupi's dealings with collaborators and
Germans reached SOE earlier, and from sources more reliable than deserters and
Partisan propaganda. According to 'most secret sources', reads a note of 7 June 1944
in SOE London's files, discussions had been held in mid-May 'between Abas Kupi
and other prominent Albanians regarding the formation of a new Government. It
appeared that the German authorities including [SS General Josef] Fitztum [Fitzthum],
the head of the Sicherheitsdienst [SD] in Albania, were participating. It seems that the
objective was the establishment of some political agreement which would provide the
basis for more effective collaboration between Albanian puppet troops and the
Germans'. The note adds that in mid-February 'friends of Abas Kupi had given the
Germans assurances that in the event of an English landing he would find some
excuse for not taking action against the Germans'.58 Another note, dated 13 July,
states that 'it is reliably reported... that the German military authorities in Tirana were
very recently approached by [Mehdi] Frasheri [head of the puppet Council of
Regency], on behalf of Abas Kupi. The latter was in danger of attack by the LNC, and
it was desired that a force of some hundreds of his supporters should be allowed to
pass through Tirana to reinforce him. The Germans granted this request'.59 A note
from Section V of the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), dated 22 July and marked
'TOPSEC "U"', states that, according to 'most secret sources', in mid- July 'Wehbi
[Vehbi] and Ragib [Raquip] Frasheri, both prominent pro-Axis Albanian politicians
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[and sons of Mehdi Frasheri], were negotiating with Abas Kupi in an attempt to
persuade him to fight the Communists'. The note continues:
Kupi is said to be willing, and the Frasheris ask for German support.
The SD at Tirana advise that Kupi is to be regarded with suspicion
until he breaks with the English Military Mission and actually starts
hostilities against the Communists. He is to be asked to visit Tirana
for negotiations and to accept a German liaison staff. He is not to
receive ammunition except under control.
All these notes are present only in SOE London's files. Yet there is reason to believe
that the intelligence they contained was available also to SOE officers in Bari. Air-
Commodore Archie Boyle, Assistant Chief of SOE, commented to David Keswick
when passing him the 22 July note: 'It is certain that similar information will be in
possession of our people in Italy'.60
These considerations compounded the fact that, for as long as SOE missions
remained with Kupi, the Albanian war effort risked being seriously jeopardised. It had
been obvious since the spring that the Allies had much to gain from remaining on
good terms with the Partisans. There was no doubt that they were more popular, better
organised and possessed the greater potential to harass the Germans than any other
guerilla group. Hoping to release that potential, SOE officers attached to Partisan units
had bombarded Bari with reports and signals asking not only for supplies but also for
more exclusive support. These officers were convinced that the presence of other
missions with Kupi and other nationalists, though in accordance with British policy,
was hampering the Partisan war effort. Feelings ran high. Captain Brian Ensor, for
example, spent February until September 1944 with the Partisans and subsequently
reported:
My briefing before infiltration... consisted of a statement that on all
possible occasions I was to use British material and Partisan
manpower to kill Germans...
The Partisans were, and would always be, the most effective
fighting machine, provided they were not deprived of weapons and
supplies to continue their fight against the Germans to the advantage
of any doubtful resistance elements whose only claim to recognition
consisted of empty promises and idle boastings... It is easy enough
to be wise after the event, but my signals of April and May prove
that I was always a staunch supporter of an immediate change of
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policy, because it was not possible to carry out my orders
properly... For a long time we were... held responsible [by the
Partisans] for a policy with which we did not agree and which was
inhibiting Partisan resistance to the Germans and preventing us from
carrying out our briefing orders, i.e. harassing the Germans.61
Many SOE officers evacuated to Bari during the spring and summer were able to
voice such opinions forcefully and in person. They included Lieutenant Colonel
Norman Wheeler, who had been in Albania since December 1943 and the senior
British officer with the Partisans since February 1944. He was evacuated with Major
Bill Tilman, who had spent nine months with the Partisans, in late May. On their
arrival in Bari, Wheeler reported:
It has been proved beyond a shadow of a doubt that the Tirana
[puppet] Gov[ernmen]t, and the Balkom are collaborating actively
against the Partisans with the Germans, and the rest of the country,
by sitting on the fence, are collaborating passively. It can be
appreciated, therefore, that it is exceedingly difficult to explain to
the Partisans the reason why the Allies not only do NOT denounce
these collaborators but give them supplies... and continue to
maintain Military Missions with them. During the past six months,
together with Major Tilman and [Lieutenant Colonel] Palmer, I have
asked for a change in policy and submitted recommendations
accordingly. The position has remained unaltered. 62
In his own report, Tilman expressed similar views:
I was as convinced when I left as I had been for some months
previously that our policy of backing the LNC [Partisans] was
honest and expedient, they being the only party in Albania with the
same war aims as our own, who are willing to make sacrifices for
them... They realised we were doing our best to help them
materially, but the good effect of that was more than offset by our
helping equally other parties, if not with money or material, then
with encouragement.63
Within days of joining Alan Palmer's mission at Enver Hoxha's headquarters in May,
Philip Leake also transmitted reports of how impressed he was by Partisan strength
and the need for policy-makers to appreciate its implications. Signals sent before his
death confirm Leake was convinced by then that the Partisans - estimated then at
being 25,000-strong - deserved continued support and that the time had come to force
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Kupi to fight.64 'Until the entry of the late Major Leake into Albania', Brian Ensor
concluded, 'the [level of] support BLOs received to help them to gain the full co¬
operation of the Partisans was criminal. The knowledge that the cries of the two most
senior BLOs with the Partisans [Wheeler and Palmer] were falling on deaf ears filled
us with despair... [I]t seemed to us that until the latter months our efforts were being
deliberately hindered by our own countrymen'.65
Conscious of the urgent need to resolve this issue, Bill Harcourt showed no
hesitation in recommending the proposals passed on by Leake and Palmer that Kupi
be set an ultimatum. Kupi's movement, he wrote in an appreciation of 20 June which
echoed Eliot Watrous' 1 June proposals, appeared 'immature and without support' and
did not yet constitute 'a military factor'. Moreover, Kupi was still 'unwilling to show
his hand either on one side or the other' and had prevaricated when any attempt had
been made by SOE officers to persuade him to fight the Germans. The time had come
'to force Kupi's hand' or 'drop him', Harcourt suggested that Kupi be told 'immediate
action' coupled with 'a declaration of wholehearted sympathy and non aggression to
other resistance movements' was essential if he was to receive continued Allied
support. If Kupi agreed, he should be warned that 'any signs of sliding back into a
collaborationist policy will cause the immediate abandonment of all support and the
withdrawal of all Allied officers with him'.66 In correspondence with Harold
Macmillan that month, Philip Broad reported that, after 'full discussions' with SOE
Bari, he 'agreed' that Kupi should now be set a time limit within which he would have
to carry out 'a specific military operation... as was done in the case of General
Mihailovic'. Since Kupi's movement was 'much weaker than was originally believed'
and the Partisans were 'the only party in Albania at present offering any active
resistance to the Germans', it was time to 'intimate clearly' to Kupi 'that unless he is
prepared to do something we shall not continue to support him'.67 That no ultimatum
was authorised owed everything to the shared concern of the Foreign Office and its
minister at Wilson's Headquarters over the potentially unfortunate consequences
should Kupi actually meet any time limit set. As Macmillan suggested to Broad,
Britain might then find itself committed to supplying Kupi with weapons that he
would 'probably' use against the Partisans. He concluded that a Kupi-Partisan
agreement was an essential precondition before any decision was taken to arm Kupi.68
The Foreign Office in London supported Macmillan's grounds for caution. It
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acknowledged, too, that 'experience' of setting Mihailovic a similar test was 'not
encouraging' and agreed that the 'first aim' should still be the reconciliation.69
By then, however, few SOE officers in Bari or with the Partisans in southern
Albania believed a reconciliation was possible. Towards the end of June, but before
the outbreak of wider civil war between Kupi and the Partisans, Bari passed Alan
Palmer details of a recent appeal ofMcLean's that Kupi be sent arms to allow him to
attack the Germans. Palmer also learnt that McLean had stressed again to Kupi that he
had to attack at once and thereby reach 'a basis of understanding' with the Partisans.
'It is felt Kupi will fight the Germans when supplies are sent, after which there will be
a good chance of collaborating with FNC', McLean had reported. Palmer, at that
moment, was on the coast awaiting evacuation to Bari, with the German summer
offensive against the Partisans pressing in from all sides. His comments on McLean's
efforts and appeal were blunt but prophetic:
Cannot believe Kupi has been asked to re-enter FNC. Think First
Partisan Division expressly fonned to attack Kupi and if his troops
resist the Partisans will attack and succeed rapidly if there is no
German drive [against them]. Any understanding between FNC and
Kupi is out of the question at such a late date even if he fights the
Germans. At the end of May Leake and myself recommended
targets for Kupi and a time limit end of June... It is too late now...
Arms must not [now] be sent [to] Kupi as they would only be
used against the Partisans and aggravate the situation. Surely by
now Kupi's unwillingness to fight the Germans is clear. There is no
time for Kupi to take action against the Germans before he is
attacked by the Partisans.
Palmer concluded by recommending the 'immediate withdrawal' of missions with
Kupi. 'Their retention can only aggravate the civil war and be a real danger to BLOs
there'.70 In the event, the Foreign Office prevaricated until almost the end about
breaking with Kupi. McLean's mission remained with him until October. By then, the
Partisans had established control over most of the country and become deeply
suspicious at Britain's continued contact with royalist Albanians with such an
insignificant record of resistance.
Frustration in Bari at out-dated or unrealistic views that threatened to fuel that
prevarication, and thereby continue to prejudice support for the Albanian war effort,
may well be enough to explain why certain reports were obstructed from making their
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way from the field to London. Indeed, other SOE officers who knew Eliot Watrous do
not, in their recollections, echo Billy McLean's disparaging comment that he
supported 'the communist cause against the nationalists at every level'. Marcus Lyon,
who spent over a year in Albania with SOE and came to know Watrous well, recalls
71that in 1944 he was 'very pleasant, enthusiastic and helpful... quite clever too'.
Reginald Hibbert remembers 'a mild man, less commanding perhaps than some might
have wished, but in so far as his views were progressive they were somewhere in the
centre, in a general sense liberal. He was advocating support (ie supplies) for the
79
Partisans, the National Liberation Army, not for "the communist cause'". Even Peter
Kemp's impression from meeting Watrous briefly in Bari that spring was of nothing
more than 'an amiable young American with a commission in the British Army who
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took endless pains to ensure my comfort and peace ofmind'.
In fact, Watrous was naturalised British, born in Johannesburg to an American
father and a New Zealand-born mother; but he was certainly young: still only twenty-
two when appointed Section Head.74 To some in SOE this seemed a relatively tender
age at which to be given such responsibility, even when given the demands of the war,
but it seems to have been a considered and logical appointment. Documents in his
SOE Personal File confirm that his qualities and commitment impressed his superiors
and give no indication that he was ever regarded as in any way difficult or a problem.
A note dated 17 January 1944 in his SOE Personal File describes him as 'a staff
officer of exceptional energy and enterprise and well suited by his abilities for a Grade
II appointment'. Bill Harcourt echoed that assessment in a confidential report in April:
'Captain Watrous has a pleasant personality and is a very keen, reliable, energetic and
intelligent GSO III [i.e. General Staff Officer, Grade III] of well above average
ability. He is willing and capable to accept responsibility and will make an excellent
Grade II Staff Officer in any capacity'.75 He was duly made up to GSO II when Philip
Leake left for Albania in May.
Nor is there any evidence, in the correspondence or papers produced by
Watrous prior to Leake's departure, to indicate that his views ever conflicted with
Leake's. In a letter of 4 March, for example, to Christopher Steel, then still the
Foreign Office adviser to SOE, Watrous had objected roundly to recent
recommendations received from Norman Wheeler for a change to be made in policy.
The BK should be officially denounced, Wheeler had suggested, and the BBC should
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identify the LNC by name and refrain from using 'loose terms such as Patriot and
Nationalist'. Writing, apparently, as temporary Section Head in Leake's absence,
Watrous was firmly in favour of the policy of persevering with attempts at fostering
resistance from all possible quarters. Wheeler's proposals, Watrous wrote, would
create 'an impossible situation' for SOE officers still working with the BK.76 The
LNC, 'although the only movement at present actively co-operating', was also weak
and in no position to take over the areas now occupied by the BK. The BK's
'Nationalist and Conservative outlook', Watrous considered, was 'more representative
of Albanian opinion than the left view of the LNC'; their denunciation would merely
increase the hostility between the two parties. Furthermore, Abas Kupi had 'strong
ties' with the BK. A declaration against them would 'certainly affect our present
relations with Kupi which, at the moment, are of paramount importance'. Other than
denouncing BK leaders proven to have collaborated, Watrous suggested, no further
action should be taken. Watrous' comments echo Leake's when the latter had resisted
'Trotsky' Davies' call for exclusive support for the Partisans in December 1943; they
were also wholly in line with the views of other observers in SOE and GHQ Middle
East in the spring of 1944. As Steel scribbled on Watrous' 4 March letter, 'I entirely
agree with the arguments and the proposed action. It is exactly what we have all felt
here before'.77 As 1944 wore on, Watrous' views changed. But so, too, did Leake's, as
he began to appreciate the rapidly evolving reality and implications of the great
Partisan recovery. Indeed, Watrous' papers and proposals during the summer of 1944
display the arguments of Leake, Wheeler, Alan Palmer and other officers with the
Partisans openly and consistently. And limits to Watrous' sympathy for the Partisans
can certainly be detected in SOE's papers. In August 1944, for example, he resisted
strongly the idea that a permanent Partisan mission be established in Bari. '[I]t would
be both difficult and awkward for [SOE]... here and the Senior BLO in the Field if
there is to be a permanent delegation' he wrote to Harcourt, 'since they will certainly
try and check everything that does not exactly suit the wishes of the LNC'.78
After Leake's death, however, it seems possible that Watrous became worried
about the possible impact that inaccurate, pro-nationalist reports might have in
London. SOE records suggest that few in its overseas headquarters shared for long the
confidence apparent in London in Billy McLean's mission's chances of success.
Certainly not Philip Leake, Bill Harcourt or the Foreign Office's successive
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representatives at that headquarters, Christopher Steel and Philip Broad. That Watrous
openly desired a policy change in line with recommendations received from the field
is also clear. 'Papers, which Philip would have told you about, have now been put up'
wrote Watrous on 8 June to Alan Palmer, referring to the policy proposals, including
the recommendation that Kupi be set a time limit within which he had to act, that the
Section had submitted to Broad and Harcourt on 1 June and passed to SOE and the
Foreign Office in London a few days later. '[W]e now have to wait for the big brains
above us to absorb and digest them before final decisions are reached' Watrous added.
'I am pressing daily for decisions and hope shortly to have authority to hold the pistol
to Kupi's head'.79 A growing anxiety that London should not act on reports that bore
little relation to Allied strategic concerns and the reality of the situation in Albania
may well have compelled Watrous to then tamper, apparently, with the flow of
information from the field. But the accusation that he acted from ulterior motives,
determined to sabotage McLean and Kupi, and without regard to the facts, appears
unconvincing and unfair. As he had been instructed to do, Watrous placed the
emphasis on war-fighting considerations, distinguished between what was urgent
(operational imperatives) and what was increasingly irrelevant to actual operations,
and submitted his assessments to higher authority. It was not the fault of the staff that
McLean's messages, like Kupi's position, were becoming increasingly irrelevant to
the exigencies of the situation on the ground. Even Bill Harcourt, as noted in a letter
from him to SOE London in September, personally and deliberately chose not to send
certain documents to London that summer detailing discussions with Partisan
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representatives in Bari, 'as they could not have failed to be extremely misleading'.
Jon Naar's recollections of life and work in Bari may reinforce this picture.
After moving there from Cairo, his own duties as military intelligence officer were
chiefly to 'debrief... bodies who came back from the field, translate and evaluate
captured documents, and then co-ordinate this information with BLOs who were
beginning to start operations in the field'. Most of Naar's 'firsthand contacts' were
with British officers arriving in Bari from working with the Partisans in southern
Albania. 'Almost all of them were extremely helpful and interested only in getting the
job done of attracting and pinning down as many German divisions as possible in the
Balkans'.81
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Yet there was indeed a 'schism between the pro- and anti-Kupi factions' in
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Bari, Naar remembers. And what certainly contributed to this were the personalities
and personal politics of individual officers.
In [the] Albanian Section, as in [the] Greek and Jugo[slav Sections],
there was a sharp dichotomy between those of us who supported or
opposed the Partisans. Altho[ugh] the crucial issue was which
resistance groups would fight (or were fighting) the Italian or
German occupiers of the 3 countries, our own political sympathies
played an important role in our evaluations of the reports sent in
from the field and our own personal contacts with resistance leaders,
BLOs, and others who came out of the field to Cairo and Bari.
Most of us on the staff and in the field were open as to our
political sympathies. [James] Klugman[n of the Yugoslav Section]
was a communist... Peter Kemp fought for Franco, and Julian
Amery... was very rightwing... John Eyre [of the Albanian Section]
was pro-communist, but so in the spirit of popular front coalition
building were most of us at that time. Personally, I was openly pro-
socialist as were almost all of us who had served in the Eighth
Army.83
Naar's own politics were not simply a product of his time in the desert. In October
1936, as a young Jewish sixth former at Mill Hill, he had fought Mosley's fascists in
Cable Street. Later, as an undergraduate in London, he had joined the University
Labour Federation and marched in protest against German and Italian territorial
aggressions. After Spain, Naar recalls, he had little time for communism. But in any
case, he stresses, in the context of SOE's Albanian operations the post-war
'polarizing' of people in Bari 'as pro- or anti-Communist' in 1944 is 'totally
misleading'.
The pro-nationalist group didn't have much support on the staff not
because we were Communist sympathizers (Klugmann and Eyre
were, of course) but because we had contributed to the pro-pzn [sic]
policy adopted by Churchill and its corresponding support for
Hoxha in Albania on the grounds that it made sense from the
military viewpoint...
Did the Pzns in Albania indulge in terrorism and other civil
war operations against their enemies within what was originally a
common front? Of course, they did. But on balance and when it
counted... the Albanian resistance was 90 per cent or more Partisan-
supported and organised at great personal loss to themselves.
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As it became clear that the Partisans were politically in the ascendant, Naar recalls, he
personally found it possible to identify other grounds on which to support them. He
remembers distinctly voicing to colleagues in 1944 his opinion that, 'by supporting
the [emergent] Partisan forces (and therefore, movements) in the three Balkan
countries', Britain might secure the rise of a 'national', westward-leaning
Communism which could 'represent a significant threat to Soviet hegemony'.84
Naar considers surprising the postwar allegation that Eliot Watrous was a
communist, a charge that he cannot substantiate. He can also recall no instance in Bari
ofmismanagement aimed at manipulating the picture presented to London of events in
Albania. 'If there was a Communist conspiracy in Bari, as alleged by Amery and his
supporters, it certainly fooled me'.85 But, while he thinks a conspiracy unlikely, Naar
does not rule out the possibility that some attempts at minor 'manoeuvring' could
have occurred. Certainly his own reports, now declassified, do not suggest Naar
distorted, for outside observers, information received from missions in the field.86 But
he recalls vividly the resentment with which Julian Amery's politics and contacts in
London came to be viewed in Bari. It was well known, Naar remembers, that Amery
was decidedly conservative in his views, that his father was a cabinet minister and that
the decision to send McLean to Kupi in 1944 had been taken with the full backing of
the Foreign Office. 'Amery and company had their own anti-Partisan, anti-Communist
agenda... and very strong connections with the FO (rather than with SOE London)
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and were able to continue for some months with a policy that was very divisive'.
Watrous, meanwhile, according to Naar, was something of an 'enigma': a poor man-
manager, secretive and possibly capable of withholding certain information in the
ways suggested by SOE's records. 'He didn't seem to trust anyone'.88
Records also suggest that Amery and McLean's working methods contributed
to the tension between their mission and SOE's Bari headquarters. In September 1944,
Bari learnt that McLean, without authorisation, had allowed Amery, a captain, to put
on major's crowns and proclaim himself to locals as Randolph Churchill's
'counterpart' in Albania. Churchill, the Prime Minister's son, had been sent recently
to work with Tito as a semi-official envoy of his father's; the decision to send Amery
to Kupi, however, had had no such diplomatic impulse or authority behind it. An
exchange of w/t messages between Bari and McLean resulted, in which Bill Harcourt
told McLean directly that his conduct had undennined the efforts of SOE officers
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working with the Partisans. 'Comparison [of Amery] with Churchill [is] unfortunate
as [the] Partisans have taken his presence as [meaning British] political support [for]
Kupi', Harcourt transmitted, pointing out that Amery was just a 'straightforward'
BLO. 'By telling Amery to assume [his] majority you have exceeded your powers and
he must revert to his proper rank' Harcourt added. 'This action on your part has made
work of ALOs [Allied Liasion Officers] with [the] Psns extremely difficult'.89 No
memoir or published account of SOE's Albanian activities refers to this incident.
Nor has anything been acknowledged before of the abrasive effect that Amery,
in particular, had on other SOE officers whom McLean's mission encountered in the
field. Major Richard Riddell, an experienced regular officer, crossed paths with him in
northern Albania. It was Riddell who reported, informally, the incident of the major's
crowns, and he recalls that he 'disliked' the forthright Amery 'almost on sight'.90
Reginald Hibbert, then Riddell's second-in-command, writes: 'They [McLean and
Amery] traded heavily on the fact that Julian's father was a Cabinet minister; and
Julian was put forward, and put himself forward, as an especially well informed sort
of political guru with a thorough understanding of the communist menace and
Britain's strategic interests in keeping it at bay. The rest of us were treated as common
soldiery who thought that fighting the Germans was all that counted and did not
understand the higher subtleties which made the Soviet Union and the CP's of eastern
Europe the real, long-term enemies. Everyone was allowed to understand that Billy
McLean had a right of direct access to the Foreign Secretary [who had agreed that
McLean could send him a personal message 'in time of need']. It was this special
character which... [McLean's] mission gave itself while committing itself wholly to
Kupi which riled the ANLA [Partisan] high command... and convinced them that,
whatever Palmer and others said, Britain was against them'.91
However, if Watrous or other Section officers feared that jaundiced reports
would precipitate support in London for an eleventh hour rising by the Nationalists,
they need not have worried. It was true that few policy-makers relished the prospect of
a communist regime coming to power in Albania. 'Another King gone down the
drain!' wrote Churchill, while in Moscow in October 1944, in a recently declassified
note to Eden after learning of the likely ascendancy of the Albanian Partisans. 'We did
not mention Albania the other night' he added, referring to the infamous 'percentages'
meeting at which he and Stalin had divided up Eastern and Southeastern Europe into
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postwar spheres of influence, 'but personally I think we should insist upon a fifty-fifty
arrangement with the Soviets'.92 It was also true that Churchill had expressed concern
for some months about whether Britain should, as he wrote to Eden in early May
1944, 'resist' or 'acquiesce in the Communisation of the Balkans'. In a memorandum
submitted to the War Cabinet early in June, the Foreign Office acknowledged that the
Partisan leaders in Albania, like those in Yugoslavia and the leaders of EAM in
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Greece, 'were spreading their doctrines in the areas under their control'. But from
the moment the Albanian Partisans attacked them at the end of June, there was never
much likelihood that the Allies would, before the war was out, intervene decisively on
behalf of Zog's supporters in Albania. Until the moment the Germans finally left in
November, the policy guiding SOE and the Balkan Air Force still gave priority to
maximising the military effort only of Albanians genuinely fighting. And during June,
before the Partisans attacked the nationalist north, Wilson in Italy and the Chiefs of
Staff in London had all agreed that Abas Kupi should not be armed unless an
agreement could be arranged between him and the Partisans.
That month, the Foreign Office had approached the Chiefs with the proposal
that Zog be asked to send Kupi a personal telegram urging 'full collaboration' with the
Allies. Reluctant to waste on the Zogists supplies that 'might be more profitably used
elsewhere', the Chiefs summoned little enthusiasm for the plan. SOE in London, they
noted, 'consider best policy is to continue support of LNC'.94 Wilson, when asked by
the Chiefs for his thoughts a few days later, confirmed their conclusion that no
encouragement should be given to Kupi along the lines suggested by the Foreign
Office. Wilson considered that such encouragement 'would involve us in military
support of and supply to' a party 'whose main characteristics are loyalist Albanian
patriotism and antagonism to the Communist Partisans'. The latter, he noted, 'are
rapidly growing in strength and organisation and are already an effective instrument
for action against the enemy in the south where his main commitments (the defence of
vital road communications from Greece) are placed'. Unless a reconciliation between
the Partisans and Kupi could be arranged, he felt, arms sent to the Zogists 'would
mainly encourage civil war'. Wilson considered that such an agreement had to be 'an
essential prerequisite before any military aid is given to [the] Zogists'. But it was
'doubtful', he concluded, whether one would be realised.95
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Senior officers in SOE London concurred with Wilson's reasoning. 'I am
against increased support for Abas Kupi' Colonel David Keswick wrote to Major-
General Colin Gubbins, Head of SOE, on 8 July. 'Our political unwisdom has got us
into the most unholy mess in the Balkans... We do not want bigger and better civil
wars, and this eternal tinkering with both sides in order to match them up one against
the other will in my opinion prove disastrous'. 6 Gubbins agreed. Support for Kupi, he
wrote on 12 July, was 'not warranted'.97 'While we are in agreement with the view
expressed by [the Foreign Office]... as regards the desirability of persuading Abas
Kupi and LNC to come to an agreement', SOE London submitted to the Chiefs that
month, 'we are very doubtful of its practical possibilities. Lt Col Maclean [sic]... has
been endeavouring for several months to bring such an agreement, but with complete
lack of success... [W]e continue to hold the view that the only useful line of action at
the moment in Albania is to continue giving wholehearted support to the LNC who are
fighting the Germans with a considerable degree of success'.98
From June onwards no support was voiced by the military or SOE for Kupi.
And after June, as predicted by Leake and others, all likelihood of an agreement being
forged with the Partisans evaporated, as Kupi proved unable to find the time, space
and resources to put up meaningful resistance to the Germans while refraining from
fighting the Partisans.
Though continuing to maintain that Kupi might still be supported if he came to
an agreement with the Partisans, the Foreign Office accepted, too, that Kupi did not,
on military grounds, justify that support. From Bari, Philip Broad kept the Foreign
Office well enough informed of events in the field.99 As a result, Whitehall knew that
Kupi's resistance record and potential stood in stark contrast to that of the Partisans,
that his many months of inaction and prevarication were obvious and undisputed even
by the SOE mission attached to him. A minute in August by Denis Laskey, the
Albanian desk officer, confirms that this reality at least was appreciated in London.
'From the military point of view, this would be no great loss' he remarked of the
possibility that SOE might have to draw to a close its contact with Kupi. 'LNC are the
only organisation which has ever done any serious fighting against the Germans and
the value of the Nationalists, even if they came out openly on our side, would be
problematical. Politically, however, it is doubtful whether we want to assist LNC to
gain control over the whole of Albania... I still think it might be in our interests and
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also in those of Albania itself if King Zog were to return after the war... I can,
however, see no way ofbringing this about'.100
That McLean was not withdrawn until October had everything to do with the
vain but prolonged hope entertained by the Foreign Office in London that continued
contact with Kupi might yet prove valuable by yielding an agreement between the
Zogists and Partisans. A report on the situation sent by Eden to Churchill on 23 July
provides a typical illustration of the Foreign Office position that summer. Days before,
Churchill had seen a telegram of Broad's from Bari that reported an imminent German
drive on Dibra and that the situation was 'no longer a straight issue of civil war'. The
Partisans were facing 'a definite German threat' and, in the opinion of Alan Palmer,
could expect 'severe losses in the coming fighting'.101 Churchill had minuted to Eden:
'Let me have a note on this, showing which side we are on'.102 Eden replied correctly
that the Partisans were the only organisation doing any serious fighting but added that
their influence was confined to the south and reconciliation with Kupi was still a
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possibility. Eden's paper, as Reginald Hibbert writes, 'considerably overstated'
Kupi's position, 'understated' the Partisan one and was 'far too optimistic in its
suggestion that reconciliation between the two was still conceivable'.104 In August,
when Broad reported that the situation might necessitate the withdrawal ofMcLean's
mission, the Foreign Office remained rooted in the past. 'At this stage of the war we
don't want to commit ourselves too deeply to one side or the other and I am against
withdrawing the BLOs from Kupi' minuted Armine Dew of the Southern Department.
Sir Orme Sargent, Deputy Under-Secretary of State, minuted his agreement.105 Only
in September did Eden finally concede that the Foreign Office had nothing to gain
from maintaining a mission with the Zogists. 'Kupi clearly doesn't intend to do
anything' he minuted. 'Surely it is asking for trouble to leave our officers with him.
Better get them out'.106
It is a measure of the strength of opinion about Kupi among observers in Bari
that the controversial decision not to evacuate him, and the steps taken to ensure that
McLean's mission complied with the order, were insisted on by the Foreign Office's
Bari representative. Given the mission's conviction that junior staff officers in Bari
were responsible, it is also a measure of how localised in 1944 were the viewpoints of
SOE officers who have become so critical of this and other decisions. Writing to
Harcourt on 27 October, Philip Broad felt it 'quite possible that McLean, when he is
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brought out of Albania, may attempt to bring out with him either Abas Kupi himself
or one or more or his followers'. These evacuees 'may cause more trouble than they
are worth', considered Broad, with an eye on improving relations with Albania's
probable new masters, and it would be 'a very wise precaution' to telegraph McLean
with 'categorical instructions... that under no circumstances whatever is he to bring
anyone out. At the same time orders might be given to the officer in command of the
naval craft concerned in the operation not to allow any Albanian on his vessel without
previously having obtained our approval'. Broad also suggested that, to avoid a fait
accompli, Harcourt seek the support of Air Vice-Marshall Elliot.107 This was secured.
Harcourt informed the captain of the boat the same day that 'on the orders of AOC
BAF... no Albanian of any sort is to be evacuated' when picking up McLean.108
Broad's dim view of Kupi is confirmed in a telegram sent to Macmillan the
following day, in which Broad passed on his personal thoughts on McLean's appeal to
evacuate the Zogist leader. Broad was not convinced by McLean's argument that Kupi
had been of 'considerable service to the Allied cause'. Kupi's 'record' over the last
few months, Broad told Macmillan, 'has not been such as to justify us in saying that
he has been of any help whatever to us'.
He has consistently failed to carry out requests for action against the
enemy. It was only when it became clear to him that [the] Germans
were to withdraw from Albania that he gave any indication at all of
being prepared to take any action against them. Such action as he
did take amounted to a few minor rebuffs of no practical
importance... On the other side of the balance sheet there are reports
that certain of his lieutenants have been working with the
Germans.109
Broad's comments echoed those expressed in Bari for some months. When word of
McLean's appeal reached Eden, however, the Foreign Secretary, who had been
content to see McLean withdrawn, expressed some sympathy for Kupi's plight. He
replied to Broad on 31 October in support of McLean's request. Inevitably, Eden's
knowledge of the case was not so intimate as Broad's, and the grounds he laid down
for Kupi's evacuation remain debatable. Kupi was a man whom Britain had supported,
Eden considered, 'and against whom the most serious charge is that of inactivity
against the enemy'. While it was 'undesirable that HM Government should be
identified with steps to rescue Abas Kupi, I do not think we can escape the moral
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responsibilities'. Eden instructed Broad 'to consult with McLean [who had been
evacuated from Albania on 28 October] as to ways and means of getting Kupi out of
the country without it appearing that HM Government have been involved in the
operation'. This was to prove unnecessary, however, as Kupi would succeed in fleeing
Albania under his own steam.110
Julian Amery later referred to Bari as 'an instrument of Enver Hodja [sic] in
the British camp'.111 Today it appears that staff officers were indeed anxious to
support the Partisans at the expense of Abas Kupi and that some were sympathetic to
the sort of new order the Partisans might deliver and seemed to deserve, too, given the
sacrifices they were making. It also seems possible that, to some degree, an officer, or
officers, on the Section staffmay have been prepared to suppress information; and, as
will be shown in the next chapter, it seems likely that one was a communist. For most
SOE officers returning from northern Albania, however, direct, first-hand experience
of Bari's command structures was relatively fleeting. It also occurred either long
before or some time after the summer of 1944: the key period of events and decision¬
making. For, in fact, SOE's Albanian Section in Bari was not responsible for taking
the decisions in favour of increased and exclusive support for the Albanian Partisans;
nor did those decisions reflect whatever ideological sympathy might have been felt in
Bari for the Partisan cause. They were taken on strong military grounds, after careful
consideration, to meet the requirements of policy-makers determined to inflict
substantial and immediate damage on the Germans.
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Chapter Six
The Strange Case of Captain John Eyre
In the Italian port of Bari in February 1944, two months before his twenty-sixth
birthday, Lieutenant John Eyre joined the headquarters staff of SOE's Albanian
Section. A photograph pinned to his SOE Personal File shows a pale, fair-haired and
thin-lipped young man in steel-rimmed spectacles and crumpled battledress. He was to
work as the Section's political intelligence officer until its closure, three months after
the Germans pulled out of Albania, in February 1945. By then he was a captain.1
It is Eyre's presence on the Albanian Section staff, as Reginald Hibbert writes,
that 'conspiracy theorists' cite as 'the chief piece of evidence' that 'British leftists' in
SOE condemned Albania to communism.2 David Smiley, for example, alleges that
Eyre was so aligned ideologically with the communist-led Albanian Partisans that he
abused his SOE post to manipulate policy in their favour.3 Other writers label Eyre a
mole and Soviet agent.4 Hibbert, however, sees little weight in these charges, arguing
that Eyre, whatever his politics and Communist Party affiliations, was irrelevant to the
evolution ofBritish policy in Albania.
This chapter suggests that many of the accusations levelled at Eyre after the
war further illustrate the conjecture and confusion that characterises one side of the
debate over why British policy in wartime Albania developed as it did. By drawing on
a variety of sources that illuminate Eyre's life and politics and have escaped the
attention of earlier writers or have until now been unavailable, it also seeks to
demonstrate the care that must be taken not to dismiss every charge levelled against
him. Although he was unlikely to have been a Soviet agent, Eyre does seem to have
sympathised with communism in 1944. Fresh light thrown on his subsequent service
in the Far East indicates that he may also have been prepared, during his army service,
to subvert British policy on ideological grounds. The chapter concludes with a fresh
examination of similar allegations levelled against two other officers, Ormond Uren
and James Klugmann, who worked for SOE's Hungarian and Yugoslav Sections
respectively. Perhaps the best-known cases of SOE personnel working in the interests
of the communist cause, both serve to underline the gravity of the charges against
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Eyre. They also illustrate how those charges merit consideration as part of a wider
phenomenon of post-war speculation over the influence of communists in SOE's
Balkan Sections.
Eyre makes his first appearance in print in Peter Kemp's memoir, No Colours
or Crest, published in 1958. Kemp had been evacuated from Montenegro to Bari in
the spring of 1944. In his latter months in the field he had worked, as has been seen,
with nationalist elements in northern Albania and Kosovo. In No Colours or Crest he
recalls meeting in Bari 'a newcomer' to the Albanian Section, Lieutenant John Eyre,
'a serious young Communist whose courteous manner could not altogether conceal his
disapproval of my Albanian record. Like his co-religionist, James Klugman [sic], he
was his Section's Intelligence Officer, and like Klugman and so many other
Communists he had great sincerity combined with charm'. Kemp adds that he 'saw
little' of Eyre in Bari but 'heard a great deal about him later, when I was in Java [in
1946]. There, while attached to the 5th Indian Division in Soerabaja, he landed
himself in trouble for editing a seditious newspaper for the troops; in consequence he
was sent home by the GOC, General Mansergh'.5
Eyre appears next in David Smiley's memoir Albanian Assignment, published
in 1984. Smiley, who encountered Eyre after being evacuated from Albania in
October 1944, claims that 'one' of the 'Communist agents' in SOE's Bari
headquarters 'was an officer in the Albanian Section, and I was told he stood as an
unsuccessful Communist candidate in the 1945 election. It was not surprising that on
our return I overheard him refer to our mission as 'Fascists'. I was told by one of the
secretaries that it was he who had prevented further transmission of McLean's signal
to Mr Eden, and that he had deliberately disposed of the message'.6 In a subsequent
memoir, Irregular Regular, Smiley identifies Eyre as the 'unacknowledged'
communist and repeats the claim that he 'stood in the next election' as a communist
candidate.7
Other writers elevate Eyre to the position of official communist and Soviet
agent. None, however, produces evidence to support either charge. In The Great
Betrayal, an account of the postwar attempt by MI6 and the CIA to undermine Enver
Hoxha's communist regime, Nicholas Bethell claims that SOE's Albanian Section
was split into opposing pro- and anti-'Stalinist' camps. He places 'James [sic] Eyre'
firmly in the former.8 M.R.D. Foot, in his popular history SOE, goes further. After
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quoting Kemp's description of Eyre, he states explicitly that Eyre, like Klugmann,
was a communist mole.9 In The Secrets of the Service, a study of British intelligence
and communist subversion, Anthony Glees reproduces Foot's description of Eyre. In
Secret War, a popular history of SOE published in 1992, Nigel West writes that
'according to Professor M.R.D. Foot, John Eyre was... working for the NKVD'.
Neither Glees nor West challenges Foot's claim.10
According to two accounts published in the early 1990s, Eyre, in 1944, was a
member of the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB). Xan Fielding's biography
of Billy McLean repeats the charge that one of McLean's signals addressed to
Anthony Eden 'had been deliberately suppressed in the SOE office'. Fielding adds
that 'at least' one officer on the Albanian Section staff 'was a member of the British
Communist Party and the rest had left-wing views'.11 The second reference to Eyre is
by Reginald Hibbert, who dismisses claims that the ideology of individual SOE staff
officers influenced British policy in Albania. In Albania's National Liberation
Struggle, Hibbert tries to tone down the charges that post-war writers have levelled at
Eyre, stressing that Eyre 'was only a junior staff officer in Bari with the rank of
Captain and... wielded no significant power'. Hibbert concedes, however, that Eyre
1 9
was a CPGB member.
Thus the case presented in print against Eyre is not particularly strong. It
consists entirely of office gossip; a few choice phrases that he apparently fired at
certain SOE officers; his supposed CPGB membership; and some stories that he
caused some trouble in the Far East and stood as a communist candidate in a post-war
general election.
However, that Eyre was sympathetic to communism in 1944 can, in fact, be
found confirmed in print by Eyre himself. The existence of The God Trip: The Story
of a Mid-century Man, a slim memoir he had published in 1976, has escaped the
notice of all other writers on SOE. This is not difficult to explain given its principal
subject matter. Just five pages of The God Trip deal with the first fifty years of Eyre's
life. The rest (in his words) recounts the subsequent experiences
of a middle-aged professional man who brought his marriage to an
end after twenty years and dropped out of society. For the past six
years I have been travelling through different countries following
the hippie trail, living in caves in Crete, in drop-out colonies in
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Israel... After a year roaming around India... I ended up barefoot
and in rags...
I have earned my way unloading rolls of barbed wire off
lorries, selling my blood, painting houses, teaching English,
mending people's clothes. I have entered the world of psychedelics
and hallucinogens, acid trips and pot, mysticism and UFOlogy.
Eyre describes his book as 'putting together factually a series of paranormal events
which started for me in 1967... a case-history of interest to both believers and
disbelievers'. Still, in the few lines he devotes to his earlier life experiences 'as a way
of indicating the yardsticks for measuring the phenomenon of my existence', Eyre
presents a straightforward account in which he makes no secret of his politics and
activism during and after the war. He also notes some of the formative experiences
that influenced his growing political and self-awareness in the 1930s.13
In The God Trip, Eyre presents his childhood and youth as unhappy, dislocated
and 'curiously Victorian'. He reflects that as a result of 'broken relationships' he had
'broken free from the grip of my own class background at a very early age'. His
father's family were 'linked to the most solid upper crust': cousins to the Crosthwaite-
Eyres of Bradshaw. His mother was the daughter of Thomas Rome, 'chairman of the
Mersey Dock and Harbour Board'. But she died when Eyre was six months old and
his father, a vicar, on remarrying moved from a rich Liverpool parish to a mining
village near Burnley 'where class distinctions killed friendships'. Eyre was sent to live
with an aunt, who dictated that he should be kept apart from his sister from the age of
three. He was then sent to boarding school and in 1931 won a Foundation scholarship
to Marlborough. He remained unsettled. Twice during his teens he ran away from
home 'leaving a suicide note on my pillow to frighten them'. At seventeen he ran as
far as Paris, at the time of the Great Exhibition. At eighteen he was 'persuaded' to
enter St Peter's College, Oxford, to train as a priest 'but dropped out to go to the
Maddermarket Theatre, Norwich to become an actor, an aborted priest'. Soon 'I had
my first bed-sitting room in London and was finding my own independent way to the
Unity Theatre, run by left-wing political militants in Mornington Crescent'.14
It is in the context of his evolving politics that Eyre refers to his time with
SOE. He writes:
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I came to accept the class basis of society during the war years when
I was working with Special Operations Executive responsible for
economic and political intelligence coming from our missions in
occupied Albania. I was trained in parachute jumping and sabotage,
preparatory to being dropped into Greece, but the plan was
abandoned. Instead, on the staff of the Albanian country section I
saw the Marxist-Leninist thesis working out under my very eyes.
Julian Amery and [Billy] Maclean [sic], my colleagues in
conspiracy, were battling against the winds of change while I and
others in our wisdom or ignorance helped to stir up the hurricane. I
had the honour of drawing up the list of Albania's quislings.
Eyre also confirms that he did indeed join the CPGB, but only on returning to Britain
after completing his military service in the Far East. In London he began speaking on
street comers as 'a complete scientific and dialectical materialist'. He stood in North
Kensington as a communist at local elections. He also stood in a general election, but
in 1951, he says, not 1945. Eyre adds that as the CPGB's official parliamentary
candidate he was 'one of only twelve throughout Britain... In my own manor one in
six of the people voted for me'.15
Given the subject and self-satisfied tone of his book, it may be tempting to
approach Eyre's recollections with care. But in 1936, according to the Oxford
University Calendar, a John Lorimer Rashdall Eyre did go up to St Peter's College,
Oxford.16 A year later, according to the records of the Maddermarket Theatre, he did
turn up in Norwich and begin to act.17 And in a by-election in North Kensington in
November 1949, according to The Times, a 'Major John Eyre' stood unsuccessfully as
a communist candidate.18 A 'J.L.R. Eyre' also stood in the same constituency as a
communist in a general election, though in 1950, not 1951. In February 1950 he won
551 votes, slightly over one per cent of all those cast in his constituency, and lost his
deposit.19 Aspects of Eyre's deepening interest in spirituality and mysticism can also
be found confirmed independently in print.20
For their part, SOE records suggest Eyre's brief description of his education
and SOE career is substantially accurate. According to his SOE Personal File, John
Lorimer Rashdall Eyre was bom on 14 April 1918 and educated at Marlborough and
St Peter's College, Oxford, where he studied English Literature for a year (1936-37)
and won a blue at fives. Next, the file states, he became a schoolmaster and published
three novels. (Eyre makes no reference in The God Trip to school teaching or writing
and the British Library catalogue has no record of other publications in his name.
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Quite possibly he exaggerated his CV a little when volunteering for SOE, not unheard
of among other applicants. Indeed, there is no mention on his Personal File of acting.)
In December 1939 Eyre then joined the army (whether he was called-up or
volunteered is not specified). In September 1940 he was commissioned into the Royal
Artillery; in January 1941 he was posted to an anti-tank regiment, with which he
served in India, the Western Desert, Iraq and Syria before finally joining SOE in
August 1943 in Cairo. Possibly he had responded to one of the circulars SOE posted
periodically on regimental bulletin boards calling for volunteers for hazardous
operations, for he spent the last two months of 1943 undergoing parachute,
paramilitary, civil affairs and signals training. But on 12 February 1944, instead of
being sent on operations, Eyre joined the headquarters of SOE's Albanian Section as a
grade three staff officer. His chief duties were to collate information received from its
missions on political conditions, developments and personalities in Albania and help
circulate it to other interested commands and departments. He remained in that role
until the Section was closed down in early 1945.21
SOE's records reveal something, too, of Eyre's views on British policy in
wartime Albania. In early August 1944, for example, Bill Harcourt, Head of SOE
Bari, asked Eliot Watrous, the young head of SOE's Albanian Section, for a paper
recommending action to be taken now that Abas Kupi was embroiled in war with the
Partisans. The paper that Watrous produced recommended that Billy McLean's
mission should be withdrawn, Kupi's movement publicly condemned for
collaborating and 'all uncompromised Nationalists' advised to join the Partisans. As
the paper explained, little meaningful resistance could now be expected from Kupi.
Moreover, the position of McLean's mission was now 'becoming untenable' as
elements ofKupi's movement were 'undoubtedly collaborating on an increased scale'
with the Germans, the puppet government and other collaborators. Once McLean's
mission was withdrawn, Allied approval of the Partisans' 'military effort' would be
'clear' and then other nationalists might join them.22 Contact should be maintained,
however, with the Kosovar leader Gani Bey Kryeziu, Watrous urged, 'since he has
continued to resist the Germans'. Subsequently, to the Balkan Air Force Policy
Committee, Harcourt put forward proposals to withdraw McLean's mission on these
grounds. In the event, the continued Foreign Office insistence that 'for the moment
there must be no question of withdrawing our BLOs from [Kupi]' postponed any
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23decision. Loose among SOE documents released inadvertently among War Office
files thirty years ago is a sheet of key points supporting the argument in Watrous'
paper. Some are typed; others are in Eyre's handwriting. 'Hang on to this please - we
may yet have another Kupi crisis' Watrous has scribbled to Eyre across the top of the
page.24
An incident is also recorded on Eyre's Personal File that suggests he was
capable of being rather intemperately critical of military authority, which may have
some relevance to the lack of respect he allegedly showed officers arriving from the
field in 1944. That summer the Army Pay Office had informed Eyre that steps were
being taken to recover an over-issue of pay into his home bank account. He replied
that, since he was in no position to examine his statements, he strongly objected to
that course of action and had instructed his bank manager to advise him should there
be any deduction in the pay going into his account. The charm Kemp attributes Eyre
had clearly deserted him when finishing his letter: 'your assumption of guilt without
defence appals me, and the fact that you have apparently already commenced docking
makes me want to vomit'. Due to the 'highly improper tone' of Eyre's
correspondence, the War Office instructed Allied Forces Headquarters in the
Mediterranean to 'take such action as you may consider appropriate'. Land Forces
Adriatic, the command responsible for all Allied land forces engaged in the Balkans in
the summer of 1944, was instructed 'to bring home to this officer the highly
injudicious phraseology of his letter, and to ensure that he does not again adopt such a
tone in his official correspondence'.
However, officers who worked alongside Eyre in Bari in 1944-45, and knew
him better than did Kemp or Smiley, paint a picture of a man whose prominence and
deviousness and influence on policy have been exaggerated in print since the war.
Bryan McSwiney, one of the Albanian Section's conducting officers, dimly
remembers 'a thin, white-faced and fair-haired' young man who was certainly 'left-
wing' but also quite 'distant'.26 Jon Naar, the Section's other intelligence officer,
remembers Eyre as 'doctrinaire in his socialism, leading one to think he was a
communist'.27 Naar is also certain of one thing: 'No one [in the Section], except
possibly Eyre, would have called any of our BLOs Fascist, because we had too much
28
respect for their courage even though at times we disagreed politically'. But even he
remembers Eyre chiefly as being 'rather odd... It's a terrible thing to say, but he
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didn't wash'.29 A training report from Eyre's paramilitary course describes him as
'sound and steady with plenty of common sense' but does not suggest a particularly
dominant personality either. 'Not a leader but a good co-operator... Takes a good,
quiet, sober interest in things. Not a ball of fire intellectually or socially but a solid,
30
sensible, companionable man to have around. Good in a limited role'.
Denys Salt worked in Bari as the intelligence officer of Military Liaison
(Albania), a joint British and American unit tasked with planning the eventual entry
into Albania of Allied forces and aid. His memory ofEyre is somewhat clearer, for he
had also been at school with him.
John and I were both at Marlborough together and for two terms, I
think, in the same form. I was never a close friend but my
recollection is of a lean, sinewy schoolboy, rather intense in looks
and somewhat inclined to keep himself to himself. This being so, he
was I believe not very keen on team games, which was the order of
the day each afternoon. The obligatory alternative was to go on one
of the school runs as exercise, which were all carefully graded
according to distance, difficulty and timing. John had no problem in
beating the required time for any run... I think he also played fives -
again not a team sport.
He had a sharp quick mind - as evidenced on one occasion in
class which took us all rather by surprise and which sticks in my
memory today. He was having some difficulty declining a Latin
verb, as far as I recall, when the classics master in some
exasperation said "Come on Eyre, pull yourself together. You've got
a mind like a sieve". Back came the rejoinder "But Sir, a sieve
catches the important things and lets the rubbish through". There
followed an awkward silence.
Ten years later Salt crossed paths again with Eyre at various intelligence meetings in
Bari. 'I was not fully aware of his left-wing political views at the time [but]... his
junior rank would not, I think, have influenced SOE [and] policy thinking much in
relation to Albania'.31
SOE records support Salt's assessment. Junior SOE staff officers like Eyre did
not deceive observers in Bari or London into recommending McLean's withdrawal or
maintaining exclusive support for the Partisans. Some of the political reviews and
summaries Eyre produced in 1944-45 did display a rather jaundiced view of the
politics of the Partisan leaders. As one Southern Department desk officer commented
of a six-page situation report drawn up by Eyre and passed by SOE to the Foreign
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Office in July 1944: 'Rather too favourable to LNC, to whom no political objectives
-20
are attributed'. But as that comment suggests, it was clear enough to all observers by
the summer of 1944 that the Partisans and their communist commanders wished to
replace the old order. Moreover, to those with responsibility for deciding British
policy in Albania, the political objectives of Albanians were of no great account
anyway. Only the Partisans and Gani Bey Kryeziu's forces were fighting the
Germans. Only the Partisans were capable of inflicting substantial losses. Even Billy
McLean's mission argued that the only way for Britain to foment large-scale action by
the Nationalists was by abandoning the policy of impartial treatment of all sides and
taking issue with the Partisans' politics. But the scepticism apparent in Bari about the
wisdom of supporting Kupi was widely shared. Military decision-makers, eager to
maximise the Albanian war effort, saw little point in halting support to the Partisans
and building up a rival force among Albanians who had demonstrated little capacity or
taste for fighting the Germans. Even British diplomats came gradually to appreciate
the wisdom of maintaining reasonable diplomatic relations with Enver Hoxha, since
the Partisans increasingly seemed set to be in the driving seat politically once the war
was over. Indeed, care must be taken not to exaggerate the significance of the
occasional error or slant in Eyre's reports and correspondence. Factual inaccuracies in
"2 "2
some of his early papers suggest an officer merely unfamiliar with his subject.
Eyre's later comments on political reports by officers returning from the field were
invariably objective and sound.34 By October, Bill Harcourt was impressed enough to
earmark Eyre as political intelligence officer for the four-man SOE team, led by Alan
Palmer, due to accompany an Allied force liberating the country.35
It remains possible, however, that Eyre may have tried to influence policy and
operations in Albania had he felt the situation demanded it. The short paragraph
quoted above from The God Trip is all he writes of his time with SOE's Albanian
Section. When describing his subsequent service in the Far East he is more expansive
and writes openly of the subversion he conducted in that theatre, clearly considering it
worthy of note. That account sheds important light on the nature and strength of
Eyre's convictions by 1945-46 and the lengths to which he was willing and able to
pursue them. It also seems to corroborate Peter Kemp's comment that Eyre, while in
Java, 'landed himself in trouble'.36
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'Towards the end of the war', Eyre writes, 'quite independently and without
any political affiliations, I began working secretly with the nationalist movements in
Burma, India, Malaya and Indonesia, as indeed were many in the armed forces at that
time. We were consumed with the vision of one world and one people, without
exploitation of man by man, a world at peace'. In Burma he wrote 'a booklet entitled
Why Burma?' which was 'circulated secretly by a friend among our troops. Its aim
was to prevent our forces being used politically to crush the nationalist movement'.
He also encountered several leading Burmese personalities:
For many evenings I sat in the rattan-walled home of Thakin Than
Tun37, General Secretary of the Communist Party of Burma, with
his young wife and child while he picked pieces of wax from the
guttering candle, moulding them into little cubes between finger and
thumb as he formulated the building of a new society in his country.
TO
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I knew Aung Gyi who was murdered and General [sic] Aung San
who was assassinated. I smuggled Thakin Soe40 into India as my
interpreter to meet P.C. Joshi, General Secretary of the Communist
Party of India, in the days before Soe formed his own party.
It was in Indonesia, however, that Eyre felt he achieved 'the climax of these covert
activities':
Here I was public relations adviser to Generals Christiansen41 [sic]
and Mansergh42, master of all I surveyed in psychological warfare
and Far Eastern publicity, answerable to no one. For a while I was in
charge of Radio Djakarta, responsible for broadcasting programmes
on two world wavelengths, with five different orchestras at my
command. With a total monopoly in Surabaja - all the printing
works, and newsprint stocks were in my hands; I was publishing all
the newspapers; I had a radio broadcasting station built to broadcast
exactly what I pleased - what was to stop me? I caused the mutiny
of a British artillery regiment and the withdrawal of an Indian
brigade. I published Mao Tse Tung's thesis on New Democracy in
three languages from a copy smuggled out of China and given me
by Stuart Gelder43 when I met him in India. I spent half a million
pounds of Japanese banana money in four months to help the cause.
I was aged twenty-seven and not even an official
communist... My final venture was a daily Digest quoting world
news picked out of the air by a radio-monitoring service manned by
Dutchmen, Eurasians and White Russians whom I had found in the
Japanese concentration camps. Every scrap of disastrous news,
every report of a further collapse of the capitalist system in France,
Holland, Italy, all round the world, I featured for the benefit of the
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English-speaking officers, NCOs and headquarters staff. My Digest
rattled with the sound of tumbrils and doomsday.
But Eyre found he had 'over-reached' himself. 'I was summoned by General
Mansergh, who explained with the utmost courtesy and patience that sometimes
democracy must be withdrawn in order to defend democracy. He ordered that from
now on everything I was putting out must be censored first by himself. This was 'too
much' for Eyre. He was 'long overdue for demobilisation' and had plans to marry a
girl he had met in Indonesia, the survivor of a Japanese concentration camp. There
was also 'the world of social revolution and socialism in Britain to explore'. So he
'got hold of an aeroplane' and flew to Singapore where he married by special license
and was demobilised 'in full honour since no one knew what I had been doing -
subsequently receiving a silver medal inscribed with my name for my services in
South-East Asia'.44
It is outside the scope of this study to explore these claims in depth. Yet it may
be noted that Eyre certainly appears to have been where he places himself during that
period. His SOE file confirms that in April 1945, after some home leave, he arrived at
the headquarters of Force 136, the cover-name of SOE's Far Eastern Section, in
Ceylon. A report from June 1945 then has him as a grade three staff officer tasked
with Political Warfare duties and 'at present on attachment to 12th Army'.45 At that
moment 12th Army was deployed in Burma in the Sittang and Irrawaddy valleys,
preparing to harry the Japanese withdrawal.46 'This officer has made a good start' the
report observed, and added that he seemed 'hard-working and conscientious' and
suitable for 'Forward Propaganda'. Another note on his file, dated September 1945,
records that he had recently been promoted major and was to be out-posted from SOE
to take up a grade two 'Political and Propaganda' staff appointment with the
'Psychological] W[arfare] Division team accompanying the SEAC Forces liberating
Java'47
It is also apparent that Eyre had both the means and opportunity to seek to
exploit the morale of British and Indian soldiers in Java and to press the cause of local
nationalists. British forces had been sent there to disarm the surrendering Japanese
forces, release imprisoned Allied soldiers and civilians and allow Dutch forces to
enter and re-impose Dutch rule. Suspicions among local nationalists that the British
were paving the way for the return of the Dutch turned quickly to violent resistance.
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Bitter fighting broke out and British casualties were high. But as India's official
Armed Forces historian remarks, the Indonesians proved more fortunate 'in gaining
world estimation':
The American press was so outspoken in their favour that the Dutch
had to assure America of their honourable intentions. The British
newspapers called for the speedy withdrawal of British forces from
the Netherlands East Indies while the Soviet Press criticised Dutch
imperialism and urged the United Nations to intervene. Reports of
strikes and demonstrations, sympathising with the Indonesians,
48continued to arrive from Australian ports.
In December 1945 Lord Mountbatten, the Supreme Allied Commander in South-East
Asia, was compelled to telegraph London about the 'delicate' morale of some of the
British forces involved:
Both by the Press and by letters from home the British troops are
being made to believe that the imposition of Dutch authority by
force of British arms is a wrong cause. They do not like fighting for
this though they are quite ready to fight to secure the safety of
European and Eurasian women and children.
The Indian troops are subject to Indonesian propaganda which
is insidious and well directed. Neither British nor Indian troops like
the Dutch and they despise the lack of discipline and the
irresponsible behaviour of the Dutch troops with whom they have to
come into contact...
Although all troops are still behaving magnificently, I must
warn you that the longer we remain in Java and Sumatra the more
morale will deteriorate.49
One British unit operating in Java in 1945-46 was the 'Far Eastern Publicity
Detachment' (FEPD). This is briefly referred to in a long contemporary report by
Laurens van der Post reproduced in The Admiral's Baby, a memoir of his time
assisting in the political administration of Java. The FEPD, according to the report,
had formerly operated in Burma as the 'Unit of Psychological Warfare' and on
arriving on Java been 'put in charge of the allied radio station in Batavia'. It also
'published an evening newspaper and generally supervised and co-ordinated press and
propaganda activities'. This unit sounds very similar to the 'P.W. Division team'
Eyre's SOE File has him set to join in September 1945; its official duties correspond
closely to those for which Eyre claims in The God Trip to have been responsible. Van
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der Post even recalls handing over charge of the Batavia radio station and its
responsibility for transmitting propaganda to an unnamed 'young British major'.50
Documents held in the archives of the Institute of Netherlands History in The Hague
confirm that commanding Allied Forces Radio in Batavia from October 1945 was a
Major J. Eyre of 'PWD'. These archives also support van der Post's assertion that
PWD and the FEPD were criticised habitually by the Dutch authorities in Java for
their apparent sympathy for Indonesian nationalism.51
On the evidence of the tone and stated purpose of The God Trip, there seems
no outstanding reason to suppose that Eyre, for all the pride and relish with which he
describes his wartime and post-war political activity, had any compelling reason to
deliberately invent his story. 'I do not mind at all what people think ofme' he writes.
'I am no longer hungry for success in any way. I have no ambitions. It makes no
difference to me whether women like me or not. I have no fear if there is no money
left for food... The fact is, I have nothing more to lose. And I have gained it all'.
Indeed, if the openness with which he writes is a reliable judge, it may even be
suggested that Eyre might not have resisted the temptation to mention if he had, at
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some point, worked for Soviet intelligence." But stronger grounds exist on which to
suggest Eyre was unlikely to have been in the same category as a Philby, Burgess or
Maclean. An Oxford communist cell did exist in the 1930s with which he feasibly
may have flirted, but a nineteen-year old actor in Norwich would seem poor material
for pre-war recruitment. There is no outstanding reason to suggest that Eyre's
communism was not, as he says, largely a product of the war years and that he did not
join the CPGB until later. Of course, once in SOE, as an 'unofficial' communist he
might have been ofmore interest to Soviet intelligence and prepared to do its bidding.
And although evidence that Eyre sought to manipulate policy-makers is thin on the
ground, it is feasible that he might have been prepared to disclose sensitive
information. But by the summer of 1944 there were plenty of opportunities for Soviet
soldiers and airmen in Bari to have leamt much about SOE and its operations and
policies in the Balkans less covertly. Jon Naar recalls that the Albanian Section 'based
closely with the Red Air Force, who took part in drops to the BLO/Pzn teams, even
when the US and RAF pilots would not fly because of bad weather conditions'. Naar
remembers 'several boozy sessions at the Imperiale Hotel [in Bari] with our Soviet
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comrades and the sharing ofmilitary and political information with them was what I
would call "normal" and certainly not in any way subversive'.54
The official SOE historian M.R.D. Foot plays down the influence on British
policy in the Balkans of communists in SOE. He suggests that, because Britain and the
Soviet Union were allies after 1941, communists in SOE could not have done much
damage in any case. Of Eyre, Klugmann and Philby, who also worked for a short
period for SOE, Foot writes:
What harm, at that moment, was any of them doing to the allied war
effort against the axis? 'Our gallant Soviet ally', that phrase,
reiterated from countless platforms and in countless broadcasts in
1942-43, was a great deal more than a phrase. It was only this
solidly tyrannous lifebelt that kept the grand alliance of free peoples
afloat through those two terrible years. Stalin's and Beria's
iniquities have now become journalists' commonplaces and were
iniquitous indeed; yet hindsight, though it sometimes clarifies, can
also distort. Had it not been for Stalin and Beria and their iron grip
on the Soviet Empire... Great Britain would have lost the war
against Nazi Germany.55
Foot is right, of course, that the Soviet Union's entry into the war in 1941 was crucial
to Britain's survival and that that was at the heart of much of the pro-Russian
sentiment felt throughout the country. But he understates the danger posed to Britain
by men so sympathetic towards a foreign ideology that they were prepared to share
secrets with unauthorised parties and manipulate SOE's functions in its interest,
breaking the most fundamental principles of security and integrity. Eyre was likely to
have been innocent of that kind of behaviour when working for SOE's Albanian
Section. The real and potential implications of the danger he posed, however, may be
illustrated by the cases ofOrmond Uren and James Klugmann.
Uren, a young captain on the staff of SOE London, was court-martialed,
cashiered and sentenced to seven years in prison in October 1943 for passing secrets
to Douglas Springhall, National Organiser of the CPGB. Although some attempts
have been made in print to portray Uren as the worst kind of traitor, the picture that
emerges from more sober accounts of his case is of an impressionable and naive
young man dangerously out of his depth. As David Stafford writes, he was 'far from
being some hard-bitten Soviet mole'.56 Uren himself recalls:
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I was not 'a communist'. I had read a certain amount of Marxist
literature - The Communist Manifesto and some of the Left Book
Club publications that were seen everywhere in 'progressive' homes
in the 1930s. One that impressed me was a simplified outline of
Marxist economics by Leo Huberman entitled Man's Worldly
Goods. There was also The Socialist Sixth of the World by the 'red'
Dean of Canterbury... I was very ignorant of history and economics
and the picture these books and others painted seemed to me to
make sense.
Also... I had grown up in the 1930s. My school, Ackworth,
was a Quaker school and had already taken in some German Jewish
children, early refugees from Hitler's persecution. I was
passionately interested in Spain and everything Spanish and my
sympathies had naturally been on the side of the Republic in the
Spanish Civil War.
I wanted to join the Communist Party... I met Springhall... I
told him where I was working, naturally, and he told me to put in
writing an outline of the sort of work I was doing and he would pass
it on to the proper people and they would decide whether I could be
a member of the Party... [At a later meeting] I handed him this
outline. And that is all... I did not look on Springhall as an agent of
the NKVD57. I took at face value his title of "National Organiser". I
did not see myself as volunteering information to the Soviet Union,
but as simply wanting to be integrated in this "great" movement. It
was obvious that if I was to be of use to the Party they had to know
what sort of work I was doing, but in the fantasy scenario in my
head it did not go any further than that. So that when, that
September, I was called into the office of Major Roche, the Security
Officer, and confronted with an MI5 officer... who said something
about "spying" I was seriously taken aback. In the fantasy I had
been living it had never occurred to me that what I had been doing
was "spying". What, precisely, I wrote [for Springhall] I cannot
remember, but I do believe I was careful to keep it as general as
possible, since, as I saw it, that was all that was required at that
stage. 58
M.R.D. Foot feels sure enough to suppose that Uren knew 'a good deal less than
Philby' about SOE and cannot have told the Russians 'anything they did not already
know'.59 Yet care must be taken not to minimise the significance of Uren's activities
on those grounds. Even if the Soviets were unlikely to have learnt much from him that
was new, what more might Uren have done, or been made to do, if he had not been
caught until much later, as even he has pointed out?60 And how secure from leakage
and penetration were the CPGB and Moscow?
Indeed, despite Foot's apparent certainty that what was disclosed was of little
account, confirmation of Uren's offence, as with Eyre's, has long been lacking.61
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Previously unseen documents detailing Uren's in camera court-martial, however, have
now surfaced among War Office files at the Public Record Office (they may well have
been declassified by mistake). These shed considerable new light on the information
he may have disclosed. A written document that Uren admitted to having passed
Springhall had not been recovered by the time of the trial, but Uren submitted
voluntarily to MI5 three handwritten statements in which he described his various
meetings with Springhall and the nature of the information he had given him. These
statements exist among the courtmartial papers and are recorded in the trial
proceedings. Each was read aloud in court and it was entirely on the basis of the
evidence contained within them that Uren was convicted. According to these
statements, Uren had met Springhall on up to six occasions between April and June
1943, during which Springhall asked for details about the kind of work he did. Uren
then drew up and gave him 'three typewritten foolscap sheets' in which he referred to
SOE by name and briefly described the following: SOE's principle purpose and
functions, including its work in neutral countries; the location of several of its
overseas sub-sections and missions, from Cairo to Chungking; its broad 'lay-out' in
terms of directorates (Operations, Intelligence, Security, Training, Communications
and Supplies) and each directorate's general responsibilities; the relationship and
'close liaison' maintained with other government departments (which included the
Ministry of Economic Warfare, the Foreign Office, the Chiefs of Staff, the Political
Intelligence Division (PID), the BBC, SIS and MI5); SOE's relations with Allied
Governments; and, finally, the nature of his own 'daily duties'. Uren also admitted to
having told Springhall in conversation a few additional details about his own work
and SOE generally, including the name of its then head, Sir Charles Hambro.62
Something of how seriously SOE and MI5 considered this breach of security
can be gauged by statements made to the court by a Major James Cussen, MI5's
investigating officer, and Major The Hon. Thomas Roche, SOE's Assistant Director of
Security. Asked by the prosecution to consider 'the possible repercussions, from the
security point of view, of the divulging of information of this nature to a person like
Springhall who was not a person authorised to receive it', Cussen replied: 'I view it as
a most serious and appalling communication. Once information of that kind passes
into the hands of an unauthorised person, such as Springhall, it is quite impossible
properly to safeguard it, and as it is information which is of vital use to the enemy, it
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is, in my view, a divulging of information which is prejudicial to the safety of the
State'.
Roche, asked to 'tell the court, from your experience as an officer in SOE, how
you would regard the contents of that statement', described them as 'most highly
secret... I have seldom seen so much information [of that nature] gathered together in
one document. There are many people inside the organisation who know most of it,
but I do not think a great many people in the organisation would know the whole of
the information which is contained in those statements. I think there are very few
outside the organisation who would know all those facts'. The prosecution's
questioning of Roche continued:
Q. How do you regard the disclosure of [the name of Sir Charles
Hambro]?
A. It is a most closely guarded secret. There were special
instructions that that was not to be mentioned outside and to
facilitate that it was forbidden inside the organisation to refer
to him by name...
Q. How do you regard the mention of the initials "S.O.E." or the
title "Secret [sic] Operations Executive" to an outsider?
A. That was forbidden because... it being a non-existent body,
the mention of those initials was bound to cause comment as
people would try to find out what it was.
Q. Have you any observations to make with regard to the
mention in the... statement [about SOE's activities]... in
neutral countries?
A. ...No doubt the enemy might suspect activities were going on,
but they have no proof. If you once put that in writing and it
gets [in] to the hands of the general public, and were to reach
the hands of the neutral or the enemy, the position would be
extremely grave.
The prosecution then drew Roche's attention to a passage of Uren's statement that
recorded the information concerning 'Relations with Allied Governments' that Uren
claimed to have passed to Springhall. Uren had written:
There is close liaison on a low level with the various emigre
Governments in this country, although the degree of confidence
varies with the Government concerned. The Poles for instance
conduct all their own operations to Poland, SOE merely assisting
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them with facilities for training, with aircraft, etc. They have their
own ciphers, which are not known to the British authorities. The
position of the Czechs is somewhat similar to that of the Poles. In
Yugoslavia and Greece, on the other hand, the work of supporting
the guerrilla movements is almost entirely in British hands. The
ciphers used are not known to the Governments concerned and their
position is more or less that of an advisory body. I have little
knowledge of what happens in Western Europe except that there are
two French Sections, one of which sends agents under British
command and one which sends agents... under the discipline of the
Fighting French.
'Would you... indicate to the court your views with regard to the statement as to the
operations conducted in Poland and the Fiaison with the countries mentioned?' Roche
was asked. 'It is a very serious matter to mention to anyone, otherwise than in the
course of duty, the distinctions between the degrees of co-operation between allies',
he replied. 'Nothing can be more likely to promote disaffection and lack of concord
than to disclose any distinction between degrees of co-operation. I see also the
mention of the cipher department. That is, of course, a very, very closely guarded
secret. There are not very many people within my organisation who are fully aware of
the cipher positions with regard to various bodies'. Summing up, the Judge Advocate
emphasised Roche's evidence and the fact that 'the defence themselves' accepted that
the 'vital information' communicated to Springhall 'was calculated to be or might be
directly or indirectly useful to an enemy'. Even 'the defendant... realised', he
declared, 'as indeed everybody in this court must realise, the danger involved to
agents who were actually engaged in foreign countries if such information reached
enemy hands'.63
Uren's case, then, suggests ways in which the security of SOE policy, plans
and operations could be jeopardised by communist sympathisers. Klugmann's,
meanwhile, illustrates how plans and operations, if not policy, might have been
influenced to benefit the cause. For while John Eyre is central to the conspiracy theory
surrounding SOE's Albanian activities, Klugmann is at the heart of a similar theory
that explains why British policy towards the wartime Yugoslav resistance developed
as it did.
When the first SOE mission to Yugoslavia arrived in September 1941, the plan
had been to cultivate Draza Mihailovic, leader of the royalist 'Chetniks'. But from
early 1943 that policy changed dramatically. In April the British Chiefs of Staff
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authorised SOE to contact the communist guerilla leader Tito, with whose 'Partisans'
the Chetniks were in open conflict. By May Britain was supporting Mihailovic and
Tito in tandem, with SOE missions attached to both. By the end of the year Churchill
had resolved to support only Tito. In February 1944 the British formally abandoned
the Chetniks in favour of all-out support for the Partisans. And to explain these policy
changes it is claimed that staff officers in SOE's Cairo headquarters (SOE Cairo),
from where its Balkan operations were launched and directed until early 1944,
conducted a campaign of subterfuge that saw Mihailovic unfairly denied the help,
recognition and respect he deserved. By supposedly massaging reports and starving
the Chetniks of supplies and propaganda, SOE Cairo is held to have sabotaged their
cause and helped secure Tito exclusive British backing and post-war power.
Klugmann, who joined SOE's Yugoslav Section as a private soldier in February 1942
and left as a major two and a half years later, is accused ofplaying a central part in the
waging of that campaign.64
To date, none of Klugmann's critics have ever produced a concrete case
against him that confirms he manipulated, or tried to manipulate, policy. Even David
Martin, the author at the forefront of attempts to pin on Klugmann substantial
responsibility for the switch of support from Mihailovic to Tito, conceded in 1990 that
'the proof of this is admittedly circumstantial'.65 Instead, Martin and others highlight
the fact that a leading British communist, a man from a very different mold to John
Eyre and Ormond Uren, was present in SOE's Cairo headquarters when all key
decisions over Yugoslavia were taken. In the early 1930s Klugmann had been a
powerful force in communist circles at Cambridge, where he had been a friend and
contemporary of the future Soviet spies Kim Philby, Anthony Blunt, Guy Burgess and
Donald Maclean. In the late 1930s he worked in Paris as Secretary of the Comintern-
linked World Student Association. Recent research has revealed that in 1937 he
assisted Soviet intelligence in the recruitment of John Cairncross, the so-called 'Fifth
Man'.
Klugmann's accusers also point to strong evidence that suggests SOE Cairo
was not always impartial in its policy proposals and handling of reports from the field.
They point to the posts Klugmann filled, to imply that he had the opportunity to
massage and mishandle signals to and from SOE's missions in the field. They also
underline colleagues' recollections that testify to Klugmann's open communism, his
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popularity and intellect and the long hours he put in, to emphasise his dedication and
prominence on the staff.66 Many authors latch on particularly to the memoirs of Basil
Davidson, Head of SOE's Yugoslav Section from the autumn of 1942 until the
summer of 1943. Davidson writes openly of the pro-Partisan sympathies of officers in
SOE Cairo. He also describes how he and his staff, including Klugmann, had
embarked on a campaign from the autumn of 1942 to persuade higher authority to
lend the Partisans British backing. They felt frustrated by 'high policy' that
determined only the Chetniks could be supported. They were impressed by what they
had heard of the Partisans and convinced they merited Allied help. They also felt that
the Chetniks, these agents of 'kings and governments-in-exile' with whom Britain
naturally sympathised, would never inflict as much damage on the Germans as left-
wing resistance movements focused on 'national liberation'. But some officers also
possessed strong ideological sympathy for the Partisan cause. "You've got to see that
this war has become more than a war against something, against Fascism" Davidson
recalls Klugmann arguing. "It's become a war for something, for something much
bigger. For national liberation, people's liberation, colonial liberation". Davidson's
praise of his friend's ideals and intellect is often held to confirm Klugmann's
prominence and influence on minds in SOE Cairo.67
With the recent release of SOE's Yugoslav files, reports by SOE Cairo to
higher authority that were directly at variance with reports from Yugoslavia can now
be traced, for the first time, directly to Klugmann's pen. A striking example is a four-
page paper of December 1943 concerning the withdrawal of SOE missions from the
Chetniks. This document presents a record of Chetnik achievement against the Axis
that bares only partial resemblance to that reported to Cairo by missions in the field.
Conspicuous by its absence is any acknowledgement by Klugmann of the destruction
by Chetnik forces of an important bridge and 250 Germans at Visegrad in October
1943.68 Shortly after that action, SOE missions with the Chetniks had been shocked to
hear the BBC attribute it to the Partisans. Strong protests were transmitted to SOE
Cairo urging the BBC to get its facts right.69 But if this had been a mistake that SOE
Cairo was prepared to rectify, why did Klugmann not acknowledge or correct it in his
paper in December?
Also revealing is Klugmann's MI5 file, released in four parts at the Public
Record Office in May 2002. One document contained within is a verbatim report of a
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conversation Klugmann had in August 1945 with Bob Stewart, a senior member of the
CPGB's executive committee and controls commission. The source of the report,
described by MI5 as 'very sure', was considered of 'extreme delicacy' and
unspecified.70 But Soviet records reveal that, after leaving MI5 in October 1945,
Anthony Blunt warned Moscow that MI5 listening devices in the London
headquarters of the CPGB had recorded a conversation in which Klugmann 'boasted
of secretly passing classified information to the Yugoslav Communists'.71 If this was
the same conversation as that for which a transcript is now available, it is clear
Klugmann had boasted ofmuch more than that.
The conversation consisted principally of details given by Klugmann of his
SOE career and subsequent work in Yugoslavia with the United Nations Relief and
Rehabilitation Agency (UNRRA). And of his time in SOE, he spoke at length about
how, from the autumn of 1942, he had conducted 'two years' of concerted 'political
work' to secure support and recognition for Tito's Partisans at the expense of the
Chetniks. He described how he had sought to control and manipulate the intelligence
gathered and reported by SOE missions in the field. This, he said, he had been able to
do in three ways. Firstly, he was able to influence the selection and destination of
British personnel, being careful to ensure the best ones went to Tito and that 'certain
Fascist and really bad elements' were 'always sent to the Chetniks'. Secondly, once he
was appointed 'Captain Regional Officer', he was able to brief agents before they left
for the field. '[T]hat was particularly useful because everybody who went to the field
had to go through me and I had to tell him what he would find, and you know that
people often find what they expect'. Thirdly, he sought to filter the intelligence
coming out of the field to help ensure that an overall picture emerged that was
favourable to the Yugoslav Partisans. He organised other 'pro-Partisan people' in SOE
and its sister agencies 'to act as a sieve... to see that what got back was satisfactory...
to bring propaganda to aid arms; intelligence to aid propaganda'. Klugmann also
admitted to passing information to Tito's Partisans 'as guidance on general tactics vis¬
a-vis the British'. Had SOE sent him later to China, he added, he would have sought
to do again 'what we had been trying to do in Yugoslavia' and 'switch official support
from Chiang to the special areas'72
To MI5, everything Klugmann had told Stewart seemed as significant as it did
authentic. On 29 August 1945, Sir David Petrie, MI5's Director, informed SOE, the
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Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), the Political Warfare Executive and the War and
Foreign Offices about the transcript's existence. He highlighted Klugmann's 'betrayal
of information' and 'most unforgivable offence... his efforts to secure that only
Intelligence was obtained from the field which supported his policy of recognition for
the Partisans and the discrediting of the Chetniks'. As for the 'sieve' Klugmann
claimed to have organised in Bari, '[w]e therefore have what is very nearly a Party
cell established on the traditional basis, and engaged on a Party task'.73
Klugmann's claims also fit the campaigns SOE Cairo is held to have waged in
1942-43 and several of the specific charges ofmanipulation that have been levelled at
him since. Indeed, given the certainty with which several writers have made those
allegations, it seems possible that the existence and something of the content of the
MI5 transcript might have leaked into certain circles since 1945.74 Yet care must be
taken not to exaggerate the influence of Klugmann's apparently meticulous effort to
promote the Partisan cause. That writers like David Martin and Chapman Pincher see
him as an important 'agent of influence' is a mark of the confusion that has long
existed over the factors at work on British policy in wartime Yugoslavia.75 Since the
release of Foreign and War Office papers in the 1970s, it has become increasingly
clear that the key decisions over wartime Yugoslavia were taken at the highest levels
and on strong military grounds. Churchill and the British Chiefs of Staff wanted
strategic gain against Axis forces in the Balkans. That desire went a very long way to
over-riding concerns about the political consequences of supporting the Partisans.
Conservative-minded British officers like Brigadier Fitzroy Maclean, Churchill's
personal representative to Tito, advocated extensive and exclusive support for the
Partisans in reports that were based on first-hand experience and went straight to the
top without going through SOE Cairo.76 These were complemented by top-secret
decrypts of enemy radio traffic, which ensured the decisions taken in favour of the
Partisans reflected the extent of Chetnik passivity and collaboration and the
superiority of the Partisan war effort.77 As Archie Boyle, SOE's Director of Security,
commented on learning of Klugmann's revelations: 'Petrie's letter of course is rather
one sided and one would think if one did not know the facts that Klugmann has been
responsible for the futility of Mihailovitch [sic] and, against the better interests of the
Allies, had brought Tito into power'.
210
As the cases of Klugmann and Uren suggest, care must be taken not to
underestimate the potential of communist officers to pursue their own private agendas.
Yet rumours about Klugmann, plus revelations about British spies like Philby, very
probably explain the postwar conjecture that John Eyre was a Soviet spy who abused
his position to manipulate British policy in wartime Albania. Certainly, Kemp and
Smiley's remarks about Eyre's politics, Far Eastern activities and postwar CPGB
candidacy do appear to possess a basis of truth. But whatever ideological sympathy
Eyre may have felt for the Albanian Partisans, no evidence has ever been produced to
confirm that he exploited his position to their advantage. A good gauge of how
strongly rumour has taken a hold is the absence of any indication in SOE's files that
suggests a message from Billy McLean to Anthony Eden was suppressed in Bari, as
David Smiley and others allege. Certainly, further research may be required to
confirm conclusively that Eyre never worked for Soviet intelligence. But enough is
known today about British wartime strategy and decision-making to dispute any claim
that he ever had significant input in to the formulation of British policy in Albania in
1944. Still, other intriguing questions about Eyre remain. What influence, for
example, might Klugmann, who worked for six months in the same headquarters as
Eyre, have had on his communism and willingness to exploit his later work in the
interests of the cause? And what did Eyre really get up to in Burma and Java in 1945-
46, and with what effect? If Eyre is able to provide answers, however, there are few
clues as to where he might be. Geoffrey Ashe, lecturer and writer on all things
Arthurian, met Eyre in Glastonbury in 1975. The last Ashe heard of him was in
January 1978, when he received a signed copy of The God Trip and a programme of
lectures Eyre was giving to the Spiritualist Association of Great Britain. At that point
78the trail goes cold.
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Conclusion and Afterword
Not every element of the conspiracy theory challenged in this dissertation is a postwar
fabrication. Contemporary diaries and reports confirm that, long before Philby,
Burgess and Maclean were unmasked as Soviet spies, SOE officers evacuated from
Albania in 1944 were concerned by the conduct, politics and influence of staff officers
at SOE Headquarters in Bari. It is apparent that some staff officers, by their own
accounts, were sympathetic to the idea that the Partisans might overturn the old order
in Albania. Two officers, John Eyre and James Klugmann, were indeed communist.
And it seems possible, to judge by recently released SOE and MI5 files, that some
staff officers, both in Cairo and Bari, had sought to impress on their superiors the
value of the Balkan Partisan movements in ways that were not always above-board.
Yet care must be taken not to exaggerate the significance of such conduct, or
to assume that ideology motivated all officers who wished to secure British backing
for the Yugoslav and Albanian Partisans. The policy decisions to support those
movements were taken above the heads of junior staff officers in SOE Headquarters
and on predominantly military grounds that reflected overwhelmingly the short-term
interests of Allied strategists. They were also based on an accurate appreciation of the
differing military capabilities of the various guerilla movements.
Over a period of forty years, however, officers who felt aggrieved by that
policy and let down by their countrymen expressed their views in print and found
them rarely challenged.1 Part of the unfortunate legacy of the post-war prominence of
those views can be detected in the work of leading historians of both SOE and
European resistance, including M.R.D. Foot and Henri Michel. Had SOE's papers
been publicly accessible at an earlier date, different conclusions may have been
drawn. In 1948, William Mackenzie completed the Cabinet Office history of SOE that
he had written with privileged access to SOE's own files; long classified, it was
published finally in 2000. 'This was clearly a case in which a small but useful military
diversion had been earned by limited investment in the guerilla movement'
Mackenzie's chapter on SOE operations in Albania concludes. 'The evidence suggests
that the Albanians fought well in the final stages of the German withdrawal'; while
retreating north, elite German mountain troops were 'severely handled'. Mackenzie is
also accurate when identifying those who were capable of doing, and did, the bulk of
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the fighting. 'In 1944... action against the Germans was possible only through [the
communist-led] FNC [Partisans], who recovered and expanded quickly after the set¬
backs of the winter'. The Balli Kombetar party was 'hopelessly compromised' while
the Zogist leader Abas Kupi was shown 'conclusively' to be 'too close to the verge of
collaboration to be of any value'.2 From comparing his account to SOE's surviving
records, it is apparent that Mackenzie, when compiling his chapter on Albania, drew
on the files of its Albanian Section and in particular the two-hundred-page History of
the Allied Military Mission to Albania. Drawn up largely by the Section's staff
officers, the History was checked, edited and signed off by Bill Harcourt, the well-
informed Head of SOE Bari, shortly before the Section was closed down in February
1945.3
Erroneous claims that flawed policy and biased staff officers handed Albania
to communism may have had consequences more serious than the mere inaccuracies
found in the historical record. The abortive coup attempt of 1949-53 was very much
based on such false premises, reflecting a poor assessment of the dynamics at work in
wartime Albania that had facilitated the Partisan rise to power. This was the occasion
when Britain and the United States embarked on a disastrous covert effort to
undermine Enver Hoxha's new communist regime. The plan was to recruit and train
Albanian exiles and then infiltrate them secretly to whip up a revolt that would bring
the communists down. One recent analysis of the episode describes it as 'primarily an
SOE, or, more accurately, an MI(R) operation, mirroring the unsuccessful 1941
venture, and featuring a number of Section D veterans'.4 Although failing to make the
distinction between the MI(R), Section D and SOE phases of the earlier operation, the
comparison is interesting, if not wholly apt. Both operations aimed to meet the
strategic interests of countries other than Albania by removing or destabilising that
country's ruling regime. And both did indeed involve a similar cast of characters.
Julian Amery and Dayrell Oakley-Hill were brought on board for the later project,
together with other former SOE officers, including Billy McLean, David Smiley, Alan
Hare, John Hibberdine and Peter Kemp, who had worked in Albania in 1943-44. Abas
Kupi and Gani Bey Kryeziu's brother Said were among the exiled leaders to whom
MI6 and the CIA turned for support, as was Midhat Frasheri, wartime leader of the
Balli Kombetar. But the ambitious plans of 1940-41, laid in desperate times by under-
resourced organisations effectively blind to wider strategic and diplomatic concerns,
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never received the full go-ahead. By contrast, the later enterprise was sanctioned at the
highest levels and, when finally abandoned in 1953, had proved a complete and costly
failure. A majority, perhaps, of those infiltrated were killed or caught and executed; in
waves of reprisals and show trials, the regime added to the toll by imprisoning or
killing hundreds of locals. Agents that survived and made their way out told of
ambushes, informers and fierce security, of locals everywhere being too afraid to offer
help or even shelter. Hoxha survived with relative ease. He died of natural causes in
1985, still at the head of his country.
From The Great Betrayal, Nicholas Bethell's 1984 account of the 1949-53
operation, and certain contemporary records it is evident that Julian Amery lobbied
hard in the late 1940s for the decision to move against communist Albania.5 In a letter
to The Times in December 1948, for example, Amery asserted that the Albanian
people 'are seething with discontent against their Communist masters, and it would
not be difficult to raise a formidable rebellion among them'.6 The following month, in
an article in the London journal Time and Tide, he claimed that 'in the face of a
popular revolt the [present] regime [in Albania] would be hard put to defend itself.
And a key obstacle Bethell seeks to overcome is in finding a means of reconciling the
disasters that overtook the enterprise to the confidence and apparently expert
knowledge of men like Amery. For Bethell, who, when preparing his book, drew
heavily on personal contributions from Amery, McLean and Smiley, these three 'were
the... key figures of British involvement in [wartime] Albania'. Adding Alan Hare to
their number, Bethell is convinced of their enthusiasm for the task at hand in 1949.
'The four musketeers were back in action' he writes. 'They had fought the Germans
together, after which they had all been unceremoniously bundled out ofAlbania on the
orders ofmen whose judgement and loyalty they nursed deep doubts, leaving a people
they had come to admire in the hands of vicious dictators... They were delighted to be
given the chance to resume the fray'. The main explanation Bethell puts forward for
the failure of the enterprise is the alleged treachery of Kim Philby, whom he accuses
of passing word of the plans to Moscow. Philby, he writes, 'gave the communists a
crucial advantage' by alerting them to what was afoot.7
No evidence has yet arisen to confirm the nature or extent of Philby's betrayal
of the plans. But while most records of the 1949-53 enterprise remain classified,
SOE's records are now open to public inspection. And the latter certainly suggest that,
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if it was to succeed, an operation to harness the support of local nationalist
communities had to be a major undertaking, with substantial and overt Western
backing and the promise of rapid and easily attainable rewards for any locals prepared
to take part.
Plenty of reports in SOE's files, many made by officers with months of
experience of working with nationalists in central and northern Albania, argue
convincingly that the very bases of nationalist society precluded the likelihood of any
large-scale or united rising. These reports all testify to the lack of patriotic feeling, the
insular and parochial interests and the vulnerability to reprisals of wartime nationalist
communities, presenting them as factors that bred disunity and an over-riding desire to
seek salvation from danger. To understand this, stressed George Seymour, for
example, in the summer of 1944, it was necessary to understand the 'natural
independence of mountain chieftans' and the 'great rivalry and mistrust' that could
exist between them. And to understand that, he went on, 'it must be appreciated that
the northern and central districts of Albania are entirely feudal':
Villages and clans follow their own chief blindly. His political
views are their political views and his enemies their enemies. They
will however only follow the chieftan whilst he remains strong
enough to retain his position. If he is usurped they will follow the
new leader just as blindly. Blood feuds also are rife which prevents
this part of the country being welded into a coherent whole.
Seymour illustrated his analysis by pointing out that, when the Partisans invaded the
mountainous nationalist heartlands of Mati and Mirdite that summer, many locals,
appreciating that 'the chieftans were not strong enough to protect them... joined the
Partisans'.8
Other SOE officers, when explaining why nationalists were unwilling to come
out to fight the Germans, drew similar conclusions. 'Everyone in North Albania,
chiefs as well as peasants, identifies the interests of Albania with his own personal
interests' reported Richard Riddell and Reginald Hibbert in late 1944. Both officers
had spent nearly a year working with both nationalists and Partisans in north and
central Albania.
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The peasants will follow a chief who is successful, or who has
powerful support which promises a success... At no time would
they have followed any chief who made open war on Italians and
Germans, and so brought upon his area the destruction and burning
which has fallen on South Albania. Only Gani Kryeziu has made
open war on the Germans, and he is enabled to do so only by the
peculiar conditions of the Kosovo frontier area. If a chief wished to
oppose the invader, he needed the support of a far larger
organisation than his own immediate following. Without such
support he would have been utterly destroyed...
'Throughout the whole "Nationalist" Movement there has been no organisation of any
sort' the two officers added. 'Trying to work with them is always infuriating, as
though they promise good intentions and results, they will immediately afterwards
produce evidence and arguments for the impossibility of carrying on with the job...
[A]ll "Nationalists"... think only of their own interests. "Nationalist" is a complete
misnomer, as they have no feeling for their country at all'.9
The belief, in 1949, that a handful of young exiles, infiltrated to contact
nationalist communities no less isolated or vulnerable than in 1939-44 and whose
principal leaders had fled or were dead or in prison, could successfully encourage
significant resistance, may have been a critical misjudgment. According to Bethell,
Britons involved in planning to overthrow Hoxha claim, in their defence, that 'they
could not [have] anticipate[d] that police control over the local people would be so
tight and effective under communism, far more so than under Nazi occupation'.10
During the war, however, even Amery had identified precisely how optimistic was the
expectation that traditional Albanian society was willing and able to put up resistance.
In May and June 1944, for example, he and Billy McLean had taken pains to point out
that the nationalists were only suited to a last minute rising as the Germans withdrew,
which would accord them a good chance of avoiding reprisals.
Reports filed by Alan Hare, Bethell's fourth 'musketeer', confirm that he, too,
was distinctly unimpressed by the nationalists' capacity for fighting either the
Germans or the Partisans, and convinced that the latter were firmly in the ascendant
politically. By the time of his evacuation from Albania that summer, Hare had spent
many months working with both Partisans and Zogists. In a long debriefing report
written in Bari that autumn, he expressed his view that, once the Partisans had
survived the winter, 'Kupi and his movement were doomed to defeat and extinction
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whatever action he had taken'. The 'very nature' of Kupi's organisation, Hare
considered, 'made it incapable of fighting the Germans over a long period due to its
inability to stand up to reverses and reprisals, except possibly with enormous
monetary and political support from us'. Hare also believed that Britain now ought to
face the reality of what was happening in Albania: 'it is obvious that in the present
Balkan political situation, the chances of exerting political influence over Albania by
peaceful methods in the next twenty years are slender' he concluded. '[B]ut one thing
is certain... [I]f we persist in identifying ourselves with a system in Albania which is
no longer even an issue... any chances of British influence are non-existent for forty
years'.11
Probably, by 1949, Hoxha's regime was indeed hated by large sections of the
population. But he and his regime were feared, too, and their grip on the country was
unlikely to have been loosened very much by the same conditions that had forced
nationalist society into inactivity and collaboration just a few short years before.
A case might be made for arguing that, during the war, some British observers
of events in Albania had little sympathy for, and understanding of, the factors that
compelled non- and anticommunist groups to refrain from fighting the Germans.
Certainly Margaret Hasluck believed that to be the case during the winter of 1943-44;
Amery and McLean felt the same during the summer and autumn of 1944 and,
seemingly, for a long time afterwards. And contemporary records do suggest that a
number of SOE officers, both at Headquarters and in the field, had little time for the
plight in which many nationalists found themselves. In June 1944, for example, Eliot
Watrous, echoing sentiments expressed recently by Norman Wheeler, stressed in a
letter to SOE London that nationalists like Abas Kupi were aiding the enemy merely
by their neutrality. 'This war', he wrote, 'appears to have reached the stage when a
neutral attitude, of assistance to the enemy, can no longer be tolerated; vide Turkey,
Spain, Sweden. It is this attitude of Kupi's which the Partisans so strongly condemn,
19 •
alleging that by it he is prolonging the war'. Of course, as Watrous implied, an
alternative route was open to Kupi: fighting the Germans in the way SOE demanded.
This was the route taken by Gani Bey Kryeziu, the Kosovar leader, in the summer of
1944. But it is difficult to dispute McLean and Amery's analysis that nationalist
society was not suited to large-scale, sustained action against the Germans, and that
the nationalists perceived the Partisans to pose the most serious and immediate threat
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to the survival of that society. And given the dominance of the Albanian and Yugoslav
Partisans by the end of 1944, it is hard to believe that, had Kupi and other nationalists
joined Gani and fought, the outcome of events in Albania and Kosovo and the fate of
those nationalists would have been very different.
In the event, by deciding to ensure their survival by keeping in with the
various collaborating factions, nationalists like Kupi excluded themselves from any
serious claim to British support. As David Talbot-Rice of SOE London remarked to
Eddie Boxshall in August 1944, 'if Kupi was really anti-German, he should have been
able to find a way out. And if not really anti-German, why should we back him,
except for reasons of internal politics?' Boxshall replied: 'Is it not an example of the
eternal discrepancy between long and short-term policies? Judged by the standards of
1 3the latter I entirely agree with you'. ' With a clearer picture today of the grounds on
which British policy in wartime Albania developed, however, it may be suggested
that, even had more sympathy been felt for the nationalists' plight, a longer-term
policy would not have emerged. A short-term desire to inconvenience Britain's
enemies had seen MI(R) and Section D instructed to involve themselves in Albania in
1940. It had then seen SOE officers return to the country in 1943. And it continued to
guide SOE's efforts in Albania until the end of the war despite the fact that, by 1944,
Britain had found itself backing a new and revolutionary movement, several of whose
leaders had their eyes fixed firmly on securing post-occupation power. Policy-makers
were not blind to the possibility that the success of that movement might see a
communist regime take power in Albania once the war was won. But any political
commitment to Albania or its people, argued the Foreign Office and Chiefs of Staff,
especially after Kosovo's incorporation into Albania in 1941, risked upsetting
Britain's wider strategy and diplomatic interests. Those policy-makers therefore
proved reluctant to recognise any kind of Albanian government-in-exile, pronounce
on Albania's borders or otherwise intervene in any other matter that might embroil
Britain in Albanian politics and undermine more important relations with Greece and
Yugoslavia. Beyond mild indications of interest in limiting civil conflict and the
growth of communism, no evidence is available to suggest that the Foreign Office or
the Chiefs would have adopted a policy in Albania that discriminated against the
Partisans' politics. A better understanding of the strength of the nationalist desire to
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stay neutral might, if anything, have seen those authorities agree to all-out support for
the Partisans at an earlier date.
Until the spring of 1944, the situation in Albania was too confused to justify
all-out support for the Partisans. But, by June, senior SOE officers in Bari (Bill
Harcourt), in the field (Philip Leake, Alan Palmer, Norman Wheeler; even Billy
McLean) and in London (Colin Gubbins, David Keswick, David Talbot-Rice) were all
agreed that the Partisans were now the only Albanians capable of inflicting substantial
damage on the Germans. The Chiefs of Staff in London and General Wilson and Air-
Vice Marshall Elliot in Italy shared that view and never ceased to support SOE's
continued contact and efforts with Hoxha's movement. These key decision-makers
were also aware that the longer SOE maintained a mission with Kupi, the more
irritated became the Partisans and the tenser Britain's working relationship with them.
But, as the picture began to clear, matters remained complicated by a vain belief
entertained by a few British diplomats in London that Kupi might finally fight the
Germans and thereby reach some form of modus vivendi with the Partisans. A
reconciliation, the Foreign Office hoped, would maximise resistance and save Albania
from a total descent into civil war; possibly, it might also save the country from
communism. Only in September did the Foreign Office in London accept that Kupi
was not going to fight and that it was time to permit SOE to withdraw McLean's
mission.
Frustration with London may well explain why Eliot Watrous seems to have
attempted to influence, by questionable means, the picture available to observers there
during the summer of 1944. SOE officers both in Bari and in the field knew that
McLean's mission considered itself to be well connected in London. They also knew
that McLean and other officers urged greater sympathy and support, on political
grounds, for the nationalists. But very few appear to have shared McLean's
confidence in his ability to bring the Partisans and Kupi back together. Even McLean,
after spending a few days with Kupi that spring, realised that his mission's chances of
effecting a reconciliation were slim. McLean suggested subsequently that, by arming
nationalists like Kupi, Britain might be able to counter-balance the Partisans and
thereby diminish the communist threat. But, again, few observers appear to have
believed by then that SOE would achieve very much by sharing the nationalists' pre¬
occupation with the Partisans' politics. Such a policy, as Leake, Harcourt, Palmer and
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others argued at the time, would have diminished the Albanian war effort and
undermined the fragile working relationship SOE had worked hard to build with
Hoxha. These officers' concerns, and a conviction that support for such political
intervention should not be forthcoming from London, were shared by many, from the
Chiefs of Staff down. It is less certain, of course, whether anyone would have shared
Watrous' apparent readiness to prevent that intervention by suppressing, albeit
temporarily, impassioned reports from Albania that spoke well ofKupi.
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